Allegations of United States support for the Khmer Rouge
There are allegations that the United States of America supported the Khmer Rouge during the Cambodian–Vietnamese War to weaken the influence of Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia.
Background
The Khmer Rouge orchestrated the Cambodian genocide, which between 1975 and 1979 killed nearly 25% of Cambodia's population. The support of North Vietnam, in conjunction with China, was essential to the triumph of the KR in the Cambodian civil war.[1] During the genocide, China was the main international patron of the KR, supplying more than 15,000 military advisers and most of their external aid.[2] Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978 and established a puppet regime led by Khmer Rouge defectors.[3] As a result of Chinese and Western opposition to the Vietnamese invasion, the KR retained Cambodia's UN seat until 1982.[4] China hosted KR military training camps from 1979 until at least 1986, stationed military advisers with KR troops until as late as 1990, and supplied at least $1 billion in military aid during the 1980s.[4][5] After the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, Thailand continued to allow KR guerillas to trade and move across the Thai border, although criticism from the U.S. and Australia caused it to disavow passing any direct military support.[6]
Allegations
According to Michael Haas, despite publicly condemning the Khmer Rouge, the U.S. offered military support to the organization and was instrumental in preventing UN recognition of the Vietnam-aligned government.[7] Haas argued that the U.S. and China responded to efforts from the Association of South East Asian Nations for disarming the Khmer Rouge by ensuring the Khmer Rouge stayed armed. U.S. efforts for merging Khmer Rouge with allied factions resulted in the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. After 1982, the U.S. increased its covert aid to the Cambodian resistance from $4 to $10 million.[8]
By contrast, Nate Thayer recounted that "The United States has scrupulously avoided any direct involvement in aiding the Khmer Rouge", instead providing non-lethal aid to non-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Armee Nationale Sihanouk (ANS) insurgents, which rarely cooperated with the Khmer Rouge on the battlefield despite being coalition partners and fought with the Khmer Rouge dozens of times prior to 1987. According to Thayer, "In months spent in areas controlled by the three resistance groups and during scores of encounters with the Khmer Rouge ... I never once encountered aid given to the [non-communist resistance] in use by or in possession of the Khmer Rouge."[9]
According to Joel Brinkley, although U.S. policy was to provide support to "15,000 ineffective 'noncommunist' rebel fighters", "charges made the rounds" that "some of the American aid ... was finding its way to the Khmer Rouge." A subsequent State Department investigation "found some leakage" in the form of "sharing of ammunition, joint defense of a bridge, and using one truck to transport both 'noncommunist' and Khmer Rouge fighters".[10]
References
Notes
- ↑ SarDesai 1998, p. 124.
- ↑ Roett 2008, p. 193.
- ↑ Brinkley 2011, pp. 53, 55–56.
- 1 2 PoKempner 1995, p. 106.
- ↑ Brinkley 2011, p. 60.
- ↑ PoKempner 1995, pp. 107–108.
- ↑ Haas 1991, pp. 17, 28–29.
- ↑ Haas 1991, p. 18.
- ↑ Thayer 1991, pp. 180, 187–189.
- ↑ Brinkley 2011, pp. 56, 60.
Bibliography
- Brinkley, Joel (2011). Cambodia's Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land. Public Affairs. ISBN 978-1-610-39001-9.
- Haas, Michael (1991). Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: The Faustian Pact. ABC-CLIO.
- PoKempner, Dinah (1995). Cambodia at War. Human Rights Watch. ISBN 978-1-564-32150-3.
- Roett, Riordan (2008). China's Expansion Into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-815-77554-6.
- SarDesai, D. R. (1998). Vietnam, Past and Present. Westview. ISBN 978-0-813-34308-2.
- Thayer, Nate (1991). "Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace". The Washington Quarterly 14 (2): 179–191. doi:10.1080/01636609109477687.