B-Dienst

The B-Dienst (German:Beobachtungsdienst, English:observation service), also called xB-Dienst, X-B-Dienst and χB-Dienst [1] was a Department of the Naval Intelligence Service (German:Marinenachrichtendienst) (MND III) of the OKM, that dealt with the interception and recording, decoding and analysis of the enemy, in particular British radio communications before and during World War II.[2] B-Dienst dealt with the cryptanalysis and de-ciphering of enemy and neutral states message traffic and security control of Kriegsmarine key processes and machinery.

"The ultimate goal of all evaluation was recognizing the opponents goal by pro-active identification of data." [3]

B-Dienst was instrumental in molding Wehrmacht forces operations during the Battles of Norway and France in the spring of 1940, primarily due to the cryptanalysis successes it had achieved against early and less secure British Naval Cyphers.

B-Dienst broke British Naval Cypher No. 3 in December 1941, which was used for all Allied North Atlantic convoy messages,[4] providing intelligence for the Battle of the Atlantic, until the British Admiralty introduced Naval Cypher No. 5 on 10 June 1943.

Background

The B-Dienst unit began as the German Radio Monitoring Service, or educational and news analysis service (German: Funkhorchdienst/Horchdienst) by the end of World War One, in 1918.[5] as part of the navy of the German Empire.

As a counterpart to the B service, in the British side, was the Y-service or 'Y Service. The Y was onomatopoeic for the initial syllable of the word wireless, similar to the B initial for German service.

Little was known outside about the internal organization and workings of the B-Dienst section. After the armistice of Italy (Armistice of Cassibile), officers of the Italian naval communications intelligence (SIM) (Italian: Servizio Informazioni Militari) in conversation with the allies, informed them that even though they had worked in close collaboration with B-Dienst, they had little understanding of the workings or internal structure of B-Dienst. [6]

Key personnel

Kapitänleutnant Heinz Bonatz, (Born: 18 August 1897) in Witzenhausen [7] was Chief of German Naval Radio Intelligence, head of Group III (Radio Intelligence, Interception, Traffic Analysis, Cryptanalysis) of 4 SKL of OKM (German: Marinenachrichtendienst, English: Marine Communications), which was responsible for cryptanalysis of enemy signals. An energetic man, he joined B-Dienst in [8]

The most important individual at B-Dienst was former radio man [9] and energetic cryptologist Oberregierungsrat (English:Senior Civil Service Councillor) Wilhelm Tranow, head of the English language crypt analysts.[10] The American military historian of cryptography David Kahn stated:

If one man in German intelligence ever held the keys to victory in World War II, it was Wilhelm Tranow.[11]

Wilhelm Tranow was in charge of section IIIF of group III of 4 SKL of OKM, which was the English desk and was responsible for the interception of enemy radio communications, the evaluation of those enemy crypts, and the deciphering of enemy crypts specifically in relation. The organization of the German radio security processes was also another important responsibility.

Organization

Disintegration

The bombing of Berlin in 1943 destroyed large parts of B-Dienst records, forcing them to move to the town of Eberswalde, located about 50km northeast of Berlin. [12] Forced again to move in the spring of 1945, due to the Russian advance, they first moved to Aurich, a town in Lower Saxony, then to the Intercept Station at Neumünster and finally moved to the Signals School at Flensburg. TICOM located them on the 17th May 1945.

Operations

Linguistic Output

The output of B-Dienst was a weekly bulletin, similar to the OKW/CHI 'Reliable Reports'(German:Verlässliche Nachrichten).[13]

Little was known about these, until a bulletin, dated 23 June 1944, was captured in Italy in September 1944.[13] The information was known to be correlated, highly cogent, carefully organized with a fixed form.[13] 25 copies were thought to be made, with 22 copies distributed, and 3 held for archive purposes. The distribution list was considerable bigger than was customary for the US Bulletin distribution.

The distribution list.[14]

  • Staff of Naval Group Command West (located at Paris and in charge of naval surface units based on Biscay and Channel ports as well as coastal defense and Channel convoys).
  • Task group Tirpitz and 4th Destroyer Flotilla in northern Norway
  • Admiral Northern Waters at Narvik in Norway
  • Naval Liaison with Werhmacht Field Headquarters
  • German Naval Command Italy
  • 10th Flieger Corps via Air Fleet 3 (West Europe)
  • German Air Force Lofoten (Luftwaffe responsible for reconnaissance on Arctic convoys for Russia)
  • Small Battle Units Command (set up early in 1944, in charge of midget submarines, explosive motor boats, special commandos for mining and sabotage)
  • 6 copies to Chief of SKL, 1 SKL section, 2 SKL/Commander of the submarines (German:Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote) BdU operations etc.)
  • 4 copies to intelligence - 3 SKL
  • 1 copy to radar and electronics research - 5 SKL
  • 3 copies within 4 SKL itself including one to the division head.

Two grades of intelligence were produced according to their source:

The captured bulletin contained both B and X-B with XB information being framed in black boxes on the page. To avoid uncertainty to arise in the interpretation of the information presented in the bulletin, a reliability scale was included, with reliability indicated by the category words probably or approximately and presume.[14]

Dissemination to U-Boats at Sea

Considerable effort was undertaken to ensure U-Boats on operational duty were kept informed of any intelligence which would have made their task easier, i.e. sinking allied shipping. [15] Hundreds of messages were passed for offensive war capability describing allied convoy movements, and neutral country shipping movements. For defensive war capability included not only the number and disposition of both surface and air anti-submarine units, but also tactics, armament, and anti-submarine location devices (Anti-submarine warfare). [15] In addition, files were kept on board, that were updated periodically by radio transmissions. From a German Naval viewpoint, radio transmission was critical to disseminate any intelligence and indeed any scrap of information that could be gathered on allied defenses. [15]

..the reader of U-boat traffic was supplied with a surprisingly large background for judging German anxieties, suspicions, fears, and misconceptions, together with plans and hopes, or expedients, for counter action.

Intelligence Dissemination Per Period

During the winter offensive of 1942-1943 (Winter Offensive), intelligence was always concerning convoys with particular emphasis on US-UK lanes. [16] During 1943, when U-boat operations moved to a defensive Battle of the Atlantic Campaign Climax, a distinct type of message began to be exchanged, which eventually became commonplace, i.e. Allied contact and attack reports. Defense situations reports, [17] became remarkable for their length and new editions. Reports of distant areas, like the Caribbean became more common. By Winter 1943-44, and the resumption of an offensive war against Allied convoys (Battle of Atlantic Final Years) brought back convoy messages. With the difficulties of finding convoys to attack, and with the Allies now reading all communications that the Kriegsmarine sent, concurrently, with daily allied operations, new types of intelligence messages including direction finding (Direction finding) on positions of Allied units and special reports from intercept parties aboard U-boats became more prominent. Particular concerns included Allied location devices, the positions of U.S. Navy Escort carrier groups (In an attempt to ensure U-boars surface safely). Attempts were made to evaluate new kinds of underwater sounds, particularity related to ASDIC, search buoys and countering devices for acoustic torpedo. [16]

Training

Interception station MPA Flanders (German: Marinepersonalamt), which was located in the Castle of Saint Andries, Bruges, was used to train the radio and cryptographic operators of German submarine U-664 [18]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Friedrich L. Bauer (2000-01-01). Entzifferte Geheimnisse, Methoden und Maximen der Kryptographie 3rd. edition. Berlin: Springer. p. 449. ISBN 3-540-67931-6.
  2. ↑ Heinz Bonatz (1981-01-01). Seekrieg im Äther. Die Leistungen der Marine-Funkaufklärung 1939-194. Herford: Springer. p. 56. ISBN 3-8132-0120-1.
  3. ↑ Heinz Bonatz, 1981 p.56
  4. ↑ B-Dienst-vs-bletchley-park-invasion-of.html "B-Dienst vs Bletchley Park - The invasion of Norway and the Battle of the Atlantic". Christos Military and Intelligence Corner. Retrieved 2015-05-16.
  5. ↑ Christopher PHD, Sterling H., ed. (2007-11-16). Military Communications: From Ancient Times to the 21st Century. ABC-CLIO.
  6. ↑ Pitz, John (2016-03-03). "Volume III German Naval Communications Intelligence, Chapter 1, Section 3-b2". ibiblio. HyperWar Foundation publishing National Security Agency, Central Security Service. Retrieved 2016-04-11.
  7. ↑ "Leaders Of The Reich". www.leaders-reich.co.uk. Leaders Of The Reich. Retrieved 2015-06-21.
  8. ↑ "German Naval Communications Intelligence". www.ibiblio.org. ibiblio.org/hyperwar. Retrieved 2015-06-21.
  9. ↑ "B-Dienst (Navy)". www.ticomarchive.com. TICOM Archive. Retrieved 2015-06-15.
  10. ↑ David Kahn.... (2001-01-01). The Journal of Intelligence History Vol 1, No. 1. Hamburg, London: Lit Verlag & (Transaction publishers). p. 12.
  11. ↑ David Kahn (2012-01-01). Seizing the Enigma - The Race to Break the German U-Boat codes 1939-1943. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. p. 246. ISBN 978-1-59114-807-4.
  12. ↑ Rezabek, Randy. "B-Dienst (Navy)". TICOM Archive Secret Intelligence in Nazi Germany. TICOM. Retrieved 2016-04-27.
  13. 1 2 3 Pitz, John (2016-03-03). "Volume III German Naval Communications Intelligence, Chapter 1, Section 4". ibiblio. HyperWar Foundation publishing National Security Agency, Central Security Service. Retrieved 2016-03-03.
  14. 1 2 Pitz, John (2016-03-03). "Volume III German Naval Communications Intelligence, Chapter 1, Section 4a". ibiblio. HyperWar Foundation publishing National Security Agency, Central Security Service. Retrieved 2016-03-03.
  15. 1 2 3 Pitz, John (2016-03-03). "Volume III German Naval Communications Intelligence, Chapter 2, Section 1". ibiblio. HyperWar Foundation publishing National Security Agency, Central Security Service. Retrieved 2016-05-02.
  16. 1 2 Pitz, John (2016-03-03). "Volume III German Naval Communications Intelligence, Chapter 2, Section 2". ibiblio. HyperWar Foundation publishing National Security Agency, Central Security Service. Retrieved 2016-05-02.
  17. ↑ Hovdet, Håvard (1945-04-29). "O.K.M. - 1.SKL Daily Situation Report". uboatarchive.net. U-boat Archive. Retrieved 2016-05-03.
  18. ↑ Pitz, John (2016-03-03). "Volume III German Naval Communications Intelligence, Chapter 1, Section3b". ibiblio. HyperWar Foundation publishing National Security Agency, Central Security Service. Retrieved 2016-03-03.

Further reading

  • Heinz Bonatz: Seekrieg im Äther. Die Leistungen der Marine-Funkaufklärung 1939-1945. Mittler: Herford 1981. ISBN 3-8132-0120-1
  • Merchant Navy wireless signal codes
  • Jak P. Mallmann-Showell (2003). German Naval Codebreakers. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-7110-2888-5. 
  • Winterbotham, F.W. (2000) [1974]. The ULTRA Secret. Orion Books Ltd. pp. 84–85. ISBN 0-7528-3751-6. 
  • David Kahn (1996) [1967]. The Codebreakers. Scribner. pp. 435–477. ISBN 0-684-83130-9. 
  • Merchant Navy codes A good summary
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