Barro Blanco Dam

Barro Blanco Dam

Computer rendition of the dam
Location of Barro Blanco Dam in Panama
Location Chiriqui Province, Panama
Coordinates 8°12.861′N 81°35.653′W / 8.214350°N 81.594217°W / 8.214350; -81.594217Coordinates: 8°12.861′N 81°35.653′W / 8.214350°N 81.594217°W / 8.214350; -81.594217
Owner(s) GENISA S.A.
Dam and spillways
Type of dam Gravity, roller compacted concrete
Height 44.91 m (147.3 ft)
Height (foundation) 61.09 m (200.4 ft)
Reservoir
Surface area 2.58 km2 (1.00 sq mi)
Normal elevation 103 m (338 ft)
Power station
Hydraulic head 42.94 m (140.9 ft)
Turbines 1 x 1.98 MW Francis-type, 2 x 13.14 MW Kaplan-type
Installed capacity 28.56 MW
Annual generation 124.83 GWh Est.[1]
Website
http://www.genisa.com.pa/en/barro-blanco/

Barro Blanco is a gravity dam currently under construction on the Tabasara River in the Chiriqui Province of Panama. As of 2015, the project is under construction and is 95 percent completed. Although the government had authorized the dam, after protests against the dam the government suspended construction in February 2015. The President of the Republic authorized the partial restart of the construction project on August 2015, but prohibited the filling of the reservoir pending a final agreement.[2] Important issues concerning the dam are controversial, such as the question whether the indigenous communities in the area initially had expressed their support or their opposition to the dam's construction and how well they had been informed about the project and its impacts prior to expressing their views.

Technical features

The engineering design was concibed to have the less impact on the river and will be no dry section of the river. The roller-compacted concrete gravity dam is to have a maximum height of 44.91 m (147.3 ft) and a maximum reservoir surface of 2.58 km2 (1.00 sq mi), including .69 km2 (0.27 sq mi) currently occupied by the Tabasara River and 1.89 km2 (0.73 sq mi) that would be inundated, according to the project design document submitted to the UN Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board.[3] The reservoir of the dam would reach into the indigenous territory in five hectares, however not floading any house or structure at all. (Comarca) of the Ngöbe–Buglé people, where 0.07 km2 (0.027 sq mi) of the inundated land would be located. The installed capacity of the planned hydropower plant is 28.84 Megawatt.

Ownership and financing

The project developer is Generadora del Istmo S. A. (GENISA), a Panamanian special purpose company created specifically for this project. GENISA is owned by the Kafie family: the public registry lists Luis Kafie (President), Luis Jose Kafie (Treasurer and Director), Shukri Kafie (Director), Eduardo Kafie (Director), Eduardo Kafie Atala (Director) and Christoper Kafie (Director) as member of the board of GENISA. In June 2015 Shukri Kafie was arrested in Honduras on suspicion of having participated in the embezzlement of US$60 million from the state of Honduras. The United States has stripped him of his visa. Shukri Kafie denies any part in the current corruption scandal.[4]

The project is financed by loans that have been provided by two European state-owned banks that promote private sector investments in developing countries, the German Investment Corporation (DEG) and the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO),[5] as well as by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). CABEI approved a USD 25 million loan to the project developer in 2011. Total funding from the three banks amounts to USD 78.3 million.[6]

Context of the conflict

There is a long-standing conflict between the Ngöbe people and the government concerning mining and the construction of dams for hydropower generation in or near their territory.[7] There are 30 planned hydropower plants in Panama with a total installed capacity of 1,804 MW, more than 30 times the capacity of Barro Blanco.[5] The Changuinola Dam in the neighboring province of Bocas del Toro was completed in 2011 and resulted in numerous Ngöbe villages being flooded, with plenty compensation provided, although many of them still do not agree, according to affected people interviewed for a documentary by Aljazeera.[8] The Changuinola Dam with an installed capacity of 223 Megawatt, developed by the US energy giant AES, is much larger than the Barro Blanco Dam.[9] Another large dam, Tabarasá I, is planned further downstream on the Tabarasá River.[8]

Environmental and social impact

According to GENISA, no indigenous village or houses will be inundated by the reservoir and no one will be resettled. However 5 hectares of stream bed will be flooded during the rainy season. The land to be inundated consists of ravines close to the river that are not suitable for agriculture or livestock grazing.[10] However, critics allege that more than half a dozen townships will be flooded. They imply that the livelihoods of some 5000 Ngöbe farmers who rely on the river for potable water, agriculture and fishing will be negatively impacted,[11] and primary forest would be cut down. They also say that the impacted communities have never provided their free, prior and informed consent to the project.[4]

Furthermore, they say that the habitat of the endangered Tabasará rain frog would be destroyed.[12] GENISA says that the Tabasará rain frog lives in several habitats in Panama, including in the Anton Valley hundreds of kilometers away from the site.[10]

Chronology

Concession award and environmental impact study (2006-2008)

In 2006, under the government of President Martín Torrijos, an international public tender was announced for various hydropower projects in Panama, including Barro Blanco. Among the four participating companies GENISA was selected. The Public Services Authority ASEP authorized GENISA to prepare studies and, subject to obtaining all relevant approvals, to develop the Barro Blanco project.

GENISA commissioned an Environmental Impact Study. As part of this study, in August 2007 in a public forum with the participation of local authorities, villagers close to the project were asked about their view of the dam. At the time, the indigenous M-10 Movement rejected the dam, because it considered indigenous people would lose their land, would not be able to use the river any more and because the environment would be harmed. However, most of the consulted people supported the project, because it would provide jobs, better road access and improved living standards. Some of those who were opposed to the project subsequently sold their land to the project developer.[3] In December 2007, GENISA and representatives of the Ngobe Bugle people signed a cooperation agreement that included safeguards for the fundamental rights of the indigenous people.[13]

In May 2008 the Panamanian Environmental Authority ANAM approved the project based on the study.[14] In December 2008 GENISA signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which it committed itself to implement a social development plan for the indigenous communities living next to the dam, including "infrastructure, health and education programs" during the construction and during the operation of the dam.[15]

In January 2009 a validation team consisting of the consulting firm AENOR working for the UN CDM Executive Board visited the area and confirmed "that the most relevant communities involved in the area of the project were consulted, all of them supported the project activity, and project participant (i.e. GENISA) has forecasted several social compensation measurements for the communities involved."[13] The International Rivers Network says that the validation report by AENOR was flawed, since allegedly only the non-indigenous population had been consulted and they had failed to take into account all comments received.[16] In 2009 the concession contract between the government and GENISA was signed.[14]

Increase of capacity and controversy about impact study (2009-2010)

After presidential elections in early 2009, in June 2009 Ricardo Martinelli, a businessman who promised to quickly upgrade Panama's infrastructure, took office as President of Panama. In May 2009 GENISA requested a modification of the permit to increase the capacity by 52% to 28.8 Megawatt by moving the turbines to a lower elevation, without increasing the water level in the reservoir. The original environmental study and the permit referred to an installed capacity of only 19 Megawatt. In January 2010 ANAM approved the modification, and in January 2011 the concession contract was modified accordingly.[14] As of 2010, according to the UN CDM project document, 98% of the land to be inundated was owned by GENISA.[3]

According to critics, the environmental impact study was flawed, because impacts on biodiversity were assessed superficially and because the capacity of the plant was increased.[5] In late 2010 the European Investment Bank withdrew funding for the dam after an investigation into human rights abuses prompted by NGO protests.[16] In January 2011 DEG and FMO approved their loans for the project.

Indigenous approval despite conflict about mining (2011)

In February 2011, the Panamanian government proposed a new mining law that would facilitate the development of mining projects in indigenous areas, while the indigenous people had asked for a law banning mining in their territories. The proposal and the simultaneous launching of bids for a large copper mining project called Cerro Colorado triggered protests of indigenous people, including local communities from the Barro Blanco area, who blocked the Interamerican Highway for four days. The protests were violently suppressed. The conflict was temporarily ended through the San Felix agreement, signed in the village of San Felix.[7] Construction of the dam began in February 2011.

On June 25, 2011, according to the project developer GENISA, the regional congress of the Kädriri, the local group of Ngäbe people, approved by public majority voting that the construction of the dam should continue, after having been authorized to take a decision by the General Congress of the Ngäbe-Buglé.[17] Also in June 2011 the UN Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Board approved the carbon finance proposal that was to generate part of the revenue stream for the project.[5] On August 25, 2011, a Compensation and Benefits Agreement was signed between GENISA and the Board of the Regional Congress of the Kädriri.[15]

International campaign and UN inspection (2012-13)

However, the conflict remained unresolved. The government called for a referendum on the dam, but the indigenous leader Silvia Carrera, elected as Cacica General in September 2011, initially rejected it.[7] An international campaign was started to stop construction of the dam and international funding for it. In March 2012 Parliament passed a modified version of the mining law that prohibited mining in the indigenous territory and required the approval of the Ngöbe Buglé General Congress for any future hydroelectric projects.[18] However, the traditional authorities of the Ngöbe criticized Silvia Carrera for having given in. They had asked for a complete ban on hydropower projects to be included in the law.[19]

Construction had to be halted in May 2012, because the local population occupied the site. The protests were suspended while "UN inspectors" were expected to visit the area.[20] In September 2012 an inspection team led by UNDP and consisting of representatives of the Catholic Church, the environmental agency ANAM, the electricity regulatory agency ASEP and the project developer GENISA, visited the area. The purpose of the inspection was to verify on the ground issues that had not been answered satisfactorily in the environmental impact assessment. The inspection team presented its report in December 2012, recommending a water flow simulation to understand the impact of sudden floods as well as a participatory rural appraisal.[21] In March 2013 an indigenous protester against the dam was killed by masked assailants.[22]

In July 2013, James Anaya, UN special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous people visited Panama and spoke to the Ngöbe. In his report he concluded that the Ngöbe "were not properly consulted".[23] Prior to the visit 12 local and international civil society organizations Anaya to conduct a formal investigation into the human rights impacts dam and to call on the government to "immediately halt the dam’s construction until the threats to the rights of the indigenous Ngӓbe people affected by the project have been fully addressed".[24]

On September 6, 2013, the United Nations released three reports on the water flow simulation, a participatory rural appraisal as well as an ecological and economic analysis conducted by two independent international experts, Gonzalo Castro de la Mata and Luis Lopez, showing that the impacts of the dam had no impact on global biodiversity, but had "real and important impacts" on the indigenous populations living in the area. However, the report did not mention that any villages would be inundated. Furthermore, the experts concluded that "the local population had not been correctly consulted". They also concluded that the local population had "a rudimentary and often erroneous knowledge of the project, being a product of rumors, often without foundation". Together with the insufficient consultation this had created a climate of fear.[25]

Complaints and suspension of works (2014-2016)

In April 2014 Silvia Carrera, the Cacica General of the Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé, submitted a complaint to the Independent External Panels of DEG and FMO. In May 2015 the joint review of the panels found that the banks had failed to fully comply with the standards to which they had committed themselves. While the banks took significant steps to understand the situation as part of their due diligence process, they accepted an indigenous peoples report that was insufficient for the purpose to approve the credit in January 2011, requiring further investigations as a condition for disbursement, while their own standards would have required a fully satisfactory report at the time of approval. The two banks accepted the conclusions and committed themselvees to "further raise the bar on the required level of information on stakeholder consultation available to (them) at the time of credit approval."[26] In the meantime, the government of Panama - since June 2014 led by a new President, Juan Carlos Varela - suspended the construction of the dam in February 2015 on the grounds that the environmental and social impact assessment was faulty pending the outcome of a court case that challenges the assessment.[27] In June 2015 new protests erupted, with protesters shutting down the Interamerican Highway for two days, as a result of which the President sent a riot squad to the area.[4] In August 2015 President Varela and the Cacia General of the indigenous Comarca, Silvia Carrera, signed an agreement to the effect that the civil works of the dam would be completed, but that the electromechanical works would remain suspended and the dam would not be flooded until a final agreement had been reached. GENISA complained that it had been left out of the agreement and that the agreement violated the agreements concluded by the state with the company.[2] In September 2015 the environmental agency ANAM imposed a 775,200 USD fine on GEMISA for having failed to comply with the resettlement and compensation measures under the project.[28] On January 21, 2016 the indigenous movement 10th of April claimed that the agreement had been violated, because tests to fill the reservoir had been made.[29] On January 28, 2016, a technical report was presented to the indigenous communities, showing that the dam was technically safe. Furthermore, a sub-commission consisting of the government and traditional authorities was created to further study the impacts of the project in view of a "final decision".[30]

See also

References

  1. ↑ "Barro Blanco". Genisa. Retrieved 13 June 2013.
  2. 1 2 "Gobierno firma acuerdo con indígenas sobre Barro Blanco; no descarta comprar la hidroeléctrica". La Prensa. 10 August 2015. Retrieved 12 March 2016.
  3. 1 2 3 "CDM Project Design Form: Barro Blanco Hydroelectric Power Plant Project, 27 April 2010". Retrieved 9 December 2012.
  4. 1 2 3 Arghiris, Richard (June 19, 2015). "GENISA director arrested in Honduras as Panama's President sends riot squad to indigenous protests". Interncontinental Cry Magazine, Center for World Indigenous Studies. Retrieved 12 March 2016.
  5. 1 2 3 4 Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung (Forum for Environment and Development): Das UN-Klimakompensationsprojekt Barro Blanco erschwert die Friedensverhandlungen in Panama (The UN Climate Project Barro Blanco makes peace negotiations in Panama more difficult), 19 March 2012, retrieved on 8 December 2012.
  6. ↑ BCIE. "Generadora del Istmo. Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Barro Blanco". Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  7. 1 2 3 "Panamá: Conflicto minero e hidroeléctrico en la Comarca Ngäbé Büglé, 13 March 2012". Prensa Indígena. Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  8. 1 2 "Panama: Village of the damned, 14 April 2012". Aljazeera. Retrieved 9 December 2012.
  9. ↑ "75 Hydroelectric Facility, Panama". Power Technology. Retrieved 9 December 2012.
  10. 1 2 GENISA. "Preguntas Frecuentes, Preguntas 20 y 30". Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  11. ↑ Business & Biodiversity Campaign. "UN’s Offsetting Project Barro Blanco Hampers Panama Peace-Talks". Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  12. ↑ JOHN AHNI SCHERTOW. "Urge Development Banks To Walk Away From Barro Blanco Dam, 10 May 2012". Intercontinental Cry. Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  13. 1 2 AENOR (25 June 2010). "CDM Validation Report, Barro Blanco Hydropower Plan Project" (PDF). p. 22. Retrieved 9 December 2012.
  14. 1 2 3 Zelideth Cortez. "La buena suerte de GENISA (The luck of GENISA), 29 February 2012". La Estrella. Retrieved 9 December 2012.
  15. 1 2 "Preguntas Frecuentes, Preguntas 25, 27 y 28". GENISA. Retrieved 13 March 2016.
  16. 1 2 International Rivers (11 February 2011). "5,000 Indigenous Peoples Ignored In Grab for Carbon Credits". Retrieved 9 December 2012.
  17. ↑ GENISA. "Preguntas Frecuentes, Pregunta 27". Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  18. ↑ The Panama Digest:Mining Banned to Protect the Ngöbe Buglé Shire, 27 March 2012
  19. ↑ Cultural Survival:Campaign Update – Panama: Ngöbe Dialogue Ends in New Mining Law, Protests Continue, 22 March 2012
  20. ↑ Don Winner:Role Of The United Nations Questioned - Barro Blanco Hydro Electric Project, Panama-Guide.com, 31 May 2012
  21. ↑ "Informe de la Misión de verificación ralizada del 23 al 28 de septiembre de 2012" (PDF). Retrieved 13 June 2013.
  22. ↑ Robin Oisín Llewellyn (25 March 2013). "Indigenous protester killed by masked assailants in Panama over UN-condemned dam". Mongabay.com. Retrieved 13 June 2013.
  23. ↑ "Campaigns: Barro Blanco – Large hydro project, Panama". Carbon Market Watch. Retrieved 13 March 2016.
  24. ↑ "UN Representative on Indigenous Peoples Asked to Investigate Human Rights Violations Caused by Panama’s Barro Blanco Dam". CommonDreams. 18 June 2013. Retrieved 13 March 2016.
  25. ↑ UNDP Panama Press Release:Presentan resultados del peritaje independiente al proyecto hidroeléctrico Barro Blanco, retrieved on March 17, 2016
  26. ↑ "Complaint Mechanism: Barro Blanco". DEG. Retrieved 4 July 2015.
  27. ↑ "Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente paraliza proyecto Barro Blanco por incumplimientos". La Prensa. 10 February 2015. Retrieved 4 July 2015.
  28. ↑ "Gobierno impone sanción a Genisa por Barro Blanco". La Prensa. 24 September 2015. Retrieved 12 March 2016.
  29. ↑ "Indígenas vuelven a la calle por Barro Blanco". La Estrella. Retrieved 12 March 2016.
  30. ↑ "Comunicado Conjunto. Encuentro para la presentación del Informe Técnico de Barro Blanco". UNDP. 28 January 2016. Retrieved 17 March 2016.
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