CIA activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The CIA has been involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo sporadically for several decades, most notably in relation to the CIA's considerations and plans to assassinate former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and accusations of CIA involvement in his eventual assassination. The CIA is also notably involved in a campaign against Lumumba's successor, which led to his eventual imprisonment and long exile from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[1] The CIA was also a vital part of the United States efforts to aid Joseph Mobutu who would take control of the Congo in 1965, renaming it Zaire. The CIA would work heavily with Mobutu, particularly in relation to American support for the National Liberation Front of Angola and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the second largest country by area on the African continent. Though it is located in the Central African UN subregion, the nation is also economically and regionally affiliated with Southern Africa as a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It borders the Central African Republic and South Sudan to the north; Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi in the east; Zambia and Angola to the south; the Republic of the Congo, the Angolan exclave of Cabinda, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west; and is separated from Tanzania by Lake Tanganyika in the east.

DRC 1960

The independent Republic of the Congo was declared on 30 June 1960, with Joseph Kasa-Vubu as President and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister. It shared a name with the neighboring Republic of the Congo to the west, a French colony that also gained independence in 1960, and the two were normally differentiated by also stating the name of the relevant capital city, so Congo (Léopoldville) versus Congo (Brazzaville).

Patrice Lumumba was seen by the United States as a potential Communist, as he turned to the Soviet Union for aid in keeping Congo independent of Belgian rule after he had been denied this aid by the United Nations and the United States. It was acknowledged, early in his term, that Lumumba was likely a "neutralist" in terms of the Cold War, and though he was "left-leaning" he likely only turned to the Soviet Union for aid.[2] Classified CIA cables from Leopoldville to the head of the CIA report the view of the CIA that Lumumba was involved with Communists:

EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT. MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MANY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TO TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.[3]

Later in his term, which lasted only 10 weeks, the CIA began to orchestrate plans for Lumumba's assassination.

Larry Devlin became Chief of Station in Congo in July 1960, a mere 10 days after the country's independence from Belgium and shortly before Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba's two-month term in office, dismissal from power and ultimate execution.[4] In his memoir, Devlin reveals that late in 1960, he received instructions from an agent ("Joe from Paris") who was relaying instructions from CIA headquarters that he (Devlin) was to effect the assassination of Lumumba.[5] Various poisons, including one secreted in a tube of toothpaste, were proffered. The directive had come from the CIA Deputy Chief of Plans Dick Bissell, but Devlin wanted to know if it had originated at a higher level and if so, how high. "Joe" had been given to understand that it had come from President Dwight D. Eisenhower, but Devlin to this day does not know for sure. Devlin writes (and has recently said in public speaking engagements) that he felt an assassination would have been "morally wrong" and likely to backfire and work against U.S. interests. In the event, he temporized, neglecting to act, and Lumumba was ultimately murdered by his enemies in Katanga, with Belgian government participation. U.S. intelligence was kept apprised.

The United Nations Security Council was called into session on December 7, 1960 to consider Soviet demands that the U.N. seek Lumumba's immediate release, the immediate restoration of Lumumba as head of the Congo government, the disarming of the forces of Mobutu, and the immediate evacuation of Belgians from the Congo. Soviet Representative Valerian Zorin refused U.S. demands that he disqualify himself as Security Council President during the debate. Hammarskjöld, answering Soviet attacks against his Congo operations, said that if the U.N. forces were withdrawn from the Congo "I fear everything will crumble."[6]

Following a U.N. report that Lumumba had been mistreated by his captors, his followers threatened (on December 9, 1960) to seize all Belgians and "start cutting off the heads of some of them" unless Lumumba was released within 48 hours.

The CIA and Joseph Mobutu

The United States backed Joseph Mobutu for over three decades. Support for Mobutu started when Lumumba was in power (Mobutu was Lumumba's chief of staff), and continued to grow as he became a more influential leader in the Congo.[7] The CIA took an early liking to Mobutu, and under the leadership of Larry Devlin spent weeks developing him. Mobutu would lead the September 14th coup against Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu, hoping to neutralize them and impose a ban on politics for the rest of the year.[7] The coup was sponsored by the CIA, and would receive continued support by the CIA, including an October 27 decision by the 5412 group to release an addition 250,000 to support Mobutu.[7] The coup resulted in Lumumba being placed under de facto house arrest, protected by U.N. forces. When Lumumbu grew tired of the situation, he escaped U.N. protection on his way to Stanleyville in the Orientale province of the Congo (Today Kisangani). Lumumba never made it; captured by Mobutu forces, he was beaten and executed on January 17, 1961.[8]

The exact involvement of the CIA in Lumumba's assassination is still debated by scholars. According to Scholar John Prados, who is also a senior fellow of the National Security Archive, the CIA was involved in several indirect ways. First the CIA had the Congolese official that issued Lumumba's arrest warrant on their payroll. The CIA also had been providing Mobutu and his forces with large amounts of money and supplies. CIA officials were also aware of much of the situation as it developed, and failed to stop the actions against Lumumba.[9]

After the death of Lumumba, the CIA's relationship with Mobutu would continue to develop. Frustrated with the assent to power of Antione Gizenga, the CIA would continue to support Mobutu. This support continued to grow after Mobutu visited President John F. Kennedy in the Rose Garden in 1963. This led to Mobutu receiving American financial and military support that allowed him to be in a position to assume control of the Congo. After his 1963 visit to the White House, Mobutu was regarded as a CIA asset, and a relationship that lasted over thirty years was solidified.[10]

Early CIA perceptions of Joseph Mobutu

Several released CIA documents shed light on how the CIA perceived Mobutu during his rise to power and his early time in power. It can be seen from these documents that many in the CIA were unsure of the long term capability of Mobutu. The CIA viewed Mobutu in what can best be called an optimistically pessimistic manner. This is demonstrated in a 1966 intelligence memorandum which opens with a quote from Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, stating that "The Coup was the best thing that could possibly have happened; it remains to be seen whether it is also a good thing."[11] The CIA would cautiously approach Mobutu, unsure if he could maintain a dual role as a political and military leader. The CIA also states in a 1966 Intelligence Memorandum that this duality is likely to cause Mobutu to move toward authoritarian rule. The CIA would speak favorably of his civilian programs, but doubt their ability to achieve long term effectiveness.[12]

References

  1. ↑ Prados, John (2006). Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. pp. 280–282.
  2. ↑ http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIA-RDP79T00975A005100490001-1.pdf>
  3. ↑ Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence: Covert Action-Behind the Veils of Secret Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009).
  4. ↑ Devlin, Lerry (2007). Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone. New York: PublicAffairs. pp. 7–10. ISBN 9781586485641.
  5. ↑ Devlin, Lerry (2007). Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone. New York: PublicAffairs. pp. 94–97. ISBN 9781586485641.
  6. ↑ Kasuka, Brdgette (2013). Prominent African Leaders Since Independence. New Africa Press. pp. 155–156.
  7. 1 2 3 Prados, John (2006). Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. p. 277.
  8. ↑ Prados, John (2006). Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. pp. 277–278.
  9. ↑ Prados, John (2006). Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. pp. 276–279.
  10. ↑ Kelly, Sean (1993). America's Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire. Washington D.C.: American University Press. pp. 1–3.
  11. ↑ "CIA Intelligence Memorandum: The Situation in the Congo" (PDF). CIA FOIA. CIA. Retrieved 5 December 2013.
  12. ↑ "CIA Intelligence Memorandum: The Congo's Joseph Mobutu: Past, Present, and Future" (PDF). CIA FOIA. CIA. Retrieved 5 December 2013.

See also

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