First Congo War

First Congo War
Part of the Congo conflicts and the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide

Map showing the AFDL offensive
Date24 October 1996 – 16 May 1997
(6 months, 3 weeks and 1 day)
LocationZaire
Result

Decisive AFDL victory

Belligerents
 Zaire
UNITA[1]
Rwanda ALiR
Interahamwe		 Democratic Republic of the Congo AFDL
Uganda Uganda
Rwanda Rwanda
Burundi Burundi[2]
 Angola[2]
Commanders and leaders
Zaire Mobutu Sese Seko
Jonas Savimbi
Rwanda Paul Rwarakabidje
Rwanda Robert Kajuga
Rwanda Tharcisse Renzaho		 Democratic Republic of the Congo Laurent-Désiré Kabila
Rwanda Paul Kagame
Rwanda James Kabarebe
Uganda Yoweri Museveni
Burundi Pierre Buyoya
Angola José Eduardo dos Santos
Strength
Zaire: 50,000 – 60,000[3]
Interahamwe: 40,000 – 100,000 total[3]
UNITA: c.1,000[3]		 AFDL: 57,000[4]
Rwanda: 3,500[4]
Casualties and losses
10,000–15,000 killed
thousands surrender		 3,000–5,000 killed
250,000[5]–800,000 dead
222,000 refugees missing[6]

The First Congo War (1996–1997) was a foreign invasion of Zaire led by Rwanda that replaced dictator Mobutu Sésé Seko with the rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Destabilization in eastern Zaire resulting from the Rwandan Genocide was the final factor that caused numerous internal and external factors to align against the corrupt and inept government in the capital, Kinshasa.

The new government renamed the country to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but it brought little true change. Kabila alienated his Rwandan and Ugandan allies. To avert a coup, Kabila expelled all Rwandan and Ugandan forces from the Congo. This event was a major cause of the Second Congo War the following year. Some experts prefer to view the two conflicts as one war.[7]

Background

Failing state in Zaire

Further information: Zaire

An ethnic Ngbandi, Mobutu came to power in 1965 and enjoyed support from the United States government because of his anti-communist stance while in office. However, Mobutu's authoritarian rule and policies allowed the Zairian state to decay, evidenced by a 65% decrease in Zairian GDP between independence in 1960 and the end of Mobutu's rule in 1997.[8] Following the end of the Cold War circa 1991, the United States stopped supporting Mobutu in favour of what it called a "new generation of African leaders",[9] including Rwanda's Kagame and Uganda's Museveni.

A wave of democratisation swept across Africa during the 1990s. Under substantial internal and external pressure for a democratic transition in Zaire, Mobutu promised reform. He officially ended the one-party system he had maintained since 1967, but ultimately proved unwilling to implement broad reform, alienating allies both at home and abroad. In fact, the Zairian state had all but ceased to exist.[10] The majority of the Zairian population relied on an informal economy for their subsistence, since the official economy was not reliable.[10] Furthermore, the Zairian national army, Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ), was forced to prey upon the population for survival; Mobutu himself allegedly once asked FAZ soldiers why they needed pay when they had weapons.[11]

Mobutu's rule had encountered considerable internal resistance, and given the weak central state, rebel groups could find refuge in Zaire's eastern provinces, far from the capital, Kinshasa. Opposition included leftists who had supported Patrice Lumumba (1925-1961), as well as ethnic and regional minorities opposed to the dominance of Kinshasa. Laurent-Désiré Kabila, an ethnic Luba from Katanga province who would eventually overthrow Mobutu, had fought Mobutu's régime since its inception.[12] The inability of the Mobutuist régime to control rebel movements in its eastern provinces eventually allowed its internal and external foes to ally.

Ethnic tensions

Tensions had existed between various ethnic groups in eastern Zaire for centuries, especially between the agrarian tribes native to Zaire and semi-nomadic Tutsi tribes that had emigrated from Rwanda at various times.[13] In addition to some Tutsi who were native to eastern Congo, the earliest of these migrants arrived before colonisation in the 1880s, followed by emigrants whom the Belgian colonizers forcibly relocated to Congo to perform manual labour (after 1908), and by another significant wave of emigrants fleeing the social revolution of 1959 that brought the Hutu to power in Kigali.[14]

All Tutsi emigrants to Zaire before Congolese independence in 1960 are known as Banyamulenge, meaning "from Mulenge", and had the right to citizenship under Zairian law.[15] Tutsi who emigrated to Zaire following independence are known as Banyarwanda, although the 'native' locals often fail to distinguish between the two, naming them both Banyamulenge and considering them foreigners.[14]

After coming to power in 1965, Mobutu gave the Banyamulenge political power in the East in hopes that they, as a minority, would keep a tight grip on power and prevent the more populous ethnicities from forming an opposition.[16] This aggravated the existing ethnic tensions, which manifested itself in several events. From 1963 to 1966 the Hunde and Nande ethnic groups of North Kivu fought against Rwandan emigrants — both Tutsi and Hutu – in the Kanyarwandan War, which involved several massacres.[17]

In 1981 Zaire adopted a restrictive citizenship law which denied the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda citizenship and therewith all political rights.[18] From 1993 to 1996 Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga youth regularly attacked the Banyamulenge, leading to a total of 14,000 deaths.[19] In 1995 the Zairian Parliament ordered all peoples of Rwandan or Burundian descent to be repatriated to their countries of origin, including the Banyamulenge.[20] Due to political exclusion and ethnic violence, the Banyamulenge developed ties to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a mainly Tutsi rebel movement based in Uganda and with power aspirations in Rwanda, as early as 1991.[21]

Rwandan Genocide

A Rwandan refugee camp in Zaire, 1994.
Main article: Rwandan Genocide

The deciding event in precipitating the war was the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda, which sparked a mass exodus of refugees known as the Great Lakes refugee crisis. During the 100-day genocide, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and sympathizers were massacred at the hands of predominantly Hutu aggressors. The genocide ended when the Hutu government in Kigali was overthrown by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front.

Of those who fled Rwanda during the crisis, about 1.5 million settled in eastern Zaire.[22] These refugees included those who fled the Hutu génocidaires as well as those that fled the Tutsi RPF fearing retaliation. Prominent among the latter group were the génocidaires themselves, such as elements of the former Rwandan Army, Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), and independent Hutu extremist groups known as Interahamwe.[23]

They set up camps in eastern Zaire from which they attacked both the newly arrived Rwandan Tutsi as well as the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda. These attacks were the cause of about one hundred deaths a month during the first half of 1996.[24] Furthermore, the newly arrived militants were intent on returning to power in Rwanda and began launching attacks against the new regime in Kigali, which represented a serious security threat to the infant state.[25] Not only was the Mobutu government incapable of controlling the former génocidaires for previously mentioned reasons but actually supported them in training and supplying for an invasion of Rwanda,[26] forcing Kigali to act.

Banyamulenge Rebellion

Given the exacerbated ethnic tensions and the lack of government control in the East, Rwanda was to take action against the security threat posed by the génocidaires who had found refuge in eastern Zaire. The government in Kigali had begun forming Tutsi militias for operations in Zaire as early as 1995[27] and chose to act following an exchange of fire between Rwandan Tutsi and Zairian Green Berets that marked the outbreak of the Banyamulenge Rebellion on 31 August 1996.[28]

While there was general unrest in eastern Zaire, the rebellion was unlikely a grassroots movement; Uganda president Yoweri Museveni, who supported and worked closely with Rwanda in the First Congo War, later recalled that the rebellion was incited by Zairian Tutsi who had been recruited by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).[27]

The initial goal of the Banyamulenge Rebellion was to seize power in Zaire's eastern Kivu provinces and combat the extremist Hutu forces that were attempting to continue the genocide in their new home. However, the rebellion did not remain Tutsi-dominated for long. Mobutu's harsh and selfish rule had created enemies in virtually all sectors of Zairian society. As a result, the new rebellion benefited from massive public support and grew to be a general revolution rather than a mere Banyamulenge uprising.[29]

Banyamulenge elements as well as non-Tutsi militias coalesced into the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who had been a long-time opponent of the Mobutu government and was a leader of one of the three main rebel groups that founded the AFDL. While the AFDL was an ostensibly Zairian rebel movement, Rwanda had played a key role in its formation. Observers of the war, as well as the Rwandan Defense Minister and Vice-President at the time, Paul Kagame, claim that the AFDL was formed in and directed from Kigali and contained not only Rwandan-trained troops but also regulars of the RPA.[30]

Foreign involvement

Map of Zaire in c.1996

Rwanda

According to expert observers, as well as Kagame himself, Rwanda played the largest role of a foreign actor, if not the largest role of all, in the First Congo War. Kigali was instrumental in the formation of the AFDL and sent its own troops to fight alongside the rebels. While its actions were originally sparked by the security threat posed by the Zairian-based génocidaires, Kigali was pursuing multiple goals during its invasion of Zaire.

The first and foremost of these was the suppression of the génocidaires who had been launching attacks against the new Rwandan state from Zaire. Kagame claimed that Rwandan agents had discovered the plans to invade Rwanda with support from Mobutu; in response, Kigali began its intervention with the intention of dismantling the refugee camps in which the génocidaires often took refuge and destroying the structure of these anti-Rwandan elements.[30]

A second goal that is cited by Kagame, and which is universally regarded as accurate, is the overthrow of Mobutu. While this was partially a means to minimising the threat in eastern Zaire, it was also a chance for the new Rwandan state to set up a puppet-regime in Kinshasa.[9] This goal was not particularly threatening to other states in the region because it was ostensibly a means to securing Rwandan security and because many of them were also opposed to Mobutu. Internationally Kigali was also aided by the tacit support of the United States, which supported Kagame as a member of the new generation of African leaders.[9]

However, the true intentions of Rwanda are not entirely clear. Some authors have proposed that the dismantling of refugee camps was a means of replenishing Rwanda's depleted population and workforce following the genocide, because the destruction of camps was followed by the forced repatriation of Tutsi regardless of whether they were Rwandan or Zairian.[31] The intervention may also have been motivated by revenge; the Rwandan forces, as well as the AFDL, massacred retreating Hutu refugees in several known instances.[32] A commonly cited factor for Rwandan actions is that the RPF, which had recently come to power in Kigali, had come to see itself as the protector of the Tutsi nation and was therefore partially acting in defence of its Zairian brethren.[33]

There is also a distinct possibility that Rwanda harboured ambitions to annexe portions of eastern Zaire. Pasteur Bizimungu himself, President of Rwanda from 1994–2000, presented the then US ambassador to Rwanda, Robert Gribbin, with the idea of a "Greater Rwanda." This idea purports that the ancient state of Rwanda included parts of eastern Zaire that should actually belong to Rwanda.[34] However, it appears that Rwanda never seriously attempted to annexe these territories. The history of conflict in the Congo is often associated with illegal resource exploitation but, although Rwanda did benefit financially by plundering Zaire's wealth,[35] this is almost universally denied as a motivation for Rwandan intervention in the First Congo War.[36]

Uganda

As a close ally of the RPF, Uganda also played a major role in the First Congo War. Prominent members of the RPF had fought alongside Museveni in the Ugandan Bush War that had brought him to power, and Museveni had allowed the RPF to use Uganda as a base during the 1990 offensive into Rwanda and subsequent civil war. Given their historical ties, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments were closely allied and thus Museveni worked closely with Kagame throughout the First Congo War. Ugandan soldiers were present in Zaire throughout the conflict and Museveni likely helped Kagame plan and direct the AFDL.[27]

Lt. Col. James Kabarebe of the AFDL, for example, was a former member of Uganda's National Resistance Army, the military wing of the rebel movement that brought Museveni to power, and French and Belgian intelligence reported that 15,000 Ugandan-trained Tutsi fought for the AFDL.[37] However, Uganda did not support Rwanda in all aspects of the war. Museveni was reportedly much less inclined to overthrow Mobutu, preferring to keep the rebellion in the East where the former génocidaires were operating.[38]

Angola

Angola remained on the sidelines until 1997 but its entrance into the fray greatly increased the already superior strength of anti-Mobutu forces. The Angolan government chose to act primarily through Katangese gendarmes called the Tigres, which were proxy groups formed from the descendents of police units who had been exiled from Zaire and thus were fighting for a return to their homeland.[39] Luanda did also deploy regular troops. Angola chose to participate in the First Congo War because members of Mobutu's government were directly involved in supplying the Angolan rebel group UNITA.[40]

It is unclear exactly how the government benefited from this relationship, other than personal enrichment for several officials, but it is certainly possible that Mobutu was unable to control the actions of some members of his government. Regardless of the reasoning in Kinshasa, Angola entered the war on the side of the rebels and was determined to overthrow the Mobutu government, as this would be the only way to address the threat posed by the Zairian-UNITA relationship.

UNITA

Due to its ties to the Mobutu government, UNITA also participated in the First Congo War. The greatest impact that it had on the war was probably that it gave Angola reason to join the anti-Mobutu coalition. However, UNITA forces fought alongside FAZ forces in at least several instances.[41] Among other examples, Kagame claimed that his forces fought a pitched battle against UNITA near Kinshasa towards the end of the war.[42]

Others

Numerous other external actors played lesser roles in the First Congo War. Burundi, which had recently come under the rule of a pro-Tutsi leader, was supportive of Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in Zaire but provided very limited military support.[43] Zambia and Zimbabwe also gave measured amounts of military support to the rebel movement.[44] Likewise, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the South Sudanese rebel army the SPLA were all financial or moral supporters of the anti-Mobutu coalition. Other than from UNITA, Mobutu also received some aid from Sudan, whom Mobutu had long supported against the SPLA, though the exact amount of aid is unclear and ultimately was unable to hinder the advance of opposing forces.[45] Zaire also employed foreign mercenaries from several African and European countries.

1996

With active support from Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila's AFDL was able to capture 800 x 100 km of territory along the border with Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi by 25 December 1996.[46] This occupation temporarily satisfied the rebels, because it gave them power in the East and allowed them to defend themselves against the former génocidaires. Likewise, the external actors had successfully crippled the ability of the same génocidaires to use Zaire as a base for attacks. There was a pause in the rebel advance following the acquisition of this buffer territory that lasted until Angola entered the war in February 1997.[47]

During this time, Rwanda was able to destroy refugee camps, which the génocidaires had been using as their safe-bases, and forcibly repatriate Tutsi to Rwanda. During this process, Rwandan and aligned forces committed multiple atrocities, mainly against Hutu refugees.[32] The true extent of the abuses is unknown because the AFDL and RPF carefully managed NGO and press access to areas where atrocities were thought to have occurred[48] however Amnesty International claimed as many as 200,000 Rwandese Hutu refugees were massacred by them and the Rwandan Defence Forces and aligned forces.[49] The United Nations similarly documented mass killings of civilians by Rwandan, Ugandan and the ADFL soldiers in the DRC Mapping Exercise Report.

1997

Statue of Laurent-Désiré Kabila

There are two explanations for the restart of the rebel advance in 1997. The first and most probable, is that Angola had joined the anti-Mobutu coalition, giving it numbers and strength far superior to the FAZ and demanding that Mobutu be removed from power. Kagame presents another, possibly secondary, reason for the march on Kinshasa: that the employment of Serbian mercenaries in the battle for Walikale proved that "Mobutu intended to wage real war against Rwanda."[50] According to this logic, Rwanda's initial concerns had been to manage the security threat in eastern Zaire but it was now forced to dispose of the hostile government in Kinshasa.

Whatever the case, once the advance resumed in 1997, there was virtually no meaningful resistance from what was left of Mobutu's army. Kabila's forces were only held back by the dreadful state of Zaire's infrastructure. In some areas, no real roads existed; the only means of transport were infrequently used dirt paths.[51] The ADFL committed grave human rights violations, such as the carnage at a refugee camp of Hutus at Tingi-Tingi near Kisangani where tens of thousands of refugees were massacred.[52]

Coming from the east, the ADFL advanced westward in two pincer movements, the northern one took Kisangani, Boende, and Mbandaka, while the southern one took Bakwanga, and Kikwit.[52] They reached Kinshasa by the middle of May. Another AFDL group captured Lubumbashi on April 19 and moved on by air to Kinshasa. Mobutu fled Kinshasa on May 16, and the "libérateurs" entered the capital without serious resistance.[52]

Throughout the rebel advance, there were attempts by the international community to negotiate a settlement. However, the AFDL did not take these negotiations seriously but instead partook so as to avoid international criticism for being unwilling to attempt a diplomatic solution while actually continuing its steady advance.[53] The FAZ, which had been weak all along, was unable to mount any serious resistance to the strong AFDL and its foreign sponsors.

Mobutu fled first to his palace at Gbadolite and then to Rabat, Morocco, where he died on 7 September 1997. Kabila proclaimed himself president on 17 May, and immediately ordered a violent crackdown to restore order. He then attempted to reorganise the nation as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Aftermath

Main article: Second Congo War

The new Congolese state under Kabila's rule proved to be disappointingly similar to Zaire under Mobutu. The economy remained in a state of severe disrepair and had even deteriorated further under Kabila's corrupt rule.[54] Furthermore, he failed to improve the government, which continued to be weak and corrupt. Instead, Kabila began a vigorous centralisation campaign, bringing renewed conflict with minority groups in the east who demanded autonomy.

Kabila also came to be seen as an instrument of the foreign regimes that put him in power. To counter this image and increase domestic support, he began to turn against his allies abroad. This culminated in the expulsion of all foreign forces from the DRC on 26 July 1998. The states with armed forces still in the DRC begrudgingly complied although some of them saw this as undermining their interests, particularly Rwanda, which had hoped to install a proxy-regime in Kinshasa.

Several factors that led to the First Congo War remained in place after Kabila's accession to power. Prominent among these were ethnic tensions in eastern DRC, where the government still had little control. There the historical animosities remained and the opinion that Banyamulenge, as well as all Tutsi, were foreigners was reinforced by the foreign occupation in their defence.[55] Furthermore, Rwanda had not been able to satisfactorily address its security concerns. By forcibly repatriating refugees, Rwanda had imported the conflict.[56]

This manifested itself in the form of a predominantly Hutu insurgency in Rwanda's western provinces that was supported by extremist elements in eastern DRC. Without troops in the DRC, Rwanda was unable to successfully combat the insurgents. In the first days of August 1998, two brigades of the new Congolese army rebelled against the government and formed rebel groups that worked closely with Kigali and Kampala. This marked the beginning of the Second Congo War.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Duke, Lynne (20 May 1997). "Congo Begins Process of Rebuilding Nation". The Washington Post. p. A10. Guerrillas of Angola's former rebel movement UNITA, long supported by Mobutu in an unsuccessful war against Angola's government, also fought for Mobutu against Kabila's forces.
  2. 1 2 Duke, Lynne (15 April 1997). "Passive Protest Stops Zaire's Capital Cold". The Washington Post. p. A14. Kabila's forces – which are indeed backed by Rwanda, Angola, Uganda and Burundi, diplomats say – are slowly advancing toward the capital from the eastern half of the country, where they have captured all the regions that produce Zaire's diamonds, gold, copper and cobalt.
  3. 1 2 3 Thom, William G. (1999). "Congo-Zaire's 1996–97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence" XIX (2). Journal of Conflict Studies.
  4. 1 2 This number was self-declared and was not independently verified. Johnson, Dominic: Kongo — Kriege, Korruption und die Kunst des Überlebens, Brandes & Apsel, Frankfurt am Main, 2. Auflage 2009 ISBN 978-3-86099-743-7
  5. ↑ http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1998/AFR/16203698.html
  6. ↑ CDI: The Center for Defense Information, The Defense Monitor, "The World At War: January 1, 1998".
  7. ↑ e.g.: Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 194
  8. ↑ Gondola, Ch. Didier. The History of Congo. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002. p. 6
  9. 1 2 3 Kennes, Erik. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need." Rethinking the Economics of War. Ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005. p. 147
  10. 1 2 Kennes, Erik. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need." Rethinking the Economics of War. Ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005. p. 157
  11. ↑ "Congo's Curse". IRIN. 5 October 2010. Retrieved 2015-10-15. Ex-president Mobutu once asked his soldiers why they needed salaries when they had guns [...]
  12. ↑ Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 190
  13. ↑ Vlassenroot, Koen. "Conflict & Malitia Formation in Eastern Congo." Ed. Preben Kaarsholm. Violence, Political Culture & Development in Africa. Athens: Ohio UP, 2006. 49–65. p. 53
  14. 1 2 Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. p. 32
  15. ↑ Vlassenroot, Koen. "Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge". Review of African Political Economy. 2002. 499–515.
  16. ↑ Autesserre, Severine. "The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict.” Foreign Affairs. 2008. 87(3). 94–110.
  17. ↑ Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. p. 13
  18. ↑ Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. pp. 15–16
  19. ↑ Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. pp. 13–14
  20. ↑ Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. p.16
  21. ↑ Vlassenroot, Koen. "Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge.” Review of African Political Economy. 2002. 499–515. p. 508
  22. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 45
  23. ↑ "North Kivu: How to end a war". ISN Security Watch.
  24. ↑ Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 143
  25. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 30
  26. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 18
  27. 1 2 3 Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 48
  28. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 49
  29. ↑ Afoaku, Osita. "Congo's Rebels: Their Origins, Motivations, and Strategies." Ed. John F. Clark. The Africa Stakes of the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 109-28. p. 121
  30. 1 2 Pomfret, John. "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo; Defense Minister Says Arms, Troops Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive." Washington Post. 9 July 1997: A1.
  31. ↑ Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 107, 201
  32. 1 2 Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 213-14
  33. ↑ Longman, Timothy. “The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo." Ed. John F. Clark. The African Stakes of the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 129-44. p. 131
  34. ↑ Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 175-76
  35. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 147-48
  36. ↑ Samset, Ingrid. ‘Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds & War in the DRC.’ Review of African Political Economy. 2002. 463–480. pp. 470–471
  37. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 54, 58
  38. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 59
  39. ↑ Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 218
  40. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 62
  41. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 63
  42. ↑ Pomfret, John. "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo; Defense Minister Says Arms, Troops Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive." Washington Post. 9 July 1997: A1
  43. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 42, 61
  44. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 65-66
  45. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 44
  46. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 55
  47. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. pp. 61–63
  48. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 100
  49. ↑ Democratic Republic of Congo. An long-standing crisis spinning out of control. Amnesty International, 3 September 1998. p. 9. AI Index: AFR 62/33/98
  50. ↑ Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 213
  51. ↑ Dickovick, J. Tyler (2008). The World Today Series: Africa 2012. Lanham, Maryland: Stryker-Post Publications. ISBN 978-1-61048-881-5.
  52. 1 2 3 David van Reybrouck. Congo: The Epic History of a People. HarperCollins, 2012. p. 423ff. ISBN 978-0-06-220011-2.
  53. ↑ Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 130
  54. ↑ Kennes, Erik. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need." Rethinking the Economics of War. Ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005. p. 154
  55. ↑ Longman, Timothy. “The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo." Ed. John F. Clark. The African Stakes of the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 129-44. pp. 131–32
  56. ↑ Vlassenroot, Koen. “Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge.” Review of African Political Economy. 2002. 499–515. p. 173

Further reading

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