Frances Egan
| Frances Egan | |
|---|---|
| Institutions | Rutgers University |
Main interests | Philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, cognitive science, psychological explanation |
Frances Egan is a professor of philosophy at Rutgers University.[1][2] She has authored a number of articles and book chapters on philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and perception.[1]
Education and career
Egan graduated from the University of Manitoba in 1976 with a B.A. in philosophy.[1] She received a Ph.D. from the University of Western Ontario in 1988.[1] She has taught at Rutgers University since her appointment as an assistant professor in 1990.[1] Besides her Rutgers appointment, she is also an associate editor of Noûs, a quarterly journal of philosophy.[1]
Research areas
Egan’s principal research interests are in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and foundations of cognitive science.[2][3] Her work focuses on the nature of psychological explanation, and on the relationship between folk explanation and scientific explanation.[2] She is known for her work on the role of representational content in computer models of mind.[3][4] She argues that computational models of mind do not require meaning ascriptions, and that meaning ascriptions should be viewed as helping to connect the formal characterization of a computational theory with our intuitive belief that mental processes are intentional.[3] She has also written on vision, including the history of vision.[1]
Awards and fellowships
Egan has received a number of awards including research fellowships at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Center for Interdisciplinary Research, Bielefeld, Germany.[1]
References
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Egan, Frances. "Curriculum Vitae" (PDF). Retrieved 11 September 2013.
- 1 2 3 "Egan, Frances". Rutgers University. Retrieved 11 September 2013.
- 1 2 3 Marshall, Richard. "meaning as gloss". 3am magazine. Retrieved 11 September 2013.
- ↑ Piccinini, Gualtiero (2009). "Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind". Philosophy Compass 4 (3): 515–532. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00215.x. ISSN 1747-9991.