Glenanne gang

Glenanne gang
Participant in the Troubles

Fields near the farm where the gang was based (Ballylane townland, near Glenanne, County Armagh)
Active 1972–1980
Ideology Ulster loyalism
Leaders John Weir
Billy McCaughey
Billy Hanna
Robin Jackson
Harris Boyle
Headquarters Glenanne,
County Armagh,
Northern Ireland
Area of operations Mainly County Armagh and east County Tyrone
Strength Over 40 known members
Part of Ulster Volunteer Force
Opponents Irish nationalists
Location of Glenanne farm in Northern Ireland.
Glenanne
Glenanne (Northern Ireland)

The Glenanne gang or Glenanne group was a secret informal alliance of Ulster loyalists, mostly from Northern Ireland, who carried out shooting and bombing attacks against Catholics and nationalists during the Troubles, beginning in the 1970s.[1] Most of its attacks took place in the "murder triangle" area of counties Armagh and Tyrone.[2] It also launched some attacks elsewhere in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. The gang included British soldiers from the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), police officers from the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and members of the Mid-Ulster Brigade of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).[3][4] Twenty-five British soldiers and police officers were named as purported members of the gang.[5] Details about the group have come from many sources, including the affidavit of former member and RUC officer John Weir; statements by other former members; police, army and court documents; and ballistics evidence linking the same weapons to various attacks. Since 2003, the group's activities have also been investigated by the 2006 Cassel Report, and three reports commissioned by Irish Supreme Court Justice Henry Barron, known as the Barron Reports.[6] A book focusing on the group's activities, Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland, was published in 2013.[7] It drew on all the aforementioned sources, as well as Historical Enquiries Team investigations.

Lethal Allies claims that permutations of the group killed about 120 people – almost all of whom were "upwardly mobile" Catholic civilians with no links to Irish republican paramilitaries.[5] The Cassel Report investigated 76 killings attributed to the group and found evidence that British soldiers and RUC officers were involved in 74 of those.[8] John Weir claimed his superiors knew he was working with loyalist militants but allowed it to continue.[9] The Cassel Report also said that some senior officers knew of the crimes but did nothing to prevent, investigate or punish.[8] It has been alleged that some key members were double agents working for British military intelligence and RUC Special Branch.[4][10] Attacks attributed to the group include the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, the Miami Showband killings, and the Reavey and O'Dowd killings.[4] Many of the victims were killed at their homes or in indiscriminate attacks on Catholic-owned pubs with guns and/or bombs. Some were shot after being stopped at fake British Army checkpoints, and a number of the attacks were co-ordinated.[11] When it wished to "claim" its attacks, the group usually used the name "Protestant Action Force". The name "Glenanne gang" has been used since 2003 and is derived from the farm at Glenanne (near Markethill, County Armagh) that was used as the gang's main 'base of operations'.[12][13] It also made use of a farm near Dungannon.[14]

Political situation in Northern Ireland

Main article: The Troubles

By the mid-1970s the violent ethno-political conflict known as the Troubles had radically transformed the daily lives of people in Northern Ireland; after five years of turbulent civil unrest, the bombings and shootings showed no signs of abating. The armed campaign waged by the Provisional IRA had escalated, with bombings in England and increased attacks on the security forces in Northern Ireland. The British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) bore the brunt of IRA violence and many Protestants felt their people to be under attack. Rogue members of the RUC Special Patrol Group (SPG) believed that the situation was rapidly deteriorating and that the IRA were actually 'winning the war'. As early as the end of 1973, it was suggested that drastic measures had to be taken to defeat the organisation.[15] The SPG was a specialised police unit tasked with providing back-up to the regular RUC and to police sensitive areas.

On 10 February 1975, the Provisional IRA and British government entered into a truce and restarted negotiations. The IRA agreed to halt attacks on the British security forces, and the security forces mostly ended its raids and searches.[16] However, there were dissenters on both sides. Some Provisionals wanted no part of the truce, while British commanders resented being told to stop their operations against the IRA just when—they claimed—they had the Provisionals on the run.[16] There was a rise in sectarian killings during the truce, which 'officially' lasted until February 1976. Ulster loyalist paramilitaries, fearing they were about to be forsaken by the British government and forced into a united Ireland,[17] increased their attacks on Roman Catholics and nationalists. Loyalist fears were partially grounded in fact as Secret Intelligence Service officer Michael Oatley had engaged in negotiations with a member of the IRA Army Council during which "structures of disengagement" from Ireland were discussed. This had meant a possible withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland.[18] Loyalists killed 120 Catholics in 1975, the vast majority civilians.[19] They hoped to force the IRA to retaliate in kind and thus hasten an end to the truce.[19]

Formation of the Glenanne gang

The Glenanne gang shared many members with the UVF Mid-Ulster Brigade, led by Robin "the Jackal" Jackson

It was during this exceptionally violent period that a group of loyalist extremists formed a loose alliance that was belatedly in 2003 given the name "Glenanne gang".[6] The gang, which contained over 40 known members, included soldiers of the British Army's Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), rogue elements of the RUC, the Mid-Ulster Brigade of the illegal paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and some Ulster Defence Association (UDA) members.[3][4]

This group began to carry out shooting and bombing attacks directed against Catholics and nationalists to retaliate for the IRA's intensified military campaign.[20] Most of these attacks took place in the area of County Armagh and Mid-Ulster referred to as the "murder triangle" by journalist Joe Tiernan.[2] It also launched attacks elsewhere in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland.[21] The name "Glenanne gang" is derived from the farm at Glenanne (near Markethill, County Armagh) that was used as the gang's arm dump and bomb-making site.[12]

In his 2013 memoirs, Joseph Pearce, a British former white supremacist and senior member of the National Front who later converted to Catholicism and is a writer and academician at Aquinas College (Nashville, Tennessee, USA), revealed what he knew about collusion between the NF, the British Army, and loyalist death squads. According to Pearce, "In spite of my own unwillingness to become too directly involved in the terrorist operations in Northern Ireland, I was very aware, as were the leaders of the UVF and UDA, that National Front members serving with the Army in Northern Ireland were smuggling intelligence information on suspected IRA members to the Loyalist paramilitaries. This information included photographs of suspected IRA members, the type of car they drove and its registration number, and other useful facts. I have little doubt that this information was used by the UVF and UDA to target and assassinate their enemies."[22]

Alleged members

The following people, among others, have been implicated by Justice Barron and Professor Douglass Cassel in their respective reports as having been members of the Glenanne gang:

Key figures

Other members

The gang has also been linked to military intelligence liaison officer Captain Robert Nairac who worked for 14th Intelligence Company (The Det).[4] On The Hidden Hand programme made by Yorkshire Television in 1993, it was claimed that Robin Jackson was controlled by Nairac and 14th Intelligence.[66] In May 1977, Nairac was kidnapped by the IRA in Dromintee and taken across the border into the Republic where he was shot dead by Liam Townson in Ravensdale Woods, County Louth.[67]

Merlyn Rees, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, lifted the proscription against the UVF on 4 April 1974,[68] but it was made illegal once again on 3 October 1975; therefore, during the period between April 1974 and October 1975, membership of the UVF was not a crime. The largest loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was also not proscribed at the time.[69]

Attacks attributed to the Glenanne gang

In 2004, the Pat Finucane Centre asked Professor Douglas Cassel (formerly of Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago) to convene an international inquiry to investigate collusion by members of the British security forces in sectarian killings in Northern Ireland committed during the mid-1970s. The gang's involvement in the killings was to be investigated in particular.[70]

The panel interviewed victims and their relatives, as well as four members of the security forces. The four members of the security forces were: RUC SPG officers John Weir and Billy McCaughey; psychological warfare operative Colin Wallace and MI6 operative Captain Fred Holroyd. They all implicated the Glenanne gang in the attacks. In seven out of eight cases, ballistic tests corroborated Weir's claims linking the killings to weapons carried by the security forces. The interviews revealed many similarities in the way the attacks were carried out, while various documents (including the Barron Report) established a chain of ballistic history linking weapons and killings to the gang. Justice Barron commented in reference to the gang:

"This joining of RUC and UDR members with members of Loyalist paramilitary organisations is emphasised by the use of the same or connected guns by intermingled groups of these organisations."[71]

The Glenanne gang has been linked to the following attacks and/or incidents:[4][72]

1972 and 1973

1974

1975

January-April

May-August

September-December

Vallely's pub in Ardress

1976

1977 onward

The Glenanne farm and the Dublin and Monaghan bombings

James Mitchell, RUC reserve officer and owner of the Glenanne farm

It is claimed in the Barron Report that Billy Hanna had asked James Mitchell for permission to use his farm as a UVF arms dump and bomb-making site.[113] Information that Loyalist paramilitaries were regularly meeting at the farm appeared on Army Intelligence documents from late 1972.[114] According to submissions received by Mr Justice Barron, the Glenanne farm was used to build and store the bombs that exploded in Dublin and Monaghan. The report claims they were placed onto Robin Jackson's poultry lorry, driven across the border to a carpark, then activated by Hanna and transferred to three allocated cars. These cars exploded almost simultaneously in Dublin's city centre at about 5.30pm during evening rush hour, killing 26 civilians. Ninety minutes later a fourth car bomb exploded in Monaghan, killing another seven civilians.

Mitchell and his female housekeeper, Lily Shields both denied knowledge that the farm was used for illicit paramilitary activity. They also denied partaking in any UVF attacks.[115] In his affidavit, John Weir affirms that the farmhouse was used as a base for UVF operations that included the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.[116] Weir also stated that on one occasion an RUC constable gave him two weapons to store at the Glenanne farm:

"He then offered me the two sub-machine guns because he knew about my connection to Loyalist paramilitaries. I accepted them and took them to Mitchell's farmhouse".[117]

In his affidavit, Weir recounted when in March 1976 he had gone to the farm where between eight to ten men dressed in camouflage had been parading in the farmyard. Inside he had discussed with Mitchell and others the details of a planned bombing and shooting attack against a nationalist pub, Tully's in Belleeks. Mitchell had shown him the floor plans of the pub's interior which he had drawn up highlighting the lack of escape routes for the pub's patrons. The plan was temporarily called off when it was discovered that the Army's Parachute Regiment was on patrol that evening in the area. Weir returned to Belfast the next day and the attack went ahead that evening, 8 March. There were no casualties, however, as Mitchell's floor plans had been inaccurate, and the customers had fled into the pub's living quarters for safety once the shooting had commenced outside, and the bomb only caused structural damage to the building.[40]

Mr. Justice Barron concluded in his report:

"It is likely that the farm of James Mitchell at Glenanne played a significant part in the preparation for the attacks [Dublin and Monaghan bombings]. It is also likely that members of the UDR and RUC either participated in, or were aware of those preparations."[118]

Miami Showband massacre

Site of the Miami Showband killings, in which the Glenanne gang was implicated

On 31 July 1975, four days after Hanna's shooting and Jackson's assumption of leadership of the Mid-Ulster brigade,[119] the Miami Showband's minibus was flagged-down outside Newry by armed UVF men wearing British Army uniforms at a bogus military checkpoint. Two UVF men (Harris Boyle and Wesley Somerville) loaded a time delay bomb on the minibus but it exploded prematurely and killed them.[120] The remaining UVF gunmen then opened fire on the bandmembers, killing three (Brian McCoy, Anthony Geraghty and Fran O'Toole) and wounding two (Stephen Travers and Des McAlea).[121] Two of the three men convicted of the killings and sentenced to life imprisonment were serving members of the UDR, and the third was a former member.[121][122] The Luger pistol used in the attack was found to have been the same one used to kill Provisional IRA member John Francis Green in January 1975 and was also used in the O'Dowd killings of January 1976.[39][121] The following May, the security forces found Jackson's fingerprints on a home-made silencer attached to a Luger. Although charged, Jackson avoided conviction.[123] A Sterling 9mm submachine gun was also used in the Miami Showband killings.[124] The 2003 Barron Report suggests that the guns were taken from the stockpile of weapons at the Glenanne farm.[125] The Luger pistol used in the Green, Miami Showband, and O'Dowd attacks was later destroyed by the RUC on 28 August 1978.[126]

Liaison officer Captain Robert Nairac has been linked to the Miami Showband killings and the killing of John Francis Green.[127] Miami Showband survivors Stephen Travers and Des McAlea both testified in court that a man with a "crisp, clipped English accent, and wearing a different uniform and beret" had been at the scene of the explosion and subsequent shootings.[127] Martin Dillon in The Dirty War, however, adamantly states that Nairac was not involved in either attack.[128] The Cassel Report concluded that there was "credible evidence that the principal perpetrator [of the Miami Showband attack] was a man who was not prosecuted – alleged RUC Special Branch agent Robin Jackson".[129] Although Jackson had been questioned by the RUC following the Showband attack, he was released without having been charged.[130]

Reavey and O'Dowd killings and the Kingsmill massacre

The co-ordinated sectarian shootings of the Reavey and O'Dowd families, allegedly perpetrated by the Glenanne gang and organised by Robin Jackson, provoked the South Armagh Republican Action Force to retaliate with a tit-fot-tat sectarian attack the following day. It stopped a minibus at Kingsmill and shot dead the ten Protestant passengers, after being taken out of their minibus which was transporting them home from their workplace in Glenanne.[131]

In 2001 an unidentified Glenanne gang-member (a former RUC man who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for his part in the gang's killings) revealed that the gang had planned to kill at least thirty Catholic schoolchildren as revenge for Kingsmill.[132][133] It drew up plans to attack St Lawrence O'Toole Primary School in the South Armagh village of Belleeks.[132][133] The plan was aborted at the last minute on orders of the UVF leadership; who ruled that it would be "morally unacceptable", would undermine support for the UVF, and could lead to civil war.[132][133] The gang-member who suggested the attack was a UDR soldier; he was later shot dead by the IRA. The UVF leadership allegedly suspected that he was working for Military Intelligence,[132][133] and that military intelligence were seeking to provoke a civil war.[134] In 2004, gang-member McCaughey spoke of the planned retaliation and said that the UVF leadership also feared the potential IRA response.[134]

Convictions

The Cassel Report states that convictions were obtained in only nine of the 25 cases it investigated and that several of those convictions are suspect as erroneous and incomplete.[135] A month before Nairac's killing, a Catholic chemist, William Strathearn, was gunned down at his home in Ahoghill, County Antrim. SPG officers Weir and McCaughey were charged and convicted for the killing. Weir named Jackson as having been the gunman but Jackson was never interrogated for "reasons of operational strategy".[136] The Special Patrol Group was disbanded in 1980 by the RUC after the convictions of Weir and McCaughey for the Strathearn killing.[137]

In December 1978 the authorities raided the Glenanne farm and found weapons and ammunition. This made it necessary for the gang to seek an alternative base of operations and arms dump.[138] James Mitchell was charged and convicted of storing weapons on his land.[139] Northern Ireland's Lord Chief Justice Robert Lowry presided over his trial on 30 June 1980.[140] The farm had been under RUC observation for several months before the raid.[141]

On 16 October 1979, Robin Jackson was arrested when he was found with a number of weapons and hoods. In January 1981 he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for possession of guns and ammunition, but was then released in May 1983.[35] John Weir stated that the Glenanne gang usually did not use the name "UVF" whenever it claimed its attacks; instead it typically employed the cover names of Red Hand Commando, Red Hand Brigade or Protestant Action Force.[47]

Later developments

A judicial review into the actions of the gang was announced by the High Court in Belfast in February 2015.[142]

See also

References

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Bibliography

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