Hindenburg Programme

Hindenburg (l.) and Ludendorff, September 1916

The Hindenburg Programme of August 1916 is the name given to the armaments and economic policy initiated by the German Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, OHL) in order to double German industrial production greatly to increase munitions output.

Provisions and impact

The attrition warfare strategy of Erich von Falkenhayn the Chief of the General Staff, had failed at the Battle of Verdun and Battle of the Somme in 1916. Many German soldiers were killed and German war production was unable to cope with the massive demand for arms, munitions and war material. On 29 August 1916, Falkenhayn was forced to resign and was replaced by Field marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) and his deputy General Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937). Ludendorff, driving force behind Falkenhayn's dismissal, had developed plans to compensate the loss of "human material" by a vast material superiority.

The Hindenburg Programme was largely drafted by Ludendorff's confidant Lieutenant Colonel Max Bauer (1869–1929), an artillery expert with good contacts to the German heavy industry. The production of ammunition and Minenwerfer was to double by 1917, the manufacture of artillery and machine guns was expected to triple. The gunpowder production was set to be increased from 6,000–12,000 t (5,900–11,800 long tons) per month. Building material and military aircraft production increases were also among the objectives. On 1 November 1916, a new Kriegsamt agency affiliated to the Prussian Ministry of War was established, to supervise the German war economy, headed by General Wilhelm Groener (1867–1939). The Hindenburg Programme was provided with a legal basis in the Gesetz über den vaterländischen Hilfsdienst (Support Services Act) implemented on 6 December.^[1]

The aims were unrealistic and required enormous infrastructural investment, for which, soldiers were taken from the front line; 1.2 million men in September 1916 and a further 1.7 million in July 1917.^[2] Enterprises "not important to the war economy" were closed to supply more workers. Men, horses and fuel were taken from agricultural production for the army and munitions, which caused food shortages and food price inflation, leading to the close of 1918 seeing Germany on the verge of starvation.^[3]

See also

• Total war
• Military–industrial complex

Notes

1. Full text (German)
2. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (Fontana, 1989), p. 348.
3. Kennedy, p. 349.

Further reading

• Feldman, G. D. (1992) [1966]. Army, Industry and Labor in Germany 1914–1918 (Berg repr. ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-85496-764-8.
• Offer, A. (1989). The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation. London: Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19821-946-0.