Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict

Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
Part of Arab Winter
Date 14 March 2011[1] – present (5 years, 1 month and 3 weeks) Location  Bahrain  Syria  Yemen Result Ongoing: Suppression of Bahraini opposition demonstrators from 2011 until 2012.[2] Iranian and Saudi involvement in Syria and Yemen. Formation of the Islamic Military Alliance in 15 December 2015. Severing of diplomatic relations by Saudi Arabia in 3 January 2016[3] Saudi Arabia and the UAE ban their citizens from visiting Lebanon and suspends military aid due to possible Iranian influence and Lebanon's refusal to condemn the Iran embassy attack.[4]
Belligerents
Iran	Saudi Arabia
Bahraini uprising Bahraini Opposition	Bahrain  United Arab Emirates  Pakistan  Jordan
Syrian Civil War  Syria Hezbollah  Russia Support:  North Korea[5][6][7]	Syrian Opposition Army of Conquest[8][9] Support:  Qatar[8][9]  Turkey[8][9] United States[10]  France[11]
Yemeni Civil War Yemen (Revolutionary Committee) Revolutionary Committee[12]	Yemen (Hadi government) Southern Movement[13]  United Arab Emirates[14]  Sudan[14]  Bahrain[14]  Kuwait[14]  Qatar[14]  Jordan[14]  Djibouti[14]  Egypt[14]  Senegal[15] Support:  Somalia[16]  Pakistan[17]  Turkey[18]
Commanders and leaders
Ali Khamenei Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Hassan Rouhani Qasem Soleimani Bashar Al Assad Hassan Nasrallah Hadi Al-Amiri Abdul-Malik Houthi	King Abdullah King Salman Mohammad bin Salman Albay Ahmed Berri Nawaz Sharif Abd Rabbuh Hadi King Hamad
Units involved
Hezbollah Syrian Armed Forces Iranian Armed Forces Yemeni Republican Guard	Free Syrian Army Security Forces Saudi Arabian Armed Forces Bahrain Defence Force

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are said to have been involved in a proxy war^[19] in the Middle East, particularly in the Syrian Civil War^[20][21][22] and Yemeni Civil War.^[23][24] The proxy conflict has also been referred to as the Mideast Cold War.^[25]

The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is on multiple levels, including the most notable the religious historic rivalry of the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam,^[19] as well as modern geopolitical competition over hegemony in the Middle East and economic rivalry over control of the oil markets.^[26]

Background

The proxy conflict can be traced back to the Iranian Revolution, where Iran became an Islamic Republic. Iranian Islamic revolutionaries called specifically for the overthrow of monarchies and their replacement with Islamic republics, much to the alarm of its smaller Sunni-run Arab neighbors Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Persian Gulf States – most of whom were monarchies and all of whom had sizable Shi'a populations. Islamist insurgents rose in Saudi Arabia (1979), Egypt (1981), Syria (1982), and Lebanon (1983).

Even before the Iranian Revolution, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had oil wealth and prestige as the land of Mecca and Medina, the two holy cities of Islam. To using Islam, Saudi Arabia sponsored an international Islamic conference in Mecca in 1962. It created the Muslim World League, dedicated to spreading Islam and fostering Islamic solidarity. The League was "extremely effective" in promoting Islam, particularly conservative Wahhabi Islam in the Muslim world.^[27] Saudi Arabia also spearheaded the creation of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in 1969.

In 1980, the Arab Nationalist and Sunni Muslim-dominated regime of Saddam Hussein of neighboring Iraq, attempted to take advantage of revolutionary chaos and destroy the revolution in its infancy. This triggered the Iran-Iraq war which lasted for eight years, killing hundreds of thousands. During the war, Iraq was supported by many countries including Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE, who supplied either financial or military aid to Iraq to prevent Iran from exporting its 'Islamic Revolution'. Apart from the Iran-Iraq War, Iran and Saudi Arabia have engaged in tense rivalry, supporting different armed groups in Lebanese Civil War, the Soviet–Afghan War and other conflicts. After the Cold War, Iran^[28] and Saudi Arabia^[29][30] continued to support different groups and organizations among sectarian lines such as in Iraq and Yemen.

History

Nuclear program of Iran

Involvement in regional conflicts

Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Throughout the conflict, at different times, both Iran (militarily/financially or both) and Saudi Arabia (financially) ^[31] have supported different factions of the Palestinian people. Saudi Arabia has been known to support Fatah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, while Iran has supported Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Popular Resistance Committees and PFLP-GC.^[32]

Both Saudi Arabia and Iran pursue different methods to end the conflict. Saudi Arabia and Arab League, support a negotiated peace, based on the two-state solution, promoting the Arab Peace Initiative.^[33] Iran, on the other hand calls for Israel's destruction.^[34] Iran has supported Hezbollah,^[35] Hamas ^[36] and Palestinian Islamic Jihad ^[37] which are committed to Israel's destruction and has engaged in attacks against Israel.

Support of Hamas

Until the Mid-2000s, half of Hamas's support came from the Persian Gulf States. Saudi Arabia supplied half of the Hamas budget in the early 2000s^[38] but, under U.S. pressure, began cut its funding by cracking down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers to Hamas in 2004,^[39] which by 2006 drastically reduced the flow of money from that area. Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Hamas's 2006 electoral victory stepped in to fill the shortfall.^[40][41]

Iran in the 1980s began by providing 10% of Hamas's funding, which it increased annually until by the 1990s it supplied $30 million,^[38] It accounted for $22 million, over a quarter of Hamas's budget, by the late 2000s,^[39] According to Matthew Levitt, Iran preferred direct financing to operative groups rather than charities, requiring video proof of attacks.^[39][42] Much of the Iran funding is said to be channeled through Hezbollah.^[39] After 2006 Iran's willingness to take over the burden of the shortfall created by the drying up of Saudi funding also reflected the geopolitical tensions between the two, since, though Shiite, Iran was supporting a Sunni group traditionally closely linked with the Saudi kingdom.^[43]

After 2009, sanctions on Iran made funding difficult, forcing Hamas to rely on religious donations by individuals in the West Bank, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Funds, amounting to tens of millions of dollars raised in the Gulf states, were transferred through the Rafah Border Crossing. These were not sufficient to cover the costs of governing the Strip and running al-Qassam Brigades, and when tensions arose with Iran over support of President Assad in Syria, ran dropped its financial assistance to the government, restricting its funding to the military wing, which meant a drop from $150 million in 2012 to $60 million the following year. A further drop occurred in 2015 when Hamas expressed its criticisms of Iran's role in the Yemeni Civil War.^[44]

In Bahrain

In Syria

In Yemen

Recent events

On 2 January 2016, 47 people were put to death in several Saudi cities, including prominent Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Protesters of the executions responded by demonstrating in Iran’s capital, Tehran. That same day a few protesters would eventually ransack the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and later set it ablaze.^[45] Police donned riot gear and arrested 40 people during the incident.^[46][47][48]

In response, Saudi Arabia, along with its allies, Bahrain, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and the Comoros cut diplomatic ties with Iran.^[49][50]

See also

• Iran–Saudi Arabia relations
• Shia–Sunni relations
• Arab Cold War
• Arab Spring
• Iran–Saudi Arabia football rivalry
• Iran-Israel proxy conflict
• Cold War II
• Arab-Israeli Conflict

Notes

References

1. "Bahrain king declares state of emergency after protests". BBC News.
2. "Bahrain: Widespread Suppression, Scant Reforms". Human Rights Watch.
3. Chulov, Martin (4 January 2016). "Saudi Arabia cuts diplomatic ties with Iran after execution of cleric". The Guardian.
4. MEE staff (February 23, 2016). "Saudi Arabia and UAE tell citizens to avoid Lebanon". Middle East Eye. Retrieved February 24, 2016.
5. "Report: Iran, North Korea Helping Syria Resume Building Missiles". Retrieved 18 November 2014.
6. Ryall, Julian (6 June 2013). "Syria: North Korean military 'advising Assad regime'". The Telegraph. Retrieved 2 August 2013.
7. "North Korea violating sanctions, according to UN report". The Telegraph. 3 July 2012. Retrieved 6 October 2012.
8. Wladimir van Wilgenburg (12 June 2015). "The Rise of Jaysh al-Fateh in Northern Syria". Terrorism Monitor. Vol. XIII no. 12 (Jamestown Foundation). p. 3.
9. Gareth Porter (28 May 2015). "Gulf allies and ‘Army of Conquest’". Al-Ahram Weekly.
10. "U.S. weapons reaching Syrian rebels". Washington Post. September 11, 2013.
11. "Hollande confirms French delivery of arms to Syrian rebels". 2014-08-21. Retrieved 2015-01-16.
12. Reardon, Martin (25 March 2015). "Saudi Arabia, Iran and the 'Great Game' in Yemen". Al Jazeera.
13. "Southern Movement now siding with Hadi: "It is our duty to defend the south... we in the movement will abandon our peaceful means and take up arms against the Houthis" : YemeniCrisis". reddit.
14. "Egypt, Jordan, Sudan and Pakistan ready for ground offensive in Yemen: report". the globe and mail. 26 March 2015. Archived from the original on March 26, 2015. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
15. "Senegal to send 2,100 troops to join Saudi-led alliance". Reuters. 4 May 2015. Retrieved 4 May 2015.
16. "SOMALIA: Somalia finally pledges support to Saudi-led coalition in Yemen – Raxanreeb Online". RBC Radio. 7 April 2015. Archived from the original on June 26, 2015. Retrieved 7 April 2015.
17. Hussain, Tom (17 April 2015). "Pakistan agrees to send ships to block arms shipments to Yemen rebels". McClatchy Newspapers. Retrieved 17 April 2015.
18. (Turkish) Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Husi terörüne karşı Yemen'e destek verdi
19. Jennifer Rubin (6 January 2016). "The Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy war". Washington Post.
20. Gerges, Fawaz (15 December 2013). "Saudi Arabia and Iran must end their proxy war in Syria". The Guardian.
21. Rogin, Josh (4 November 2015). "Iran and Saudi Arabia Clash Inside Syria Talks". Bloomberg View. ...Iran and Saudi Arabia to discuss anything civilly, much less come to an agreement on Syria, where both sides have proxy forces in the fight.
22. Loewenstein, Jennifer. "Heading Toward a Collision: Syria, Saudi Arabia and Regional Proxy Wars". CounterPunch. Saudi Arabian and Iranian-backed factions are contributing to the proxy war in Syria...
23. Tisdall, Simon (25 March 2015). "Iran-Saudi proxy war in Yemen explodes into region-wide crisis". The Guardian.
24. Browning, Noah. "The Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy war in Yemen has reached a new phase". Business Insider.
25. New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran 's Rivalry.
26. Kenneth M. Pollack (8 January 2016). "Fear and Loathing in Saudi Arabia". Foreign Policy.
27. Gold, Dore (2003). Hatred's Kingdom. Washington, DC: Regnery. pp. 75–6.
28. "State Sponsors: Iran". Council on Foreign Relations.
29. "How Saudi Wahhabism Is the Fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism". The Huffington Post. 21 January 2015.
30. Patrick Cockburn (11 January 2016). "Prince Mohammed bin Salman: Naive, arrogant Saudi prince is playing with fire". The Independent.
31. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/saudipal.html
32. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65479.pdf
33. Time to Test the Arab Peace Offer. By Scott MacLeod. Time. 8 January 2009.
34. Barany, Ronen (28 January 2012). היום האחרון [The Last Day] (in Hebrew and English). Retrieved 26 July 2012.
35. Norton, Augustus (1987). Amal and the Shi'a: the struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Austin: University of Texas Press. pp. 167–87. ISBN 0-292-73040-3.
36. The Avalon Project: Hamas Covenant 1988
37. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21599826-decline-hamas-may-result-new-wave-chaos-whos-charge The Gaza Strip: Who's in charge?
38. Marsh E.Burfeindt, 'Rapprochement with Iran', in Thomas A. Johnson (ed.),Power, National Security, and Transformational Global Events: Challenges Confronting America, China, and Iran, CRC Press, 2012 pp.185-235 p.198.
39. Jodi Vittori, Terrorist Financing and Resourcing, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 pp.72-74, p.193 notes 50,51.
40. Levitt p.173.
41. Joshua L. Gleis, Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012 p.156.
42. Levitt,pp.172-174.
43. Lawrence Rubin,Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics, Stanford University Press, 2014 p.104
44. Davis, p.173.
45. Yousuf Basil, Salma Abdelaziz and Michael Pearson, CNN (2 January 2016). "Tehran protest after Saudi Arabia executes Shiite cleric - CNN.com". CNN. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
46. Loveluck, Louisa. "Iran supreme leader says Saudi faces 'divine revenge'". Telegraph.co.uk. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
47. Staff writers. "Farsnews". en.farsnews.com. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
48. Ben Brumfield, Yousuf Basil and Michael Pearson, CNN (3 January 2016). "Mideast protests rage after Saudi Arabia executes Shia cleric al-Nimr, 46 others". CNN. Retrieved 3 January 2016.
49. "More countries back Saudi Arabia in Iran dispute".
50. Ali Mmadi (14 January 2016). "Comoros Cuts Ties With Iran in Solidarity With Saudi Arabia". Bloomberg.com.