KN-08

KN-08
Type Ballistic missile , Mobile IRBM ICBM TEL , can be modified as SLBM
Place of origin  North Korea
 Soviet Union/ Russia
Service history
Used by  North Korea
Production history
Manufacturer  North Korea
Specifications
Length 16 m PVB 18 m longer (12 to ± 20 m , improvements can be longer (RS-24\RT2PM2 dimensions))
Diameter 1,8 m (1,60 to 1,87 m ± (if it enlarged , like No\RoDong was maded and other missiles))
Warhead nuclear TNW 20 100 kt to + - 10 Mt (also HE)
Engine Liquid , three stages or two + warhead stage (also Solid can be the 3rd or 4th(wh stage)) , probable the same or derived from R-29
Propellant storable , liquid (also solid) or TG02 or hydrazine UDMH with IRFNA AK or NTO N2O4
Operational
range
 3000 5000 Km to 12000 Km more or less (depend also from propellant , with IRFNA AK TG02 the range is half , 1500 2500 to 6000 + - )
Launch
platform
 MAZ-based vehicle , SLBM variant on submarines

The KN-08, also known under the names No-dong-C and Hwasong-13 (Korean: 화성 13호 Hanja: 火星 13號), is a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile believed[1] to be under development by North Korea.[2][3][4][5] The changes shown in the mock-up displayed in October 2015 indicated a change from a three to two stage design.[6]

Development

Mock-ups of the missile were first displayed during a military parade in April 2012 to mark the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung.[3][4][7][8] Six missiles were carried on 16-wheel [9] transporter erector launchers,[10][11] similar in size to those used by the Russian RT-2PM2 Topol-M missiles.[5] The TELs are thought to be based on WS-51200 frames made by Wanshan Special Vehicle in China,[4][8] possibly using technology from Minsk Automobile Plant.[5][12] UN investigators have concluded that the TELs were Chinese WS51200 trucks exported to North Korea for lumber transport. The North Koreans converted them into TELs by installing hydraulic gear and controls to erect a missile. Despite being converted to fire a missile, the truck would not be likely to survive damage from the rocket exhaust like a purpose-built TEL, making it a single-use launcher.[13]

Mock-ups were again paraded in 2013, with fewer discrepancies between them than in the previous year.[14] The KN-08 was paraded again to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of Korean Workers Party on 11 October 2015. In this parade, the missile featured a modified smaller-in-length but larger-in-diameter third stage plus re-entry vehicle section design,[15] which has led to suggestions that North Korea might have perfected nuclear warhead miniaturization.

The KN-08 mock-up dimensions are estimated to be: length of about 17.1 metres, and first and second stage diameter of about 1.9 metres, reducing to about 1.25 metres for the third stage.[16] Liquid-fueled ICBMs generally only have two stages for best performance, with a few exceptions (usually when an existing design is upgraded). The three stage design of the KN-08 is puzzling.[17] While a three stage design is common for solid propellant ICBMs, western analysts say that North Korea lacks the experience and ability to develop a solid-fueled ICBM.[18]

In early 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that although they had not seen the KN-08 tested, they believed North Korea had the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08, and it was prudent to plan for that threat.[19] The KN-08 theoretically poses a threat to the U.S. homeland, able to deliver a 500–700 kg (1,100–1,500 lb) payload 7,500–9,000 km (4,700–5,600 mi) to the American West Coast. Practically speaking however, its accuracy is likely "barely adequate" to target large cities, mobility would be limited to paved roads, and the system will require 1–2 hours of pre-launch fueling. The KN-08 may achieve an “emergency operational status” by 2020.[20]

New KN-08 based missile: KN-14

The mock-up displayed by North Korea in October 2015 was significantly different to previous years, with two stages rather than three. Overall size was somewhat reduced, with larger fuel tanks for the two stages. It was no longer built with extensive riveting, suggesting a more modern structural design, with reduced weight.[6]

On 31 March 2016, the Washington Free Beacon reported that North Korea this missile shown in 2015 is a new missile, KN-14 instead of KN08. The KN-14 missile, being similar to Russian R-29 SLBM in terms of appearance, but with a range of 8,000 to 10,000 km. Therefore, KN-14 is also given a nickname of "KN-08 on steroids". Neither KN08 nor KN14 have flight tested as of 2016 April, but the report claimed that North Korea has tested the missiles in "all other aspects". This report noted that Rick Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in this report concluded KN-14 with a 10,000 km range could hit Chicago and Toronto, but insufficient range to hit Washington from the furthest North point in North Korea.[21] The report is also quickly republished in Japanese,[22] Chinese,[23] Taiwanese[24] and Korean[25][26] media.

Reactions from Chinese Military Expert

For this new missile, the CCTV 4 aired a 9 minute long interview with a Chinese Military expert discussing about KN-14 and North Korea's potential in future. This video was subsequently uploaded into other Chinese Internet TV.[27]

The Chinese expert in the video has estimated that North Korea can have a true ICBM strike against US mainland within 5 years to 10 years from now (2016), if they can successfully master their Musudan missile. He stated that the technology and the theory behind an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile is exactly the same as an ICBM except that ICBM involves more Stage separation in order for the missile to have a longer range. North Korea have successfully demonstrated their Stage Separation technology by the latest 2 satellite launches in 2012 and 2016.

However, he have noted the 2 weakness from North Korea missile's development program.

One would be all the North Korea missiles are based on the older missile designs. Therefore, the flaws in older missile designs would have continued in their new missile development due to the fact that North Korea has done only minimal flight tests than any other countries with active missile development program.

The other aspect would be all of the North Korea ballistic missiles, excepts KN-02 is a liquid fuel missile. Therefore, the procedure to prepare, fuel and launch needs to take hours of time. This amount of time would have given enemies such as United States or South Korea to conduct airstrike and destroy the missiles before it was being launched.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Gertz, Bill (December 5, 2011). "North Korea making missile able to hit U.S.". The Washington Times: 1–4. Retrieved 2013-04-12.
  2. ↑ C. P. Vick (2012–13). "KN-08:The semi-mobile Limited Range ICBM – No-dong-C". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2013-04-13.
  3. 1 2 Jonathan Marcus (27 April 2012). "New ICBM missiles at North Korea parade 'fake'". BBC News. Retrieved 2013-04-13.
  4. 1 2 3 "An essential aspect of ballistic proliferation: transporter erector launchers (TEL)". CESIM. 2012. Retrieved 2013-04-13.
  5. 1 2 3 Nick Hansen (4 May 2012). "North Korea’s New Long-Range Missile – Fact or Fiction". 38 North. Retrieved 2013-04-12.
  6. 1 2 John Schilling, Jeffrey Lewis, David Schmerler (22 December 2015). "A New ICBM for North Korea?". 38 North (U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies). Retrieved 6 January 2016.
  7. ↑ Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker (April 18, 2012). "A Dog and Pony Show, North Korea’s New ICBM" (PDF). armscontrolwonk. Retrieved 2013-04-12.
  8. 1 2 Craig Scanlan (April 19, 2012). "North Korea’s Newest Road-Mobile Ballistic Missile". Asia Security Watch. Retrieved 2013-04-12.
  9. ↑ Jeffrey Lewis (September 11, 2012). "KN-08 Markings". armscontrolwonk. Retrieved 2013-04-12.
  10. ↑ "North Korean missile vehicle 'similar' to China design". BBC News. 20 April 2012. Retrieved 2013-04-13.
  11. ↑ "US 'kept quiet over Chinese UN breach' on North Korea". The Telegraph. 13 Jun 2012. Retrieved 2013-04-12.
  12. ↑ Melissa Hanham (July 31, 2012). "North Korea's Procurement Network Strikes Again: Examining How Chinese Missile Hardware Ended Up in Pyongyang". NTI. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
  13. ↑ Tales Of The Forbidden TEL - Strategypage.com, 19 July 2013
  14. ↑ Jeffrey Lewis and John Schilling (4 November 2013). "Real Fake Missiles: North Korea's ICBM Mockups Are Getting Scary Good". 38 North (U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies). Retrieved 14 January 2014.
  15. ↑ Richard D. Fisher (12 October 2015). "North Korea unveils new version of KN-08 ICBM". Janes Defence. Retrieved 13 October 2015.
  16. ↑ John Schilling (12 March 2015). "Where's That North Korean ICBM Everyone Was Talking About?". 38 North (U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies). Retrieved 15 March 2015.
  17. ↑ Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker (2 May 2012). The Assumed KN-08 Technology (PDF) (Report). Retrieved 12 April 2013.
  18. ↑ Markus Schiller (2012). Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat (Report). RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-7621-2. TR-1268-TSF. Retrieved 19 January 2013.
  19. ↑ Aaron Mehta (8 April 2015). "US: N. Korean Nuclear ICBM Achievable". DefenseNews (Gannett). Retrieved 12 April 2015.
  20. ↑ John Schilling, Henry (Long) Kan (2015). The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems (PDF) (Report). US-Korea Institute at SAIS.
  21. ↑ http://freebeacon.com/national-security/pentagon-confirms-new-north-korean-icbm/
  22. ↑ http://www.news24.jp/articles/2016/04/01/10326292.html
  23. ↑ http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2016-04-01/doc-ifxqxcnr5175529.shtml
  24. ↑ http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20160402001587-260417
  25. ↑ http://news.donga.com/BestClick/3/all/20160401/77351139/1
  26. ↑ http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_Po_detail.htm?lang=e&id=Po&No=118042&current_page=
  27. ↑ http://tv.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0401/c67816-28245618.html
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