Market game
In economic theory, a market game is a game explaining price formation through game theory. Typically implementing a general equilibrium outcome as a Nash equilibrium.
Fundamentally in a market game, markets in a strategic way that does not involve price. The key ingredients to model market games is the definition of such trading posts, and their price formation mechanisms as a function of the action of players. A leading example is the Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik [1] trading post game.[2]
Shapley-Shubik use a numeraire and trading posts for goods, the relative price of each good with the numeraire is chosen in inverse proportion to the relative quantity of goods and numeraire brought to each posts so that posts can clear. Pradeep Dubey and John Geanakoplos show that such a game can be a strategic foundation of the Walras equilibrium.[3] A key ingredient of such approaches is to have oceanic players in a way that for each player the action appear to him as a linear constraint that he cannot influence.
References
- ↑ Shapley, L., Shubik, M., 1977. Trade using one commodity as a means of payment. Journal of Political Economy 85, 937–968.
- ↑ Strategic market games: an introduction
- ↑ From Nash to Walras via Shapley–Shubik