Foreign Office (Germany)

Federal Foreign Office
Auswärtiges Amt (AA)
Agency overview
Formed 1870 (1870)
Jurisdiction Government of Germany
Headquarters Werderscher Markt 1
10117 Berlin
Annual budget €3.725 billion (2015)[1]
Minister responsible
Agency executives
Website http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de
Foreign Office on the Spree river

The Federal Foreign Office (German:  Auswärtiges Amt ), abbreviated AA, is the foreign ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany, a federal agency responsible for both the country's foreign politics and its relationship with the European Union. It is a cabinet-level ministry.

The term "Auswärtiges Amt" was the name of the Foreign Office established in 1870 by the North German Confederation, which then became German Empire's Foreign Office in 1871. It is still the name of the German foreign ministry today. From 1871 to 1919, the Foreign Office was led by a Foreign Secretary, and since 1919, it has been led by the Foreign Minister of Germany. Since December 2013, Frank-Walter Steinmeier has served as Foreign Minister, succeeding Guido Westerwelle. The primary seat of the ministry is at the Werderscher Markt square in the Mitte district, the historic centre of Berlin.

New Foreign Office building in Berlin (centre) with former Reichsbank (left)

History

The Auswärtiges Amt was established in 1870 to form the foreign policy of the North German Confederation, and from 1871 of the German Empire. The Foreign Office was originally led by a secretary of state (therefore not called a ministry), while the Chancellor remained in charge of foreign affairs.

Foreign Office on Wilhelmstraße 76, about 1880
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic to 1972

In the first years of the German nation-state under Otto von Bismarck, the Foreign Office on Wilhelmstrasse No. 76 next to the Reich Chancellery had two departments: one for political affairs and the other for economic, legal and consular matters. After Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, another department for colonial policy was established, spun off as the separate Reichskolonialamt in 1907. Bismarck in order to maintain his control of the Auswärtiges Amt appointed his son Herbert von Bismarck as State Secretary.[2] That Bismarck appointed his rather incompetent son as State Secretary reflected his determination to be his own foreign minister, and his need for an utterly loyal man to run the Auswärtiges Amt when he was not around. Bismarck would not accept opinions contrary to his own, and only those diplomats who were devoted to him rose to high rank.[3] One British diplomat wrote of Count Paul von Hatzfeldt that he was "a shrewd, cautious man without convictions, who does what he is told intelligently and diligently, and that is what Bismarck likes in his agents".[4] However, Bismarck did greatly value accurate information, and as such diplomats tended to report what they believed to be the truth back to Berlin.

Right from the start, the Auswärtiges Amt was very socially exclusive. To join, one needed a university degree, preferably in jurisprudence and needed to prove that one had a considerable private income.[5] In 1880, a candidate had to prove that he had a private income of at least 6,000 marks/annum in order to join; by 1900, the requirement was 10,000 marks/annum and by 1912, a candidate needed at least 15,000 marks/annum to join.[6] This requirement explains why so many German diplomats married richer women because without the wealth of their wives they would never had been able to join the Auswärtiges Amt.[7] The income requirement to enter the AA was only dropped in 1918.[8] Aristocrats were very much overrepresented in the Auswärtiges Amt. During the Imperial period, 69% of the 548 men who served in the Auswärtiges Amt were noblemen, and every single ambassador during the Second Reich was an aristocrat.[9] The most important department by far was the Political Department which between 1871-1918 was 61% aristocratic; middle-class men tended to serve in the less important Legal, Trade and Colonial Departments.[10] In the 19th century, it was believed that only aristocrats had the proper social standing and graces to correctly represent the Reich abroad as ambassadors, which explains why no commoner was ever appointed ambassador during the Imperial era.[11] The British historian John C. G. Röhl wrote:

"In the great embassies of Europe-in London, Vienna, St Petersburg, Rome, Madrid and Constantinople, but in Paris, too-only an aristocrat of one of the highest-born families could play the role in court society which his position as ambassador demanded. He had to invite the right people and be invited by them in return in order to represent the interests of his country with dignity-and also in order to collect the secret information which he required for his reports. His wife, too, had to be acceptable at court and preferably possess money, charm and intelligence."[12]

Additionally, during the entire duration of the 'old' Auswärtiges Amt from 1871 to 1945, Roman Catholics were underrepresented in the Auswärtiges Amt, comprising between 15-20% of the AA's personnel.[13] The Auswärtiges Amt was largely a Protestant institution with Protestant candidates favored over Catholic candidates when it came to recruitment.[14] Even more underrepresented were the Jews. During the Imperial period from 1871 to 1918, the Auswärtiges Amt had only three Jewish members, plus four Jews who had converted to Lutheranism in order to improve their career prospects.[15] If Jews were not formally excluded, Jewish candidates were rarely accepted because of a climate of snobbish anti-Semitism, where Jews were considered to be too pushy, vulgar and lacking in social graces to be diplomats However, there was some meritocratic elements within the AA. Besides for the income requirement, to enter the AA during the Imperial period, only candidates with the best grades at university and who knew two foreign languages were considered, and to join one had to pass what was widely considered to be one of the toughest diplomatic entrance exams in the world.[16]

In the years preceding World War I, the Auswärtiges Amt was responsible for the country's foreign policy under Emperor Wilhelm II, and played a key role in the Reich's pursuit of Weltpolitik (World Politics), under which Germany sought to become the world's dominant power. Röhl wrote that:

"The diplomatic corps was without doubt the leading group within the German civil service. Judged not only by its splendid social standing, but also by the political talents of its leading representatives, which are amply attested to by their extensive correspondence with one another, the Auswärtiges Amt and Chiefs of Mission might have been expected to claim the right to determine the course of foreign policy. Indeed in times of a power vacuum (as after Bismarck's fall or the collapse of 1918), in times of extreme danger (as in the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War or during the Hitler regime), the diplomatic corps might even have been tempted to assume political power in order to avert catastrophe. Instead it was content to accept the role of a subordinate executive body."[17]

Röhl further added that the great paradox of the Auswärtiges Amt under Wilhelm II was that despite in many ways having the some of the best and brightest minds in Germany working within it, the Auswärtiges Amt played a key role in the foreign policy that led the Reich straight into the catastrophe of World War I in 1914, and hence into the defeat of 1918, which in turn led to the November Revolution which toppled the monarchy.[18] The principle problem of the AA under Wilhelm was the nature of the Kaiser's personality. Wilhelm was a megalomaniac bully who was most happy in hurting the feelings of others, and throughout his life took a great deal of childish pleasure in playing mean-spirited practical jokes on his entourage. One of Wilhelm's principle pleasures was forcing his leading ministers, generals, and courtiers to perform homoerotic spectacles before him and his court.[19] The leading men of the Reich had to dance before the Emperor and the rest of the court dressed as variously as poodles or ballerinas, while acting very flirtatiously and blowing kisses to the Kaiser.[20] In the early years of the 20th century, contemporaries called the climate at the Kaiser's court, "Byzantinism" as it was the atmosphere at the court was rife with factionalism, intrigue and obsequiousness towards the Emperor.[21] Perhaps, the most infamous case of "Byzantinism" occurred in 1908 when General Dietrich von Hülsen-Haeseler, the Chief of the Emperor's Secret Military Cabinet danced before Wilhelm and his court dressed in a pink ballerina's dress while blowing kisses to the Kaiser, and then felt so humiliated by what he had been forced to do that he promptly dropped dead of a heart attack.[22] The strange atmosphere of Wilhelm's court was where everyone was aggressively competing to see who could degrade themselves the most in these homoerotic spectacles before their flamboyantly campy Emperor was not exactly an environment conductive to critical thinking or a willingness to offer a dissenting opinion.[23] The Foreign State Secretary, Prince Bernhard von Bülow in 1896 wrote an extremely obsequious letter to Wilhelm saying if the Kaiser appointed him Chancellor that he would be nothing more than Wilhelm's "executive tool", that his only wish was to slavishly obey Wilhelm's every command, and act as the Kaiser's "political chief of staff".[24] Bülow's servility had the intended effect, and on 16 October 1900 he was appointed Chancellor. Röhl wrote that even if one accepts that Bülow was an intelligent, cynical and very ambitious man who knew that the best way to the top was via the most abject sycophancy, and that his letter cannot be taken as a sign of Bülow's true feelings, the very fact that Bülow felt it necessary to engage in such flattery of the Kaiser was an important sign of what historians have called the "dengeneration" of the AA under Wilhelm.[25] Bülow's nickname was "Bernard the Obliging", as he was a man who almost never disagreed with Wilhelm even if he believed him to be wrong, and whose "...mostly charming, often also ridiculous flatteries were essentially the result of falseness and a shallow, but also extremely ambitious character".[26] All too often, the diplomats told Wilhelm what he wanted to hear rather than the truth, something that explains much of constantly self-defeating nature of German foreign policy under Wilhelm.[27] For an example, in the years 1904-07, the Reich attempted to form an alliance with the United States on the basis of the supposedly shared year of the "Yellow Peril" with Wilhelm writing to the American President Theodore Roosevelt a series of letters telling him that Germany and the United States must join forces to stop the "yellow peril", especially Japan from conquering the world.[28] It took the diplomats a long time to tell Wilhelm that Roosevelt was a Japanophile who was not impressed with Wilhelm's call for an alliance based on anti-Asian racism.[29] Writing of the "Willy-Teddy" relationship, the German historian Regnild Fiebig-von Hase stated:

"Comparing Wilhelm II's 'personal diplomacy' with Roosevelt's statesmanship reveals the extreme weakness of the first. Roosevelt and his advisors excelled in their rational evaluation of international developments, their country's strength, the international environment, and even the psyche of their counter-players. They adapted their political strategy and actions accordingly. The same cannot be said of Wilhelm II and his top political advisors. Not only were their far-reaching political aims based on unrealistic assumptions, but so was their perception of the global environment and of foreign statesmen. The reasons for this must be sought in a political system which enabled a man like Wilhelm II to be at the center of power. He was responsible for the fact that men like Bülow and Sternburg, who opportunistically adhered to his wishes and advanced their own personal careers to the detriment of the nation, became so influential in German-American relations and German foreign policy in general. In the Byzantinistic 'personal regime' it became more important to please and satisfy the vanities of the Kaiser than to pursue a rational foreign policy and present Germany as a reliable partner in the community of nations".[30]

Despite their loyalty to him and their faithful attempts to execute his every command, Wilhelm wrote with contempt about his own diplomats that they "had so filled their pants that the entire Wilhelmstrasse stinks of shit!".[31]

Beyond that, under Wilhelm the Auswärtiges Amt became engulfed in what Röhl called a "culture of intrigue" from the 1890s onwards.[32] The diplomat Prince Philip von Eulenburg wrote the Wilhelmstrasse during his time there was a "witches kitchen" of plotting as the Auswärtiges Amt schemed against other departments, courtiers, the military, the Emperor's Secret Cabinets, and most of all against itself.[33] The Auswärtiges Amt was split into three factions competing against one another, namely one faction of men loyal to Bismarck, another faction loyal to Friedrich von Holstein, and yet another faction led by Eulenburg and Bülow.[34] This constant plotting and scheming between these factions weakened the execution of German foreign policy.[35] As a whole, the Wilhelmstrasse was never entirely in charge of foreign policy under the Second Reich, but was instead just one out of several agencies, albeit a very important one that made and executed foreign policy.[36]

A nation with whom the Auswärtiges Amt was much concerned during the Imperial period was the Ottoman empire, especially during the Armenian genocide. In 1915, the German ambassador to the Sublime Porte, Baron Hans von Wangenheim told the American ambassador to the Sublime Porte, Henry Morgenthau, Sr. : "I do not blame the Turks for what they are doing to the Armenians...They are entirely justified".[37] On September 28, 1915 Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the ambassador in Washington, D.C. stated to American journalists that reports of a systematic campaign of extermination against the Armenian minority in the Ottoman empire were all "pure inventions", that these reports were all the work of British propaganda and no such campaign of extermination was doing place.[38] However, Wangenheim's successor as ambassador to the Sublime Porte, Count Paul Wolff Metternich was appalled by the Armenian genocide, and unlike Wangenheim, who did not really care about the Armenians, Metternich was prepared to speak out against the genocide. In August 1916, the triumvirate known as the Three Pashas which ruled the Ottoman empire informed the German government that if Count Metternich was not recalled, he would be declared persona non grata. Metternich was promptly recalled from Constantinople rather risk a public relations disaster which potentially could damage German-Ottoman relations during the middle of the war. As the Ottoman empire today would be considered a third world country with no almost modern industry, the Ottoman government was entirely dependent upon weapons from Germany to fight World War I, giving the Reich a powerful form of leverage to apply against the Ottomans on behalf of the Armenians if only the political will in Berlin had been present. In a 2015 speech, the German president Joachim Gauck apologized for his country's inaction, stating that those diplomats who protested against the Armenian genocide were "ignored" by the leadership of Auswärtiges Amt, who valued good relations with the Ottoman empire more than they did the lives of the Armenians.[39]

In 1919, the Foreign Office was reorganized and a modern structure was established. It was now under the authority of a foreign minister, though still called Amt for traditional reasons. In 1922, the Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau was assassinated because he was a Jew. The most notable head of the Foreign Office during the Weimar Republic was Gustav Stresemann, foreign minister from 1923 to 1929, who strived for a reconciliation with the French Third Republic, which earned him - together with Aristide Briand - the 1926 Nobel Peace Prize. In an important sign of changed emphasis within the Auswärtiges Amt, in July 1930 Carl von Schubert, the State Secretary (the number #2 man in the Auswärtiges Amt) and Stresemann's right-hand man was fired and replaced with the "crudely nationalist" Prince Bernhard von Bülow (who is not to be confused with his uncle, Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow).[40] The replacement of Schubert with Bülow marked the ascendency of the more nationalistic fraction within the Auswärtiges Amt who favored a more confrontational foreign policy with regards to France.[41] In May 1932 Baron Konstantin von Neurath was appointed foreign minister in the "Cabinet of the President's Friends" headed by Franz von Papen. Neurath continued on as Foreign Minister under the governments of General Kurt von Schleicher and Adolf Hitler. During the Nazi period, Neurath found himself exposed to increasing competition from Nazi politicians like Alfred Rosenberg and Joachim von Ribbentrop. In February 1938, Hitler fired Neurath and replaced him with Ribbentrop.

In 1933, the vast majority of the diplomats serving in the Auswärtiges Amt came from upper-class families with a disproportionate number coming from the aristocracy.[42] The overrepresentation of aristocrats together with its overwhelming upper-class character gave the Auswärtiges Amt an elitist cache, and made the Auswärtiges Amt into one of the most prestigious institutions in Germany. Because of its upper-class composition, the diplomats could afford extremely expensive clothes, and the men of Auswärtiges Amt were generally considered to the best dressed officials in the entire German government, contributing to the Auswärtiges Amt's glamorous, stylist image. There were no female diplomats, and besides for the women employed as secretaries, clerks and cleaners, the Auswärtiges Amt had no female employees. That the men of the Auswärtiges Amt formed an elitist group can be seen that every single diplomat had a university degree (before the 1950s, most Germans did not go to university).[43] The requirement that one had to have a university degree to enter the Auswärtiges Amt effectively guaranteed upper-class dominance of the Auswärtiges Amt. In March 1935, Hitler reintroduced conscription and announced the goal of a 35-division army.[44] So few Germans went to university in those days that the National Defense Law of March 1935 bringing back conscription exempted university students from conscription as this exemption in no way affected achieving the goal of a 35 division army. The few diplomats of middle-class origin were always considered to be "outsiders" by their upper-class colleagues.[45] In 1933, the average age of the senior diplomats was 52, and as such the formative years of these men had been in the early years of the 20th century when Imperial Germany was seeking Weltpolitik.[46] Almost all of the men in the Auswärtiges Amt had joined after graduating from university, and all of the senior diplomats in the 1930s were veterans of the struggle to win Germany "world power status" in the first years of the 20th century. Hitler's goal of making Germany into the world's greatest power was thus a foreign policy goal that the diplomats embraced quite headily. The German historian Eckart Conze stated about the overlap in viewpoints between the diplomats and the Nazis :"...the top diplomats in the Weimar Republic were opposed to a liberal political order and parliamentarianism. And then the Nazis built political and ideological bridges for them. They announced their intention to reverse the Treaty of Versailles and make the German Reich into a world power. The majority of the diplomats were able to sign their names on to such a program."[47] In March 1933, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron, the Ambassador to the United States resigned under the grounds that he could not in good conscience serve the Nazi government; he was the only member of the entire Auswärtiges Amt who resigned in protest at the Nazi regime.

Officially, the men of the Auswärtiges Amt were supposed to be non-political, but in practice the diplomats formed a "quite exclusive group" with extremely conservative views and values.[48] For these men, unconditional loyalty to the state was the highest possible value, and though the majority of the diplomats were not ideological National Socialists, they served the Nazi regime loyally until the very end.[49] The dominance of the traditional "insiders" at the Auswärtiges Amt can be seen that every State Secretary during the Nazi era was a professional diplomat. The State Secretaries of the Third Reich were Prince Bernhard von Bülow (State Secretary 1930-36), Count Hans Georg von Mackensen (State Secretary 1936-38 and ambassador to Italy 1938-42), Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker (State Secretary 1938-43 and ambassador to the Holy See 1943-45) and Baron Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland (State Secretary 1943-45). The overlap in goals between the professional diplomats and the Nazis were well illustrated by the memo on what should be the foreign policy of the Hitler government written by Bülow in March 1933 calling for Germany to recover the borders of 1914 and all of the lost colonies, annexation of Austria, and German domination of Eastern Europe.[50] During the Neurath years, there were very few "outsiders" allowed into the Auswärtiges Amt .[51] Besides for Ribbentrop who served as the variously as Commissioner of Disarmament (1934-35), Extraordinary Ambassador-at-Large (1935-36), and Ambassador to Great Britain (1936-38), the most notable of the "outsiders" were Franz von Papen (Ambassador to Austria 1934-38 and to Turkey 1939-44), Hans Luther (Ambassador to the United States 1933-37), Colonel Hermann Kriebel (Consul in Shanghai 1934-39), and General Wilhelm Faupel (Ambassador to Spain 1936-37).[52] Most diplomats were not believers in National Socialism, but during the Third Reich, many diplomats such as Neurath himself joined the NSDAP and/or the SS as an opportunistic way of improving their career prospects; such self-interested careerism was rampant amongst the German civil service in the Nazi period.[53] Those diplomats involved in the attempts to overthrow Hitler such as Count Ulrich von Hassell, Adam von Trott zu Solz, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, Richard Kuenzer, Hans Bernd von Haeften, and Edmund Brücklmeir comprised a small minority of the Auswärtiges Amt.[54] The German historian Hans-Adolf Jacobsen wrote that for those diplomats who chose to become involved in Widerstand, given that they were steeped in Prussian traditions where loyalty to the state was the highest virtue, it required "extraordinary strength of character" for them to go against everything that they had been taught to believe in.[55]

A report entitled The Ministry and the Past written by historians and released by the German government in October 2010 shows that wartime-era diplomats played an important role in assisting the Nazis in carrying out the Holocaust, and disproved the claim often made after 1945 that German diplomats were "sand in the machine" who acted to moderate the actions of the Nazi regime.[56] [57][58] [59][60][61][62] In a 2010 interview, the German historian Eckart Conze who had been in charge of the committee to investigate the war-time actions of the Auswärtiges Amt stated that the Auswärtiges Amt was a "criminal organization" that was as every bit involved in the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" as the SS were.[63] In another interview, Conze stated: "This document makes it clear that all officials in the Foreign Ministry — including low-level office clerks — knew about the mass persecution of Jews and were actively involved in the Holocaust. It was an open secret."[64] In October 1941, when Franz Rademacher visited Belgrade to meet officials of the Government of National Salvation of General Milan Nedić of Serbia, he submitted an expense claim for his trip to his superiors at the Auswärtiges Amt after his return to Berlin; on his expenses claim, Rademacher described the purpose of his trip to Belgrade as the "liquidation of Jews."[65] At the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, the Auswärtiges Amt was represented by Martin Luther, who agreed that the Auswärtiges Amt would do everything within its power to persuade the governments of neutral and allied states to hand over their Jewish populations to be exterminated. Later on in 1942, Ambassador Otto Abetz arranged for the deportation of 25, 000 French Jews to the death camps in Poland while Ambassador Hanns Ludin arranged for the deportation of 50, 000 Slovak Jews to the death camps.[66] In the spring of 1944, Ambassador Edmund Veesenmayer played a key role in having 400,000 Hungarian Jews deported to Auschwitz.[67] In 2003, the French historian Lucas Delattre published a biography of Fritz Kolbe, a mid-ranking diplomat who become a spy for the American Office of Strategic Services because he believed his country deserved to lose the war on the account of the genocide it was waging against the Jews. Delattre stated that Kolbe really was a case of a diplomat being "sand in the machine" as Kolbe provided intelligence to help his country lose the war, but added sarcastically that if every German civil servant really were "sand in the machine" as almost all of them claimed to be after 1945 that Hitler would never had managed to get anything done.[68] Diplomats like Kobe were the very much the exception, not the rule.[69]

Röhl wrote about the continuities of German foreign policy from the 1890s to 1940s, most notably the quest for "world power status" that:

"What is certain is that by the turn of the century wide circles of German society were gripped by dreams of world power, and that the diplomatic corps, whose professional duty it was to assess Germany’s international position realistically, with very few exceptions shared the widespread illusions about her strength and potential. Fritz Fischer’s findings, which thirty years ago were so controversial, have in the intervening years been largely accepted by international scholarship, and except for a few nuances, even by his former German adversaries. Fischer’s views were so controversial partly because they placed Hitler’s expansionist aims in a quite different perspective. Not only could Wilhelmine Weltmachtpolitik [world power politics] and Tirpitz’s battlefleet programme be seen as a first attempt to acquire for Germany the status of a ‘world power’-by the means of a world war if need be; even the revisionist policy of the Weimar Republic could be interpreted as merely a transitional phrase to Hitler’s later, second attempt. Jacobsen has shown how in the early phrases of the National Socialist dictatorship, the traditional diplomatic corps, ‘in ignorance of the true aims of the Nazi leadership’, was able to approve of the new course in foreign policy without suffering pangs of conscience. Only one among the diplomats and officials of the Auswärtiges Amt seems to have seen clearly in advance the ‘qualitative change’ of German foreign policy under Hitler, and submitted his resignation on the grounds of conscience: the ambassador in Washington, Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron. Even the Reich Foreign Minister, Baron Konstantin von Neurath, with all his abhorrence of certain ‘excesses’ perpetrated by the regime, developed into ‘an unmistakeable admirer of Hitler and the National Socialist idea’, while his successor Joachim von Ribbentrop was possessed by an almost pathological devotion to Hitler. Among the Secretaries of State in the Foreign Office too, attitudes towards the Nazi regime were, if certainly not unanimous, on the other hand not so very different. Bülow and Weizsäcker had their reservations but were not oppositional; Mackensen and Steengracht were enthusiastic supporters. With this example set by their superiors, it is not surprising that by 1941 76 percent of the diplomatic corps had become party members, nor that so many had risen to high positions in the SS One is nevertheless shocked by the fact uncovered by Christopher Browning and Hans-Jürgen Döscher that Under-Secretary of State Martin Luther and his ‘young guard’ were involved in the deportation of Jews to Auschwitz. Such dedication went beyond the call of duty.

One might say in conclusion that the German diplomatic corps was no worse than other elite groups. Perhaps the problem is that, in view of its social splendour and its political potential, in view of its exclusivity and claims to leadership which it based thereon, it should have been better".[70]"
Foreign Office building in Bonn

After Germany's defeat in May 1945, the country was occupied and the German state was abolished by the Allies. The country was administered as four zones controlled respectively by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. In August 1949, a German government was reestablished in the western zones, the Federal Republic of Germany, which in its first years had very limited powers. In October 1949, the German Democratic Republic was founded in what had been the Soviet zone. Whereas Georg Dertinger had already been appointed the first minister of foreign affairs of East Germany in 1949, due to the Allied occupation statute the Auswärtiges Amt of West Germany was not reestablished until March 15, 1951. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer took office as the first Foreign Minister in Bonn until he was succeeded by Heinrich von Brentano in 1955. By and large, the men who had served in the new Auswärtiges Amt were the same men who had served in the old Auswärtiges Amt. In a Bundestag debate on 23 October 1952, Adenauer admitted that 66% of the diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt had belonged to the NSDAP, but justified their employment as: "I could not build up a Foreign Office without relying upon such skilled men".[71] Upon Willy Brandt's taking office as Foreign Minister in the grand coalition under Kurt Georg Kiesinger starting in 1966, the office was usually connected with the position of the Vice-Chancellor. From 1974 until 1992 - with a short pause in 1982 - Hans-Dietrich Genscher served as Foreign Minister and continued to champion Brandt's Ostpolitik while also playing a crucial role in the preparation of German reunification.

In 2000 the Foreign Office returned to Berlin where it took up quarters in the former Reichsbank building, which from 1959 to 1990 had served as the seat of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and was enlarged by a newly built annex. The former ministry in Bonn was retained as a secondary seat. The Foreign Office has always stressed its continuity and traditions going back to 1870.

German representation overseas

In addition to the ministry's headquarters in Berlin, Germany has established embassies and consulates around the world.

List of Federal Foreign Ministers (since 1949)

Political Party:       CDU       SPD       FDP       Green

Name
(Born-Died)		 Portrait Party Term of Office Chancellor
(Cabinet)
Konrad Adenauer
(1876–1967)
Chancellor		 CDU 15 March 1951 6 June 1955 Adenauer
(I • II)
Heinrich von Brentano
(1904–1964)		 CDU 6 June 1955 30 October 1961 Adenauer
(II • III)
Gerhard Schröder
(1910–1989)		 CDU 14 November 1961 30 November 1966 Adenauer (IV • V)
Erhard (I • II)
Willy Brandt
(1913–1992)
Vice-Chancellor		 SPD 1 December 1966 20 October 1969 Kiesinger
(I)
Walter Scheel
(b. 1919)
Vice-Chancellor		 FDP 21 October 1969 15 May 1974 Brandt
(I • II)
Hans-Dietrich Genscher
(1927-2016)
Vice-Chancellor		 FDP 17 May 1974 17 September 1982 Schmidt
(I • II • III)
Helmut Schmidt
(1918–2015)
Chancellor		 SPD 17 September 1982 4 October 1982 Schmidt
(III)
Hans-Dietrich Genscher
(1927-2016)
Vice-Chancellor		 FDP 4 October 1982 17 May 1992 Kohl
(I • II • III • IV)
Klaus Kinkel
(b. 1936)
Vice-Chancellor 1993–98		 FDP 18 May 1992 26 October 1998 Kohl
(IV • V)
Joschka Fischer
(b. 1948)
Vice-Chancellor		 Greens 27 October 1998 22 November 2005 Schröder
(I • II)
Frank-Walter Steinmeier
(b. 1956)
Vice-Chancellor 2007–09		 SPD 22 November 2005 28 October 2009 Merkel
(I)
Guido Westerwelle
(1961-2016)
Vice-Chancellor 2009–11		 FDP 28 October 2009 17 December 2013 Merkel
(II)
Frank-Walter Steinmeier SPD 17 December 2013 Incumbent Merkel
(III)

See also

References

  1. ↑ "Budget 2015".
  2. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  3. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  4. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  5. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 151.
  6. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 151.
  7. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 152.
  8. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 152.
  9. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 152.
  10. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 152.
  11. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 154.
  12. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 154.
  13. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 153.
  14. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 153.
  15. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 154.
  16. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 151.
  17. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 157.
  18. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 pages 150-151 & 157.
  19. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  20. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  21. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  22. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  23. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  24. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  25. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  26. ↑ Fiebig-von Hase, Ragnhld "The Uses of 'friendship': The 'personal regime' of Wilhelm II and Theodore Roosevelt" pages 143-175 from The Kaiser edited by Annika Mommbauer and Wilhelm Deist, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 page 156
  27. ↑ Fiebig-von Hase, Ragnhld "The Uses of 'friendship': The 'personal regime' of Wilhelm II and Theodore Roosevelt" pages 143-175 from The Kaiser edited by Annika Mommbauer and Wilhelm Deist, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 pages 149-150
  28. ↑ Fiebig-von Hase, Ragnhld "The Uses of 'friendship': The 'personal regime' of Wilhelm II and Theodore Roosevelt" pages 143-175 from The Kaiser edited by Annika Mommbauer and Wilhelm Deist, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 page 155
  29. ↑ Fiebig-von Hase, Ragnhild "The Uses of 'friendship': The 'personal regime' of Wilhelm II and Theodore Roosevelt" pages 143-175 from The Kaiser edited by Annika Mommbauer and Wilhelm Deist, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 page 166
  30. ↑ Fiebig-von Hase, Ragnhild "The Uses of 'friendship': The 'personal regime' of Wilhelm II and Theodore Roosevelt" pages 143-175 from The Kaiser edited by Annika Mommbauer and Wilhelm Deist, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 page 174
  31. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 158.
  32. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 159.
  33. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 159.
  34. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 pages 159-160.
  35. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 page 159.
  36. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 pages 157-161.
  37. ↑ Balkakian, Peter The Burning Tigris, New York: HarperCollins, 2003 page 285.
  38. ↑ Balkakian, Peter The Burning Tigris, New York: HarperCollins, 2003 page 285.
  39. ↑ "Germany bears a 'responsibility' for Armenia 'genocide': president". i24news. April 23, 2015. Retrieved 2015-06-18..
  40. ↑ Rothwell, Victor The Origins of the Second World War, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001 page 30.
  41. ↑ Rothwell, Victor The Origins of the Second World War, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001 page 30.
  42. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 page 60.
  43. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 page 60.
  44. ↑ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris, New York: Norton, 1998 page 551
  45. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 page 60.
  46. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 pages 60-61.
  47. ↑ Conze, Eckart (October 27, 2010). "Hitler's Diplomats Historian Calls Wartime Ministry A 'Criminal Organization'". Der Spiegel. Retrieved 2011-07-07..
  48. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 page 60.
  49. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 pages 60-61.
  50. ↑ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris, New York: Norton, 1998 pages 490-491
  51. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 page 61.
  52. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 page 61.
  53. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 pages 62-63.
  54. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 page 63.
  55. ↑ Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-1945" pages 49-94 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 page 63.
  56. ↑ Germany - Speech by Federal Minister Westerwelle on the presentation of the study by the Independent Commission of Historians Federal Foreign Office
  57. ↑ canadaeast.com - German foreign minister 'ashamed' of diplomats' role in Holocaust | The Associated Press - Breaking News, New Brunswick, Canada
  58. ↑ Report Confirms German Foreign Ministry Role in Holocaust - TIME
  59. ↑ German foreign minister 'ashamed' of diplomats' role in Holocaust - Winnipeg Free Press
  60. ↑ Niemcy: Szokujący raport. "To nas zawstydza" - Wiadomości w Onet.pl
  61. ↑ Moshe Zimmermann. Secrets and Revelations: The German Foreign Ministry and the Final Solution, in: Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. V, No. 1 (2011)
  62. ↑ "The Machine's Accomplices". The Economist. October 28, 2010. Retrieved 2011-07-07..
  63. ↑ Conze, Eckart (October 27, 2010). "Hitler's Diplomats Historian Calls Wartime Ministry A 'Criminal Organization'". Der Spiegel. Retrieved 2011-07-07..
  64. ↑ Moore, Tristana (October 27, 2010). "Were German Diplomats Complicit in the Holocaust?". Time. Retrieved 2011-07-07..
  65. ↑ "The Machine's Accomplices". The Economist. October 28, 2010. Retrieved 2011-07-07..
  66. ↑ Bloch, Michael Ribbentrop New York: Crown Publishing, 1992 1992 page 356.
  67. ↑ Bloch, Michael Ribbentrop, New York: Crown Publishing, 1992 1992 pages 400–401.
  68. ↑ Delattre, Lucas A Spy at the Heart of the Third Reich: The Extraordinary Story of Fritz Kolbe, America's Most Important Spy in World War II, New York: Grove Press, 2006 page 2.
  69. ↑ Delattre, Lucas A Spy at the Heart of the Third Reich: The Extraordinary Story of Fritz Kolbe, America's Most Important Spy in World War II, New York: Grove Press, 2006 page 2.
  70. ↑ Röhl, John The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 pages 160-161.
  71. ↑ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 page 48

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Coordinates: 52°30′53″N 13°23′58″E / 52.51472°N 13.39944°E / 52.51472; 13.39944

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