NLRB v. Hearst Publications

NLRB v. Hearst Publications

Argued February 8–9, 1944
Decided April 24, 1944
Full case name National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc
Citations

322 U.S. 111 (more)

64 S. Ct. 851; 88 L. Ed. 1170; 1944 U.S. LEXIS 1201; 8 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P51,179; 14 L.R.R.M. 614
Prior history Court of Appeals refused to enforce the NLRB's orders, 136 F.2d 608 (reversed).
Holding
Reviewing courts have limited review over administrative agencies' interpretation of terms in their organic statutes. The NLRB's finding that the newsboys were employees was subject to deference.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Harlan F. Stone
Case opinions
Majority Rutledge, joined by Stone, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson
Concurrence Reed
Dissent Roberts
Laws applied
National Labor Relations Act

NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) was an administrative law case heard before the United States Supreme Court. The case concerned the meaning of the term "employees" in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

Background

Hearst Publications (Hearst), the publishers of four daily Los Angeles newspapers, refused to bargain collectively with their newsboys. The newsboys filed petitions with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for certification as a local union. The NLRB found that the newsboys were full-time employees within the meaning of the NLRA and ordered Hearst bargain with the newsboys. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the order, reasoning that the newsboys were independent contractors, rather than employees.[1]

Decision of the Court

Justice Rutledge, delivering the opinion of the court, ruled that the NLRB's interpretation of the Act was not erroneous. The court held that when an administrative agency engages in "specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited."[2] The newsboys were employees within the meaning of the Act, with whom Hearst was required to collectively bargain.

Dissent

Justice Roberts, dissenting, wrote that "the question of who is an employee, so as to make the statute applicable to him, is a question of the meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative question."[3]

National Labor Relations Board v Hearst Publications, Inc 322 U.S. 111 (1944) is a US labor law case, concerning the scope of protection for employees under the National Labor Relations Act 1935.

Facts

Newsboys, who distributed papers on the streets of the city of Los Angeles, formed a union to collectively bargain over wages. They claimed they were ‘employees’ under the National Labor Relations Act 1935. They alleged their employers were Hearst Publications Inc, which owned the Los Angeles Examiner and the Los Angeles Evening Herald and Express, as well as the Los Angeles Times. The National Labor Relations Board determined that the newsboys were employees, as they worked continuously, regularly and relied on their earnings to support themselves and their families. The publishers dictated the buying and selling prices, fixed their markets, controlled their supply of papers, supervised their work hours and effort, and gave them sales equipment for the publishers’ benefit. The NLRB then designated the full-time newsboys and ‘checkmen’ to be a bargaining unit within the city, excluding temporary, casual and part-time newsboys and bootjackers. The newspapers argued that under common law standards, their control over the newsboys made them no more than independent contractors, so that they were not ‘employees’ and had no duty to bargain in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act 1935.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the Act’s history, context and purposes should be taken into account when determining whether someone is an employee, not just common law standards, local law or legal classifications made for other purposes. The NLRB’s determination that someone is an employee may not be set aside if it has a reasonable legal basis. Its identification of bargaining units was within its discretion, including its exclusion of suburban newsboys on the ground that they were not in the union.

Rutledge J gave the court’s judgment.[4]

“
I

The principal question is whether the newsboys are "employees." Because Congress did not explicitly define the term, respondents say its meaning must be determined by reference to common law standards. In their view, "common law standards" are those the courts have applied in distinguishing between "employees" and "independent contractors" when working out various problems unrelated to the Wagner Act's purposes and provisions.

The argument assumes that there is some simple, uniform and easily applicable test which the courts have used, in dealing with such problems, to determine whether persons doing work for others fall in one class or the other. Unfortunately this is not true. Only by a long and tortuous history was the simple formulation worked out which has been stated most frequently as "the test" for deciding whether one who hires another is responsible in tort for his wrongdoing.[5] But this formula has been by no means exclusively controlling in the solution of other problems. And its simplicity has been illusory because it is more largely simplicity of formulation than of application. Few problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.[6] This is true within the limited field of determining vicarious liability in tort. It becomes more so when the field is expanded to include all of the possible applications of the distinction.

It is hardly necessary to stress particular instances of these variations or to emphasize that they have arisen principally, first, in the struggle of the courts to work out common law liabilities where the legislature has given no guides for judgment, more recently also under statutes which have posed the same problem for solution in the light of the enactment's particular terms and purposes.

It is enough to point out that, with reference to an identical problem, results may be contrary over a very considerable region of doubt in applying the distinction, depending upon the state or jurisdiction where the determination is made;[7] and that, within a single jurisdiction, a person who, for instance, is held to be an "independent contractor" for the purpose of imposing vicarious liability in tort may be an "employee" for the purposes of particular legislation, such as unemployment compensation. See, e.g., Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Utah 36, 91 P.2d 512. In short, the assumed simplicity and uniformity, resulting from application of "common law standards," does not exist.

Mere reference to these possible variations as characterizing the application of the Wagner Act in the treatment of persons identically situated in the facts surrounding their employment and in the influences tending to disrupt it would be enough to require pause before accepting a thesis which would introduce them into its administration. This would be true even if the statute itself had indicated less clearly than it does the intent they should not apply.

Two possible consequences could follow. One would be to refer the decision of who are employees to local state law. The alternative would be to make it turn on a sort of pervading general essence distilled from state law. Congress obviously did not intend the former result. It would introduce variations into the statute's operation as wide as the differences the forty-eight states and other local jurisdictions make in applying the distinction for wholly different purposes. Persons who might be "employees" in one state would be "independent contractors" in another. They would be within or without the statute's protection depending not on whether their situation falls factually within the ambit Congress had in mind, but upon the accidents of the location of their work and the attitude of the particular local jurisdiction in casting doubtful cases one way or the other. Persons working across state lines might fall in one class or the other, possibly both, depending on whether the Board and the courts would be required to give effect to the law of one state or of the adjoining one, or to that of each in relation to the portion of the work done within its borders.

Both the terms and the purposes of the statute, as well as the legislative history, show that Congress had in mind no such patchwork plan for securing freedom of employees' organization and of collective bargaining. The Wagner Act is federal legislation, administered by a national agency, intended to solve a national problem on a national scale. Cf. e.g., Sen.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4. It is an Act, therefore, in reference to which it is not only proper, but necessary for us to assume, "in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, that Congress . . . is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law." Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101, 318 U. S. 104. Nothing in the statute's background, history, terms or purposes indicates its scope is to be limited by such varying local conceptions, either statutory or judicial, or that it is to be administered in accordance with whatever different standards the respective states may see fit to adopt for the disposition of unrelated, local problems. Consequently, so far as the meaning of "employee" in this statute is concerned, "the federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or right by state law." Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 309 U. S. 81; cf. Labor Board v. Blount, 131 F.2d 585 (C.C.A.).

II

Whether, given the intended national uniformity, the term "employee" includes such workers as these newsboys must be answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the legislation. The word "is not treated by Congress as a word of art having a definite meaning. . . ." Rather "it takes color from its surroundings . . . [in] the statute where it appears," United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 310 U. S. 545, and derives meaning from the context of that statute, which "must be read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained." South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251, 309 U. S. 259; cf. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552; Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91.

Congress, on the one hand, was not thinking solely of the immediate technical relation of employer and employee. It had in mind at least some other persons than those standing in the proximate legal relation of employee to the particular employer involved in the labor dispute. It cannot be taken, however, that the purpose was to include all other persons who may perform service for another, or was to ignore entirely legal classifications made for other purposes. Congress had in mind a wider field than the narrow technical legal relation of "master and servant," as the common law had worked this out in all its variations, and at the same time a narrower one than the entire area of rendering service to others. The question comes down, therefore, to how much was included of the intermediate region between what is clearly and unequivocally "employment," by any appropriate test, and what is as clearly entrepreneurial enterprise, and not employment.

It will not do, for deciding this question as one of uniform national application, to import wholesale the traditional common law conceptions or some distilled essence of their local variations as exclusively controlling limitations upon the scope of the statute's effectiveness. To do this would be merely to select some of the local, hairline variations for nationwide application, and thus to reject others for coverage under the Act. That result hardly would be consistent with the statute's broad terms and purposes.

Congress was not seeking to solve the nationally harassing problems with which the statute deals by solutions only partially effective. It rather sought to find a broad solution, one that would bring industrial peace by substituting, so far as its power could reach, the rights of workers to self-organization and collective bargaining for the industrial strife which prevails where these rights are not effectively established. Yet only partial solutions would be provided if large segments of workers about whose technical legal position such local differences exist should be wholly excluded from coverage by reason of such differences. Yet that result could not be avoided if choice must be made among them and controlled by them in deciding who are "employees" within the Act's meaning. Enmeshed in such distinctions, the administration of the statute soon might become encumbered by the same sort of technical legal refinement as has characterized the long evolution of the employee-independent contractor dichotomy in the courts for other purposes. The consequences would be ultimately to defeat, in part at least, the achievement of the statute's objectives. Congress no more intended to import this mass of technicality as a controlling "standard" for uniform national application than to refer decision of the question outright to the local law.

The Act, as its first section states, was designed to avert the "substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce" which result from "strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest" by eliminating the causes of that unrest. It is premised on explicit findings that strikes and industrial strife themselves result in large measure from the refusal of employers to bargain collectively and the inability of individual workers to bargain successfully for improvements in their "wages, hours, or other working conditions" with employers who are "organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association." Hence the avowed and interrelated purposes of the Act are to encourage collective bargaining and to remedy the individual worker's inequality of bargaining power by

"protecting the exercise . . . of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."

49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U.S.C. § 151.

The mischief at which the Act is aimed and the remedies it offers are not confined exclusively to "employees" within the traditional legal distinctions separating them from "independent contractors." Myriad forms of service relationship, with infinite and subtle variations in the terms of employment, blanket the nation's economy. Some are within this Act, others beyond its coverage. Large numbers will fall clearly on one side or on the other, by whatever test may be applied. But intermediate there will be many the incidents of whose employment partake in part of the one group, in part of the other, in varying proportions of weight. And consequently the legal pendulum, for purposes of applying the statute, may swing one way or the other, depending upon the weight of this balance and its relation to the special purpose at hand.

Unless the common law tests are to be imported and made exclusively controlling, without regard to the statute's purposes, it cannot be irrelevant that the particular workers in these cases are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords are appropriate for preventing them or curing their harmful effects in the special situation. Interruption of commerce through strikes and unrest may stem as well from labor disputes between some who, for other purposes, are technically "independent contractors" and their employers as from disputes between persons who, for those purposes, are "employees" and their employers. Cf. Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Co., 311 U. S. 91. Inequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours and working conditions may as well characterize the status of the one group as of the other. The former, when acting alone, may be as "helpless in dealing with an employer," as "dependent . . . on his daily wage" and as "unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment" as the latter. For each, "union . . . [may be] essential to give . . . opportunity to deal on equality with their employer."[8] And for each, collective bargaining may be appropriate and effective for the "friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions."[9] 49 Stat. 449. In short, when the particular situation of employment combines these characteristics, so that the economic facts of the relation make it more nearly one of employment than of independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh technical legal classification for purposes unrelated to the statute's objectives and bring the relation within its protections.

To eliminate the causes of labor disputes and industrial strife, Congress thought it necessary to create a balance of forces in certain types of economic relationships. These do not embrace simply employment associations in which controversies could be limited to disputes over proper "physical conduct in the performance of the service."[10] On the contrary, Congress recognized those economic relationships cannot be fitted neatly into the containers designated "employee" and "employer" which an earlier law had shaped for different purposes. Its Reports on the bill disclose clearly the understanding that "employers and employees not in proximate relationship may be drawn into common controversies by economic forces,"[11] and that the very disputes sought to be avoided might involve "employees [who] are at times brought into an economic relationship with employers who are not their employers."[12] In this light, the broad language of the Act's definitions, which in terms reject conventional limitations on such conceptions as "employee," "employer," and "labor dispute,"[13] leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts, rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal classifications. Cf. Labor Board v. Blount, supra.

Hence, "technical concepts pertinent to an employer's legal responsibility to third persons for the acts of his servants" have been rejected in various applications of this Act both here (International Association of Machinists v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 72, 311 U. S. 80-81; H. J. Heinz Co. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 514, 311 U. S. 520-521)[14] and in other federal courts (Labor Board v. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d 67; North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. Labor Board, 109 F.2d 76, 82; Labor Board v. Blount, supra). There is no good reason for invoking them to restrict the scope of the term "employee" sought to be done in this case. That term, like other provisions, must be understood with reference to the purpose of the Act and the facts involved in the economic relationship.[15] "Where all the conditions of the relation require protection, protection ought to be given."[16]

It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive limitation around the term "employee." That task has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. Determination of "where all the conditions of the relation require protection" involves inquiries for the Board charged with this duty. Everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships in various industries, with the abilities and needs of the workers for self-organization and collective action, and with the adaptability of collective bargaining for the peaceful settlement of their disputes with their employers. The experience thus acquired must be brought frequently to bear on the question who is an employee under the Act. Resolving that question, like determining whether unfair labor practices have been committed, "belongs to the usual administrative routine" of the Board.[17] Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 314 U. S. 411. Cf. Labor Board v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885, 887, 888.

In making that body's determinations as to the facts in these matters conclusive, if supported by evidence, Congress entrusted to it primarily the decision whether the evidence establishes the material facts. Hence, in reviewing the Board's ultimate conclusions, it is not the court's function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the Board's when the latter have support in the record. Labor Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U. S. 105; cf. Walker v. Altmeyer, 137 F.2d 531. Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294; United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U. S. 534. But where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited. Like the commissioner's determination under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Act,[18] that a man is not a "member of a crew" (South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251) or that he was injured "in the course of his employment" (Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U. S. 244) and the Federal Communications Commission's determination[19] that one company is under the "control" of another (Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125), the Board's determination that specified persons are "employees" under this Act is to be accepted if it has "warrant in the record" and a reasonable basis in law.

In this case, the Board found that the designated newsboys work continuously and regularly, rely upon their earnings for the support of themselves and their families, and have their total wages influenced in large measure by the publishers who dictate their buying and selling prices, fix their markets, and control their supply of papers. Their hours of work and their efforts on the job are supervised and to some extent prescribed by the publishers or their agents. Much of their sales equipment and advertising materials is furnished by the publishers with the intention that it be used for the publisher's benefit. Stating that

"the primary consideration in the determination of the applicability of the statutory definition is whether effectuation of the declared policy and purposes of the Act comprehends securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protection afforded by the Act,"

the Board concluded that the newsboys are employees. The record sustains the Board's findings, and there is ample basis in the law for its conclusion.

III

The Board's selection of the collective bargaining units also must be upheld. The units chosen for the News and the Herald consist of all full-time[20] newsboys and checkmen engaged to sell the papers in Los Angeles. Bootjackers, temporary, casual and part-time[21] newsboys are excluded. The units designated for the Times and the Examiner consist of newsboys selling at established spots[22] in Los Angeles[23] four or more hours per day five or more days per week, except temporary newsboys.[24]

The Board predicated its designations in part upon the finding that the units included, in general, men who were responsible workers, continuously and regularly employed as vendors, and dependent upon their sales for their livelihood, while schoolboys and transient or casual workers were excluded. The discretion which Congress vested in the Board to determine an appropriate unit is hardly overstepped by the choice of a unit based on a distinction so clearly consistent with the need for responsible bargaining. That the Board's selection emphasizes difference in tenure, rather than function, is, on this record certainly, no abuse of discretion.

Nor is there substance in the objection that the Board's designations on the one hand fail to embrace all workers who in fact come within the responsible or stable full-time category generically stated, and, on the other hand, fail to exclude all who in fact come within the schoolboy or more volatile part-time category. The record does not suggest that the units designated, at least so far as Los Angeles newsboys are concerned, do not substantially effectuate the Board's theory or embrace a large portion of those who would make up a stable bargaining group based on responsible tenure and full-time work. In these matters, the Board cannot be held to mathematical precision. If it chooses to couch its orders in terms which for good reasons it regards effective to accomplish its stated ends, peripheral or hypothetical deviations will not defeat an otherwise appropriate order.

Another objection urged by the Times, the Herald, and the Examiner is to the Board's exclusion of suburban newsboys[25] from the units on the ground they were not organized by the union. The Board found that, although all vendors in metropolitan Los Angeles were eligible for membership, the union had not been extended to the suburban groups generally, and that no other labor organization was seeking to represent respondents' employees. There is no suggestion either that the union deliberately excluded suburban newsboys who sought admission or that suburban newsboys have displayed any interest in collective bargaining or self-organization.

Wide variations in the forms of employee self-organization and the complexities of modern industrial organization make difficult the use of inflexible rules as the test of an appropriate unit. Congress was informed of the need for flexibility in shaping the unit to the particular case,[26] and accordingly gave the Board wide discretion in the matter. Its choice of a unit is limited specifically only by the requirement that it be an "employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof," and that the selection be made so as

"to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act."

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 146. The flexibility which Congress thus permitted has characterized the Board's administration of the section, and has led it to resort to a wide variety of factors in case-to-case determination of the appropriate unit.[27] Among the considerations to which it has given weight is the extent of organization of the union requesting certification or collective bargaining. This is done on the expressed theory that it is desirable in the determination of an appropriate unit to render collective bargaining of the company's employees an immediate possibility.[28] No plausible reason is suggested for withholding the benefits of the Act from those here seeking it until a group of geographically separated employees becomes interested in collective bargaining. In the circumstances disclosed by this record, we cannot say the Board's conclusions are lacking in a "rational basis."

The judgment are reversed, and the causes are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

 ”

Reed J concurred, and said the NLRB had the definition of ‘employee’ correct.

Roberts J dissented, stating his view that the newsboys were not employees.

See also

References

  1. ↑ NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 113-15 (1944)
  2. ↑ Id. at 131.
  3. ↑ Id. at 136.
  4. ↑ 322 US 120-134
  5. ↑ The so-called "control test" with which common law judges have wrestled to secure precise and ready applications did not escape the difficulties encountered in borderland cases by its reformulation in the Restatement of the Law of Agency § 220. That, even at the common law, the control test and the complex of incidents evolved in applying it to distinguish an "employee" from an "independent contractor," for purposes of vicarious liability in tort, did not necessarily have the same significance in other contexts, compare Lumley v Gye [1853] El. & Bl. 216, and see also the cases collected in 21 A.L.R. 1229 et seq.; 23 A.L.R. 984 et seq.
  6. ↑ See, e.g., Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation (1939) 38 Mich.L.Rev. 188; Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life (1935) 2 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 501; Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors (1938) 28 Mich.L.Rev. 365; N.Y. Law Revision Commission Report, 1939 (1939) Legislative Document No. 65(K).
  7. ↑ Compare Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo, 1, 22 P.2d 189, with Auer v. Sinclair Refining Co., 103 N.J.L. 372, 137 A. 555; Schomp v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N.J.L. 487, 12 A.2d 702; In re Schomp, 126 N.J.L. 368, 19 A.2d 780, with Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201; Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 1027, 134 P.2d 1006, with Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 82 S.W.2d 909.
  8. ↑ American Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 257 U. S. 209, cited in H.R.Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10; cf. Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769.
  9. ↑ The practice of self-organization and collective bargaining to resolve labor disputes has for some time been common among such varied types of "independent contractors" as musicians (How Collective Bargaining Works (20th Century Fund, 1942) 848-866; Proceedings of the 47th Annual Convention of the American Federation of Musicians (1942)), actors (see e.g. Collective Bargaining by Actors (1926) Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 402; Harding, The Revolt of the Actors (1929); Ross, Stars and Strikes (1941)), and writers (see, e.g., Rosten, Hollywood (1941); Ross, Stars and Strikes (1941) 48-63), and such atypical "employees" as insurance agents, artists, architects and engineers (see, e.g., Proceedings of the 2d Convention of the UOPWA, C.I.O. (1938); Proceedings of the 3d Convention of the UOPWA, C.I.O. (1940); Handbook of American Trade Unions (1936); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 618, 291-293; Constitution and By-Laws of the IFTEAD of the A.F.L., 1942.)
  10. ↑ Control of "physical conduct in the performance of the service" is the traditional test of the "employee relationship" at common law. Cf., e.g., Restatement of the Law of Agency § 220(1).
  11. ↑ Sen.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7.
  12. ↑ Sen.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6.
  13. ↑ Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177; and compare Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Co., 311 U. S. 91, with Sen.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7.
  14. ↑ Compare Labor Board v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U. S. 206; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177.
  15. ↑ Cf. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251; Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (C.C.A.)
  16. ↑ Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552.
  17. ↑ E.g., Matter of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B. 662, 686-690; Matter of KMOX Broadcasting Station, 10 N.L.R.B. 479; Matter of Interstate Granite Corp., 11 N.L.R.B. 1046; Matter of Sun Life Ins. Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 817; Matter of Kelly Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 325; Matter of John Yasek, 37 N.L.R.B. 156.
  18. ↑ 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
  19. ↑ Under § 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 1065, 47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
  20. ↑ Full-time newsboys for the Herald includes those who regularly sell to the public five or more editions five or more days per week. Full-time newsboys for the News includes those who regularly sell to the general public the fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth and tenth, or the sixth, eighth, ninth and tenth editions five or more days per week, or the fourth and earlier editions for at least four hours daily between 4:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. five days per week.
  21. ↑ Part-time newsboys for the Herald means those selling less than five editions daily or for less than five days per week.
  22. ↑ Established spots are corners at which newsboys sold those papers for at least five or more days per week during at least six consecutive months.
  23. ↑ Glendale is included in the Times unit.
  24. ↑ Temporary newsboys are those selling for less than thirty-one consecutive days.
  25. ↑ Except newsboys selling the Times in Glendale.
  26. ↑ Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 83.
  27. ↑ E.g., see First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 112-120; Second Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 122-140; Third Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 156-197; Fourth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 82-97; Fifth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 63-72; Sixth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 63-71.
  28. ↑ Matter of Gulf Oil Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 133.

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