Big Week
| Operation Argument | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of World War II | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United States United Kingdom |
.svg.png){kind=small} Germany | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Jimmy Doolittle Carl Spaatz Arthur Harris |
Hermann Göring Adolf Galland | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
US Eighth Air Force US Fifteenth Air Force RAF Bomber Command RAF Fighter Command[1] |
Luftwaffe | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
|
RAF: 131 bombers[2] USAAF: 226 heavy bombers[3] 28 fighters[3] Over 2,000 aircrew killed or captured[3] |
262 fighters[3] 250 aircrew killed or injured,[3] including nearly 100 pilots KIA[4] | ||||||
From February 20–25, 1944, as part of the European strategic bombing campaign, the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) launched Operation Argument, a series of missions against the Third Reich that became known as Big Week. The planners intended to lure the Luftwaffe into a decisive battle by launching massive attacks on the German aircraft industry. By defeating the Luftwaffe, the Allies would achieve air superiority and the invasion of Europe could proceed. The daylight bombing campaign was also supported by RAF Bomber Command, operating against the same targets at night.[5]:73 Arthur Harris resisted contributing RAF forces as it diverted them from the British area bombing offensive. It took a direct order from Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff to force Harris to comply.[1] RAF Fighter Command also provided escort for USAAF bomber formations, just at the time that the Eighth Air Force had started introducing the P-51 long-range fighter to take over the role.
Background
Prior to the Big Week, throughout 1943, the U.S. 8th Air Force had been growing in size and experience and started pressing attacks deeper into Germany. It was believed that the defensive firepower of the B-17 and B-24 bombers, typically ten .50 caliber machine guns or more, would allow them to defend themselves as long as they remained arranged into tight formations, allowing for overlapping fire. In practice this proved less successful; although the bombers did claim a fair number of German fighters, losses among the bombers were unsustainable.
The Schweinfurt-Regensburg missions are a famous example. On August 17, 1943, 230 bombers launched a mission against the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt and another 146 against the aircraft factories in Regensburg. Of this force, 60 aircraft were lost before returning to base and another 87 had to be scrapped due to irreparable damage. The Germans claimed 27 fighters lost, serious enough but paling in comparison to the losses on the part of the US forces. The Second Raid on Schweinfurt on October 14, 1943, remembered as "Black Thursday", was even more bloody; of the 291 aircraft on the mission, 60 were lost outright, with a further 17 damaged beyond repair. Daylight missions into Germany were called off in order to rebuild the forces.
The raids were extensively studied by both forces. The Germans concluded that their tactic of deploying twin-engine heavy fighter designs, with heavy armament to make them usable as bomber destroyers, serving primarily with the Zerstörergeschwader combat wings was working well. Over the winter of 1943–44 they continued this program, adding to their heavy fighter ranks and developing heavier armaments for all of their aircraft. They also pulled almost all of their fighter forces back into Germany, as the majority of their losses were due to fighter actions over forward areas. There seemed to be no point in trying to attack the bombers with enemy fighters in the area. The Allied forces came to other conclusions. Schweinfurt demonstrated that the bombers were not able to protect themselves, contrary to earlier thinking and fighter cover had to be extended over the entire mission. Luckily for the U.S., the P-51 Mustang, an aircraft that had the range to escort the bombers to targets deep within Germany, was starting to arrive in quantity. Over the winter they re-equipped their fighter squadrons as Mustangs arrived and longer-range versions of existing fighters were developed.
By the early spring of 1944, both forces had laid their plans and were waiting to put them into action. The U.S., expecting a fighter advantage, planned missions that would demand a German response. They decided to make massive raids on the German fighter factories; if the Germans chose not to respond they would be at risk of losing the air war without firing a shot, if they did respond, they would meet fighters in the process. The Germans needed no provocation, they were ready to meet a raid with their new forces. By up-gunning their fighters they reduced their performance, making them easy targets for the new and unexpected Mustangs.
Operations
The Americans flew continuously escorted missions against airframe manufacturing and assembly plants and other targets in numerous German cities including: Leipzig, Brunswick, Gotha, Regensburg, Schweinfurt, Augsburg, Stuttgart and Steyr. In six days, the Eighth Air Force bombers based in England flew more than 3,000 sorties and the Fifteenth Air Force based in Italy more than 500. Together they dropped roughly 10,000 tons of bombs.
During Big Week, the Eighth Air Force lost 97 B-17s, 40 B-24s and another 20 scrapped due to damage.[6] The Fifteenth Air Force lost 90 aircraft and American fighter losses stood at 28. Although these numbers are high in absolute terms, the numbers of bombers involved in the missions were much higher than previous and the losses represented a much smaller percentage of the attacking force. The earlier Schweinfurt missions had cost the force just under 30 percent of their aircraft per mission; for the Big Week it was under 7 percent.
U.S. aircrews claimed more than 500 German fighters destroyed, though the numbers were massively exaggerated.[5]:78 The Luftwaffe losses were high amongst their twin-engined Zerstörer units and the Bf 110 and Me 410 groups were severely depleted.[5]:77–8 More worrying for the Jagdwaffe was the loss of 17 percent of its pilots, nearly 100 of them being killed.[7] In contrast to the raids of the previous year, the US losses were replaceable, while the Germans were already hard pressed due to the war in the East. Although not fatal, Big Week was an extremely worrying development for the Germans.
The actual damage to the German aircraft industry was fairly limited; during 1944 German aircraft industry was to reach its fighter production peak by reducing the production of other aircraft types and ruthlessly exploiting the workforce, comparable with the U.S and Soviet industries. The lack of skilled pilots due to an attrition in the three-front war was the factor eroding the capability of the Jagdwaffe.[6] The Luftwaffe had to abandon its tactic of "maximum defensive effort" to daylight bombing missions in favor of hit-and-run intercepts. While the Jagdwaffe remained formidable, air superiority had passed irrevocably to the Allies.
Aftermath
The Big Week raids demonstrated that the Luftwaffe's best anti-bomber weapon, twin-engine Zerstörer designs like the Me 410 Hornisse, were appallingly vulnerable against Allied fighters. They were removed from service in the west, passing the defense role primarily to the higher performance single-engine designs.
Due to the protection offered by Allied long-range fighters, a change of tactics was introduced: German fighters formed up well in front of the bombers, took a single head-on pass through the stream and then departed. This gave the defending fighters little time to react and a few shells into the cockpit could "destroy" a bomber in one pass. In a repeat of earlier RAF strategy, the Luftwaffe also attempted to form up their own version of the "Big Wing", which they hoped would allow them to bring the twins back into combat in the safety of a huge number of escorting single-engined fighters. As had sometimes been the British experience, these formations proved extremely difficult to arrange.
Big Week bolstered the confidence of U.S. strategic bombing crews. Until that time, Allied bombers avoided contact with the Luftwaffe; now, the Americans used any method that would force the Luftwaffe into combat. Implementing this policy, the United States looked toward Berlin. Raiding the German capital, Allied leaders reasoned, would force the Luftwaffe to battle. On March 4, the USSTAF launched the first of several attacks against Berlin. A force of 730 bombers set off from England with an escort of 800 fighters. Fierce battles raged and resulted in heavy losses for both sides; 69 B-17s were lost but it cost the Luftwaffe 160 aircraft. The Allies replaced their losses; the Luftwaffe could not.[8]
The new German tactic of using Sturmböcke (heavily armed Fw 190s) as bomber destroyers, and Bf 109Gs to escort them in Gefechtsverband formations, were proving somewhat effective. The U.S. fighters, kept in close contact with the bombers they were protecting, could not chase the attacking fighters before they were forced to turn around and return to the bombers. Lt. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle, commander of the 8th Air Force from the end of 1943, responded by "freeing" the fighters, allowing them to fly far ahead of the heavy bomber formations in an air superiority "fighter sweep" mode on the outward legs, then roam far from the bomber streams and hunt down the German fighters—especially the Sturmböcke, that had limited manoeuvrability with their heavy cannons—before they could approach the bombers. Though the change was unpopular with the bomber crews, its effects were immediate and extremely effective.
When the combined bomber offensive officially ended on April 1, 1944 and control of the strategic air forces passed to U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied airmen were well on the way to achieving air superiority over all of Europe. While they continued strategic bombing, the USAAF turned its attention to the tactical air battle in support of the Normandy invasion.[8]
Timeline
| Date | USAAF | Theatre | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sunday 20 February 1944 |
8 | ETO: Strategic operations[9] | Mission 226: The Eighth Air Force begins "Big Week" attacks on German aircraft plants and airfields. For the first time, over 1,000 bombers are dispatched; 21 bombers and 4 fighters are lost hitting 3 areas in Germany:
Missions one and three above are escorted by 94 P-38 Lightnings, 668 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47 Thunderbolts and 73 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51 Mustangs; they claim 61-7-37 Luftwaffe aircraft; one P-38 Lightning, two P-47 Thunderbolts and one P-51 Mustangs are lost, two P-47 Thunderbolts are damaged beyond repair and 4 other aircraft are damaged; casualties are 4 MIA. German losses amount to 10 Messerschmitt Bf 110s destroyed and three damaged with 10 killed and seven wounded. Total losses included 74 Bf 110s, Fw 190s and Bf 109s and a further 29 damaged.[10] |
| Sunday 20 February 1944 |
8 | ETO | Mission 227: 4 of 5 B-17s drop 200 bundles of leaflets on Tours, Nantes, Brest and Lorient, France at 2123–2200 hours without loss. |
| Sunday 20 February 1944 |
9 | ETO: Tactical operations[9] | 35 B-26 Marauders bomb Haamstede Airfield, The Netherlands, as a target of opportunity, after about 100 B-26s abort attacks on other airfields because of weather. |
| Monday 21 February 1944 |
8 | ETO: Strategic operations[9] | Mission 228: 3 areas in Germany are targeted with the loss of 16 bombers and 5 fighters:
Escort for Mission 228 is provided by 69 P-38s, 542 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 68 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 0-1-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 19-3-14 Luftwaffe aircraft, two P-47s are lost, two are damaged beyond repair, three are damaged and two pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 14-1-4 Luftwaffe aircraft, three P-51s are lost and the pilots are MIA. German losses were 30 Bf 109s and Fw 190s, 24 pilots killed and seven wounded.[11] Mission 229: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 250 bundles of leaflets on Rouen, Caen, Paris and Amiens, France at 2215–2327 hours without loss. |
| Monday 21 February 1944 |
9 | ETO: Tactical operations[9] | 18 B-26s bomb Coxyde Airfield, Belgium; weather causes almost 190 aborts. The Ninth Air Force's Pathfinder Squadron (provisionally activated on 13 Feb) takes part in this operation, its first venture into combat. 185 aircraft scheduled to attack other airfields in the Netherlands and France in the afternoon are recalled because of bad weather. |
| Tuesday 22 February 1944 |
8 | ETO: Strategic operations[9] | VIII Bomber Command is redesignated as the Eighth Air Force. |
| Tuesday 22 February 1944 |
8 | ETO: Strategic operations[9] | Mission 230: "Big Week" continues with 799 aircraft dispatched against German aviation and Luftwaffe airfields; 41 bombers and 11 fighters are lost.
These missions are escorted by 67 P-38s, 535 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s, and 57 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 1 Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair and 6 are damaged; the P-47s claim 39-6-15 Luftwaffe aircraft, 8 P-47s are lost and 12 damaged, 8 pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 19-1-10 Luftwaffe aircraft, 3 P-51s are lost and 3 damaged, 3 pilots are MIA. |
| Tuesday 22 February 1944 |
9 | ETO[9] | 66 B-26s bomb Gilze-Rijen Airfield, The Netherlands; bad weather causes 100+ others to abort. Bombs also fell on the cities of Arnhem, Nijmegen and Enschede and in the vicinity of Deventer, killing about 900 civilians. In 1984, a book "De Fatale Aanval", was written about this by an eye witness Alphons Brinkhuis, who was a 10-year-old boy at Enschede when it happened. |
| Tuesday 22 February 1944 |
15 | MTO:Strategic operations[9] | B-17s attack Petershausen marshaling yard and Regensburg aircraft factory in Germany and the air depot at Zagreb, Yugoslavia; a large force of B-24s hits Regensburg aircraft plants about the same time as the B-17 attack; other B-24s pound the town of Sibenik and the harbor at Zara, Yugoslavia; they claim 40 Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed; 13 bombers are lost. |
| Wednesday 23 February 1944 |
8 | ETO: Strategic operations[9] | Mission 232: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 250 bundles of leaflets on Rennes, Le Mans, Chartres, Lille and Orleans, France at 21:36–22:32 hours without loss. |
| Wednesday 23 February 1944 |
15 | MTO:Strategic operations[9] | B-24s bomb the industrial complex at Steyr, Austria. Other heavy bombers are forced to abort because of bad weather; the bombers and escorting fighters claim 30+ aircraft shot down. |
| Thursday 24 February 1944 |
8 | ETO[9] | Missions 237, 238 and 239 are flown against targets in France; 7 B-17s are lost. Heavy clouds cause over half the bombers dispatched to return without bombing. |
| Thursday 24 February 1944 |
8 | ETO[9] | Mission 237: 49 of 81 B-24s hit the Ecalles sur Buchy V-weapon sites; 1 B-24 is damaged. Escort is provided by 61 P-47s. |
| Thursday 24 February 1944 |
8 | ETO[9] | Mission 238: 258 B-17s are dispatched against V-weapon sites in the Pas de Calais; 109 hit the primary target, 10 hit a road junction E of Yerville, 7 hit a rail siding SW of Abbeville and 6 hit targets of opportunity; 7 B-17s are lost and 75 damaged; casualties are 5 WIA and 63 MIA. Escort is provided by 81 P-38s, 94 P-47s and 22 P-51s; 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-51s claim a single German aircraft on the ground. |
| Thursday 24 February 1944 |
8 | ETO | Mission 239: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 250 bundles of leaflets on Amiens, Rennes, Paris, Rouen and Le Mans, France at 2023–2055 hours without loss.[9] |
| Thursday 24 February 1944 |
9 | ETO | 180 B-26s attack NOBALL (V-weapon) targets and Rosieres-en-Santerre, France. Bad weather makes bombing difficult and causes 34 other B-26s to abort.[9] |
| Friday 25 February 1944 |
8 | ETO | Mission 235: In the final "Big Week" mission, 4 targets in Germany are hit; 31 bombers and 3 fighters are lost.
Escort is provided by 73 P-38s, 687 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 139 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 1-2-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 13-2-10 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-47 is lost and 6 damaged, 1 pilot is MIA; the P-51s claim 12-0-3 Luftwaffe aircraft, 2 P-51s are lost and 1 damaged beyond repair, 2 pilots are MIA. Mission 236: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 250 bundles of leaflets on Grenoble, Toulouse, Chartres, Caen and Raismes, France at 2129–2335 hours without loss.[9] |
| Friday 25 February 1944 |
9 | ETO: Tactical operations[9] | 191 B-26s bomb Venlo, Saint-Trond, and Cambrai/Epinoy Airfields, France in a morning raid as a diversion in support of the VIII Bomber Command heavy bombers over Germany; 36 abort, mainly because of a navigational error. 164 B-26s dispatched against military targets in France during the afternoon are recalled because of bad weather. |
| Friday 25 February 1944 |
9 | MTO: Strategic operations[9] | Continuing coordinated attacks with the Eighth Air Force on European targets, B-17s with fighter escorts pound Regensburg aircraft factory; enemy fighter opposition is heavy. Other B-17s hit the air depot at Klagenfurt, Austria and the dock area at Pola, Italy. B-24s attack Fiume, Italy marshaling yard and port and hit Zell-am-See, Austria railroad and Graz airfield and the port area at Zara, Yugoslavia; 30+ US aircraft are lost; they claim 90+ fighters shot down. |
RAF bomber sorties during Big Week
Bomber Command directly contributed to the attacks on the aircraft industry in Schweinfurt. Some 734 bombers were dispatched on the night of 24/25 February, and 695 struck the target.[1] Of the bombs dropped, 298 hit within three miles and 22 hit inside the target area. Little damage was done. On 25/26 February 1944, Bomber Command sent 600 bombers to the aircraft assembly plant at Augsburg. The attack was accurate and they destroyed some 60 percent of the industrial city.[12]
| Date | Notes |
|---|---|
| 19/20 February 1944 | 921 sorties, 79 aircraft (8.6%) lost. The major raid, by 823 aircraft, was to Leipzig; (B-17s of the U.S. VIII bombed Leipzig-Mockau Airfield earlier the same day). 24 de Havilland Mosquitos bombed airfields in the Netherlands and a further 7 made a diversionary raid on Munich.[13] |
| 20/21 February | 826 sorties, 10 aircraft (1.2%) lost. The major raid, by 598 aircraft, was to Stuttgart;[13] (50 B-17s of the U.S. VIII bombed Stuttgart industrial areas on Friday, 25 February). |
| 21/22 February | 17 Mosquitos to Duisburg, Stuttgart and 2 flying-bomb sites with other sorties. The total effort for the night was 69 sorties, with 1 aircraft (1.4%) lost.[13] |
| 22/23 February | 10 Mosquitos to Stuttgart, 8 to Duisburg and 3 to Aachen with other sorties the total effort for the night was 134 sorties, no aircraft lost.[13] |
| 23/24 February | 17 Mosquitos of 692 Squadron to Düsseldorf, with other sorties the total effort for the night 22 sorties, no aircraft lost.[13] |
| 24/25 February | 1,070 sorties, 36 aircraft (3.4%) lost. The major raid, by 734 aircraft, was on Schweinfurt, home of Germany's main ball-bearing factories. American B-17s had bombed the factories the previous day. 15 Mosquitos bombed airfields in the Netherlands, 8 Mosquitos bombed Kiel and 7 Aachen.[13] |
Notes
- 1 2 3 Hall 1998, p. 138.
- ↑ Caldwell & Muller, p. 162
- 1 2 3 4 5 Harvey 2012, p. 37
- ↑ Caldwell & Muller, p. 162–163
- 1 2 3 Hess 1994
- 1 2 Caldwell & Muller, p163
- ↑ Caldwell & Muller, p162–163
- 1 2
- Russell, Edward T. (1999). The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: Leaping the Atlantic Wall Army Air Forces Campaigns in Western Europe, 1942–1945, Big Week Air Force history and museums program 1999, Federal Depository Library Program Electronic Collection (backup site)
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 USAF History Publications, The Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology (pdf), (February 1945 (html)). Accessed 9 August 2008
- ↑ Caldwell & Muller 2007, p. 156.
- ↑ Caldwell & Muller 2007, p. 158.
- ↑ Hall 1998, p. 140.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Staff, RAF Bomber Command Campaign Diary February 1944 on www.raf.mod.uk
References
- Caldwell, Donald & Muller, Richard (2007). The Luftwaffe over Germany - Defense of the Reich; Greenhill books, MBI Publishing; ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0
- Hess, William. N. B-17Flying Fortress - Combat and Development History;Motor books;1994; ISBN 0-87938-881-1
- Hall, R. Cargill. Case Studies In Strategic Bombardment. Air Force History and Museums Program 1998. ISBN 0-16-049781-7
- Harvey, Arnold D. (Spring 2012). "The Battle of Britain in 1940 and "Big Week," in 1944: A Comparative Perspective". Air Power History 59 (1).
Further reading
- Scutts, J. (1994). Mustang Aces of the Eighth Air Force, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-447-4
- Weal, John. (2006). Bf 109 Defense of the Reich Aces, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-84176-879-0
- Yenne, Bill. (2012). "Big Week: Six Days That Changed The Course of World War II"; Penguin; ISBN 978-0-425-25575-9