Prison gang
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Definition
A prison gang is an inmate organization that operates within a prison system, that has a corporate entity, exists into perpetuity, and whose membership is restrictive, mutually exclusive, and often requires a lifetime commitment.[1] Prison officials and others in law enforcement use the euphemism "security threat group" (or "STG"). The concept for this name is to take away the recognition and publicity that the term "gang" connotes when referring to people who have an interest in undermining the system.
The Convict Code
Political scientists and researchers have long found that inmates band and organize around an understood “ code” or set of norms, even outside of more tight structures like gangs. Political scientist Gresham Sykes, in his work, “ The Society of Captives,” a study based off of New Jersey State Prison claims that, ““conformity to, or deviation from, the inmate code is the major basis for classifying and describing the social relations of prisoners.” Norms established by the code may include understood territories allotted to inmates, or simply loyalty towards other inmates, and against guards. Sykes writes that inmates may, ““bind himself to his fellow captives with ties of mutual aid, loyalty, affection, and respect, firmly standing in opposition to the officials. “ Sykes also notes that restrained freedom, and lack of access to heterosexual relationships, shape these social relationships and political dynamics.
Prison Gangs as Governance
Scholars that are proponents of the view of prison gangs as political entities, or governing actors, point to several factors that sparked the formation of prison gangs in the US to 1960’s. David Skarbeck, for example, argues that the convict code was no longer enough to coordinate and protect inmates. Skarbeck points the increase in prison population as a major contributing factor of this change; as the number of inmates grew, norms were no longer enough to enforce a sense of community. The constant surge of inmates coming into the system meant that there was disruption in the equilibrium-established norms held. As the demographics inside prison changed drastically, small groupings centered on ethnicity, race and pre-prison alliances were disrupted. John Irwin, in “ Prisons in Turmoil, “ writes that by 1970, “there [was] no longer a single, overarching convict culture.” (Irwin, John. 1980. Prisons in Turmoil. Boston: Little, Brown) Furthermore, as the prison population grew, so did the consumer-base for contraband items, like drugs and weapons but also for items, which are legal outside of prison, like money, alcohol, tattoos etc.
Challenges arose to destabilize the socio-political system of self-enforced cooperation under the just the convict code; it was hard to run an underground economy under these new conditions. Firstly, as the inmate population was ever fluctuating, building relationships of trust, between suppliers with unknown quality of products, who feared no punitive measures if they happened not to deliver, and consumers who could rat out a supplier or refuse to pay, was very hard. The size particularly contributed to transparency between supplier and consumer; the scale of supply of an individual supplier could not be enough to signal to potential buyers of the quality of product.
Thus, suppliers faced the challenges of: - Protecting themselves from murder and assault by consumers and other suppliers and protecting their products from confiscation and theft –Being vulnerable to those who delivered and carried the contraband into jail - Risking consumers not paying for the product, or if given on credit, not paying the loan. -Risking consumers informing the guards of the sales
On the consumer side, the challenges lay in: - Not knowing the quality of the product they are paying for/ consuming -Being assaulted or cheated in the deal. Scholars in favor of the governance theory point out that outside bars, the government accounts for risks like these in licit economies, by means of contracts and police enforcement. They argue that prison gangs formed to step into this role in illicit markets. David Skarbeck argues that the organizational structures of prison gangs allow for them to navigate these transactional challenges. He writes, “First, a gang strong enough to protect its members and property is strong enough to credibly threaten others.” And he says, “Their information transmission and enforcement mechanisms make it easier for them to hunt down and assault people who default.” In this view: A prison gang can provide protection, and more effectively than an individual. Prison gangs carry the credible threat of exercising violence, and even murder, to enforce payments. They can protect their members against competing suppliers, and they can supply enough to build a reputation and thus, credibility with consumers. Prison gangs can sell contraband on credit, knowing who they can and cannot loan to and sell to, as collectively they are able build a collective information based on the experience and knowledge of members and affiliates of member inmates. Consumers may feel safe in their transaction with a gang as they know that prison gangs, which wish to keep functioning and profiting in prison as institutions- unlike individual suppliers who cycle in and out- have the incentive to provide quality product and uphold a good reputation. Thus, prison gangs formed and grew
The Political Economy of Prison Gangs- Stergios Skaperdas
This model draws upon writings of political economist Stergios Skaperdas. Skarpedas, in his article "The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection When the State Does Not." claims that organized crime exists “because of the existence of a power vacuum and the shortage or absence of ultimate enforcement.” (180) Most prison gangs operate to manage gangs that participate in the production, transportation or distribution of narcotics and take advantage of power vacuum created by the “the legal prohibition of the production and distribution of certain goods and services.” (181) Prison gangs thus act as a governing body to regulate and secure transactions in illicit markets, where government can neither uphold contracts no secure property rights. Skaperdas notes that higher inefficient economic costs are incurred in their governance.
Skaperdas, Stergios. "The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection When the State Does Not." Conflict and Governance (2003): 163-92. Web. --
Present day prison gangs are said to have evolved from this early formation, into organizations with hierarchies and ranks with votes, coalitions and exclusive and, many times, permanent memberships.
Prison Gangs as Stationary Bandits
In line with this a common model used to discuss the actions of prison gangs is Marcur Olson’s stationary bandit model, which he writes about in Power and Prosperity. Exploring economies under different political structures, Olson creates a model for those that exist in anarchy. Since prison gangs function under a vacuum of power, or a type of anarchy, Olson’s "roving bandit, stationary bandit” model, can be used to discuss the role prison gangs play in illicit economies, or underground gang communities. Olson crafts stationary bandits as actors who wish to extort or loot some share of what a town produces. Stationary bandits who may benefit from the people of a town in a long-term time frame will refrain from taking all the loot in a single day, or everyday so that they do not stop the townspeople from producing anything at all. They will act to maximize their profit as much as they can in the long-term, so they will not only restrain their plunder but also try and increase the produce that they may benefit from. In the process of this, they may provide public goods like streets and law enforcement to ensure smooth production. Prison gangs, similarly are said to work to resolve gang-wars, and regulate the illicit markets so that they may profit from the exchanges within and outside prison. It must be noted that the time frame is crucial factor here, as if the stationary bandit can only be present for a short, while in the town, then the bandit will loot all the produce as there are no negative consequences he will have to bear from the resulting reduced production. This can be compared to the individuals supplying narcotics prior to the establishment of prison gangs, who would come in and out of the prison system without fear of long-term consequences of a bad transaction.
Following this, Skarbeck writes, “Like the stationary bandit, prison gangs provide governance institutions that allow illicit markets to flourish. They adjudicate disputes and protect property rights. They orchestrate violence so that it is relatively less disruptive. They do not do this because they are benevolent dictators. Gangs do it because they profit from doing so. In addition to governing prisons, these gangs are also an important source of governance to the criminal world outside of prison. They wield tremendous power over street gangs, specifically those participating in the drug trade. Because of this power, governance from behind bars helps illicit markets to flourish on the streets.”
Tax and extortion; interacting with the outside world as stationary bandits
Non-incarcerated prison gangs members collect taxes from gangs, or allow a non-member affiliate to do so on the prison gang’s behalf. Gangs must regulate for fraud, or those individuals who play as tax collectors, and taxpayers have interest to be cautious of this as well. Both wield and use the threat of violence to ensure that the money is going to the right place.
Prison gangs can - extort street gangs because they have a credible threat to hurt people in the county jail, and street gang members rationally anticipate spending time there. -use incarcerated street gang members as hostages to force non-incarcerated gang members to pay. -can encourage street gangs to and steal from other, non-taxpaying street gangs.
They cannot:
- extort taxes from drug dealers who they cannot harm in jail; this usually means members of other races for American prison gangs - extort taxes from people who don’t anticipate incarceration, as they have no fear of any possible violence inside bars. - tax those outside the jurisdiction that would lead to incarceration in a county jail controlled by the gang.
Organizational and Structural elements
Gangs work to smart, loyal members who are able to carry out the gangs’ functions and exercise force when necessary, they also need to regulate the behavior of members within the gangs to ensure that activities run smoothly. This additionally means that gangs need a means to monitor activities of members to ensure this.
Recruiting and entrance:
-To ensure that high quality, dedicated members are being recruited, many prison gangs rely on existing members to vouch for or refer new members into the group. - To enter gangs, members often have to prove their loyalty though costly activity, often sexual hazing known often what is referred to as,“ blood in, blood out,”
Hierarchy and rules of conduct:
-Gangs have constitutions to define the rules and expectations. They create laws for those they govern and they establish mechanisms or establish a process for the creations of new rules. - Often, at the top of gang- hierarchy are a group of “ shot-callers” like major stakeholders, they move most the major decisions surrounding operations. Having a single dictator- like shot caller is unusual.
Exit and Voice - In many gangs, exit is not an option, or a very costly one. Many prison gangs require a life- time membership. - Checks and balances within prison-gang organizations seem to be lucrative; there seem ways to voice dissatisfaction towards any level of the organization. Actions are regulated through violence.
Charles Tilly and Prison Gangs as State Building
It is important to note that all these models draw heavily from Charles Tilly’s predatory theory of state building model, as the governance model sees prison gangs as behaving as quasi-states that gain the legitimacy to extort (tax) gangs in exchange for providing security and coordinating economic transactions.
Tilly’s model predicts that in making states, actors will engage in:
• “ War making”- Prison gangs this is gaining a monopoly on force or power caused by vacuum of state authority. • “State making” or "eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside their own territory” -US prison gangs often form along racial cleavages and compete and eliminate rivals on this basis. • Offering protection – as prison gangs do to their members, affiliates and clients • And extracting, or collecting taxes- from client gangs and those in the trade • (Tilly, Charles (1990). Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell.ISBN 1-55786-368-7.)
Alternative explanations
Prison Gangs as extensions of Street Gangs
a) “A common argument is that prison gangs arise when street gangs import their operations behind bars.119 For example, “super-gangs” in Illinois were so large that it was relatively easy for them to import their organizational structure into the prison system.”
Jacobs, James B. 1977. Stateville: The Penitentiary in Mass Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
b) In a similar vein, political scientist Ben Lessings discusses prison gangs that arose within the prison system, which he calling ‘natives’ and those that were already formed outside, calling them ‘imports’. He claims, “Native groups’ norms and culture—initiation rituals, rules about homosexual sex, comportment and relations with guards and non-members—tend to have a strong ‘prison character’. These traits can persist when native gangs project power beyond the prison system: even if outside operations become relatively autonomous, imprisoned elders and leaders often retain significant influence and prison remains an important locus of power.” He writes that import gangs arrive with a “ strong group identity, behavioral norms, and often their publicly known histories and reputations.” He furthermore claims, “While this gives imports an ‘automatic’ basis for cohesion within prison, it may also make them less well adapted to prison life, and hence less ‘successful’ at consolidation than native gangs (Jacobs, 1974, p. 405).The same holds true with projection of power. Imports already have outside operations, and the mechanisms that allow native prison gangs to expand beyond prison would permit imports, in theory, to centralize control over their outside members, formalize rules and rankings, routinize succession, and generally become ‘institutionalized’ (Hagedorn, 2007, p. 303). But this requires a restructuring of the gang, and not all imports end up making prison a locus of power.”
Prison Gangs as a result of judicial decisions
a) “This argument suggests that judicial interventions affected the administration of corrections departments and gave rise to prison gangs. Prior to the mid-1960s, an inmate lost all legal rights when incarcerated. He or she experienced a “civil death” that made the person a “slave of the state.”125 Federal and state courts followed a hands-off doctrine and generally refused to hear cases about poor prison conditions.126 However, Earl Warren (serving on the Supreme Court) and others participated in a process of legal reform that extended legal rights to inmates. Courts became more confident about intervening in state-based institutions after gaining experience implementing school desegregation.127 This corresponded with the rise of public law litigation, and lawyers sought and obtained court-ordered reform for schools, mental health facilities, prisons, and jails.128The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave inmates more procedural rights with which to complain about prison administration.129 Members of the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People also challenged poorly run prisons systems in the courts.130 As a result, the number of legal suits filed against corrections officials increased from 219 in 1966 to nearly 10,000 annually by the late 1970s.131 By the mid-1980s, 45 states had some part of their correctional system under a court order.132 This increasing interference by federal courts, it is argued, tied the hands of correctional officials, preventing them from controlling their facilities effectively (and perhaps in a cruel manner), so that they were unable to manage inmates and subdue gangs.133 If U.S. Supreme Court rulings or the Civil Rights Act affected prisons in all states, then we would expect to see prison gangs forming across the United States at the same time, not across a span of more than three decades and not (p. 65) prior to the 1960s. This is not what we have seen. If judicial intervention mattered, it would have to be in a more context-specific way. This is plausible because many court rulings affected the operation of a specific prison or prison system. However, past work has rarely identified the mechanism that leads from judicial intervention generally to the formation of prison gangs in a specific location. James Jacobs notes that the court intrusions have had a “subtle and indirect” effect, making any sort of empirical testing difficult to conduct.134 It is not clear how much judicial intervention matters and in what way.” ( Skarbeck)
Prison Gangs as a result of government (state level) policy
a) “This approach focuses on government policy changes at the state level. For instance, California implemented an indeterminate sentencing regime from 1944 to 1977.”
Prison Gangs as a result of inmates “ desire for camaraderie”
a) “A fourth approach to understanding prison gangs incorporates demand-side factors, such as inmates’ desire for protection or camaraderie. One article in this vein infers a five-step process of prison gang formation, based on observations of inmates in the Texas prison system.155 The first stage begins when an inmate enters prison and he finds himself alone and afraid. The second stage occurs when he seeks out a clique of inmates with whom to associate who provide a sense of belonging”
Prison Gangs as a result of the pursuit of a hypermasculine ideal
a) Two prominent arguments focus on the idea of male domination and on inmates’ adherence to a hypermasculine ideal. The former seeks to explain prison life by identifying a general tendency to, or desire for, male domination and to understand how it is constructed and reproduced in prison.156Given the absence of females to subjugate, men must find alternative forms of domination, and “an obvious answer is that incarcerated men create gangs and use physical violence to control each other.”
Dolovich, Sharon. 2011. “Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison” American Criminal Law Review 48(1): 1–110.
Sociology theories
The two leading sociology theories surrounding prison gangs and the order within prisons is deprivation theory and importation theory.
-Deprivation theory: Argues that social order within prisons arises due to the pain of imprisonment; studies focusing on this look at the experiences of prisoners and the nature of their confinement. -Importation theory: Argues that the focus should instead be on the experiences that prisoners had prior to incarceration, and explores the ways in which class, race drug culture outside bars has shaped dynamics inside prisons.
Formation of “ classic”( American)Prison gangs
(Under construction) - La Eme - Nuestro - Aryan - Black Guerrila
Names of prison gangs: Hispanic
La Eme or the Mexican Mafia: (Blue)"Eme" is the Spanish name of the letter "M" and it is the 13th letter in the alphabet. The Mexican mafia are composed mostly of Hispanics, although some Caucasian members exist. The Mexican Mafia and the Aryan Brotherhood are allies and work together to control prostitution, drug running, weapons and "hits" or murders. Originally formed in the 1950s in California prisons by Hispanic prisoners from the southern part of that state, Eme has traditionally been composed of US-born or raised Hispanics and has retained ties to the Southern California-based "Sureños". During the 1970s and 1980s, Eme in California established the model of leveraging their power in prison to control and profit from criminal activity on the street.
Nuestra Familia ("our family" in Spanish):(Red) The "N" is the 14th letter in the alphabet which is used as their symbol along with the Roman numeral "XIV" to represent their gang; another mostly Hispanic prison gang that is constantly at war with La Eme and was originally formed from Northern-California or rural-based Hispanic prisoners with ties to "Norteños" of Northern California opposing the domination by La Eme, which was started by and associated with Los Angeles gang members. The gang was first established in Soledad prison in California in the 1960s.[4]
The Texas Syndicate: A mostly Texas-based prison gang that includes mostly Hispanic members and does (albeit rarely) allow Caucasian members. The Texas Syndicate, more than La Eme or Nuestra Familia, has been associated or allied with Mexican immigrant prisoners, while Eme and Familia tend to be composed of and associate with US-born or raised Hispanics.
Ñetas: a Hispanic (mainly Puerto Rican) gang, found on Puerto Rico and on the eastern coast of the US. Originally formed in 1970 in Rio Pedras Prison, Puerto Rico.[5] African American[edit]
Black
Most African-American prison gangs retain their street gang names and associations. These commonly include Rollin' sets (named after streets, i.e. Rollin' 30's, Rollin' 40's etc.) that can identify with either Blood or Crip affiliations. The Black Guerilla Family represents an exception, as an originally politically based group that has a significant presence in prisons and prison politics. It was founded in 1966 at San Quentin State Prison, California by former Black Panther member George L. Jackson.[6]
United Blood Nation: an African-American prison gang found on the east coast. They are rivals with the Netas and have ties with the Black Guerilla Family. Folk Nation: Found in Midwestern and Southern states, allied with Crips, bitter rivals with the People Nation.
People Nation: Found in Midwestern and Southern states, allied with Bloods, bitter rivals with the Folk Nation.
D.C. Blacks: Found in Washington D.C. by African-American inmates, are allied with the Black Guerilla Family and United Blood Nation, and enemies to the Aryan Brotherhood and Mexican Mafia.
Conservative Vice Lords (CVL): A primarily African American gang that originated in the St. Charles Illinois Youth Center outside Chicago.[7] In Chicago, CVL operated primarily in theLawndale section and used drug sales profits to continue operation and used prisons to train and recruit new members.[8]
Caucasian
Aryan Brotherhood: A white prison gang that originated in California's San Quentin Prison amongst White American prisoners in 1964. Their emblem, "the brand", consists of a shamrock and the number 666. Other identifiers include the initials "AB", Swastikas and the sigrune.[9] Perhaps out of their ideology and the necessity of establishing a presence among the more numerous Black and Hispanic gang members, the AB has a particular reputation for ruthlessness and violence. Since the 1990s, in part because of this reputation, the AB has been targeted heavily by state and federal authorities. Many key AB members have been moved to "supermax" control-unit prisons at both the federal and state level or are under federal indictment.
Nazi Lowriders: A newer white prison gang that emerged after many Aryan Brotherhood members were sent to the Security Housing Unit at Pelican Bay or transferred to federal prisons. NLR is associated with members originally from the
Antelope Valley and is known to accept some light-skinned or Caucasian-identified Hispanic members.
European Kindred: a white supremacist prison gang founded in Oregon that is affiliated with the Aryan Brotherhood and the Ku Klux Klan.
Confederate Knights of America: a white supremacist prison gang in Texas that is affiliated with the KKK and AB.
Aryan Circle: a white supremacist prison gang concerned about race before money.
Dead Man Incorporated (DMI): a predominantly white prison gang founded in the Maryland Correctional System with branches in many other correctional facilities throughout the U.S.
Aryan Brotherhood of Texas: Despite the similarity of the name, the Aryan Brotherhood of Texas (A.B.T.) does not have ties with the original Aryan Brotherhood. Founded in Texas in the 1980s the A.B.T. was created mainly as a criminal enterprise.[10]
Brotherhood of Aryan Alliance (a. k. a. the "211's") [11]
International Gangs
(Under construction) PCC: Brazil
The PCC http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/113/3/503.full.pdf+html PCC: http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ea/v21n61/en_a02v2161.pdf http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2010/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2010-Chapter-06-EN.pdf 170
South Africa: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2010/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2010-Chapter-06-EN.pdf 163 Journal of Gang Research: Prison Gangs in South Africa: A Comparative Analysis
-- Militant prison- based groups: Ireland
Peru
VIII. Policy implications: (Under construction)