Battle of El Agheila

Battle of El Agheila Part of the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War The withdrawal of the Axis forces through North Africa. Date 11–18 December 1942[lower-alpha 1] Location El Agheila, Libya Coordinates: 30°16′N 19°12′E / 30.267°N 19.200°E Result Allied victory Territorial changes Axis forces retreat into Tripolitania Belligerents  United Kingdom  New Zealand  Germany  Italy Commanders and leaders Harold Alexander Bernard Montgomery Erwin Rommel

The Battle of El Agheila was a brief engagement of the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War. It took place in December 1942 between Allied forces of the Eighth Army (General Bernard Montgomery) and the Axis forces of the German-Italian Panzer Army (Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel), during the long Axis withdrawal from El Alamein to Tunis. It ended with the German-Italian Panzer Army resuming its retreat towards Tunisia, where the Tunisia Campaign had begun with Operation Torch (8–16 November 1942).

Background

Area of Rommel's retreat from El Alamein to El Agheila, 4–23 November 1942

On 4 November 1942, Rommel decided to end the Second Battle of El Alamein and withdraw west towards Libya. In doing so, he defied the "Stand to the last" orders of Adolf Hitler, to save the remainder of his force.^[1] The Afrika Korps reached the village of Fuka the next day. Italian forces had arrived earlier, having withdrawn from El Alamein from 3–4 November and formed a defensive line. The Italians resumed their withdrawal on the same day after an Allied attack and the Germans followed suit.^[2] Montgomery rested some of his formations after their efforts at El Alamein, lading with the 4th Light Armoured Brigade.^[3]

Rain on the afternoon of 6 November, impeded the British pursuit as the Axis forces continued their withdrawal and a new defence line was established at Mersa Matruh the following day, some 110 mi (180 km) west of El Alamein. Rommel received a warning from Hitler of an expected Allied landing between Tobruk and Benghazi but on 8 November, he discovered that this was wrong. There were Anglo-American landings in Morocco and Algeria (Operation Torch). The Eastern Task Force—aimed at Algiers—landed with 20,000 troops and began moving east towards Rommel. Facing the prospect of a large Allied force to his rear, he decided to withdraw in one bound to El Agheila.^[4]

A Stuart tank being refuelled from an RAF fuel bowser outside Sidi Barrani, 15 November 1942

Axis forces retired from Sidi Barrani on 9 November and Halfaya Pass (on the Libyan–Egyptian border) the last position in Egypt, on 11 November. Cyrenaica was abandoned without serious resistance. Rommel wanted to save 10,000 short tons (9,100 t) of equipment in Tobruk but it fell to the British on 13 November.^[5] An attempt by Montgomery to trap the Tobruk garrison by an encirclement toward Acroma, west of Tobruk failed and the garrison retreated along the Via Balbia toward Benghazi with few losses.^[6] Derna and the airfield at Martuba, were captured on 15 November. The RAF quickly occupied the airfield to provide air cover for a Malta convoy on 18 November.^[7] Axis forces had withdrawn 400 mi (640 km) in ten days.

Despite the importance of the Port of Benghazi to the Axis supply chain, Rommel abandoned the port to avoid a repeat of the disastrous entrapment suffered by the Italians at the Battle of Beda Fomm in February 1941.^[8] Rommel ordered the demolition of port facilities and materiel in Benghazi, writing afterwards that

...in Benghazi, we destroyed the port facilities and platforms and the chaos overwhelmed the civilians in this miserable town.

— Rommel^[9]

Benghazi was occupied by the British on 20 November and three days later, the Axis forces retreated from Agedabia and fell back to Mersa Brega.^{[lower-alpha 2]} During their withdrawal to Mersa Brega, the Axis forces faced many difficulties, including British air superiority, that allowed them to target the Axis columns, crowded on the coastal road and short of fuel. To delay the British advance at any cost, Axis sappers laid mines in the Mersa Brega area and steel helmets were laid to mislead British mine detectors.^[10]

For much of the pursuit to El Agheila, the British were uncertain of Rommel's intentions. They had been caught out in earlier campaigns, by an enemy that had drawn them on and then counter-attacked. Montgomery had intended to build his army's morale by banishing the habit of defeat and retreat and the 1st Armoured Division and 2nd New Zealand Division were held at Bardia, resting and providing a defence. Despite Rommel's concerns of entrapment by a rapid Allied advance across the Cyrenaica bulge, Montgomery was aware that an extended and isolated force could also be vulnerable, as in early 1941 and early 1942. When a reconnaissance force of armoured cars was sent across country, it became delayed by water-logged ground.^[6] Signals intelligence revealed to the Eighth Army that the Panzerarmee was virtually immobilised by lack of fuel, prompting Montgomery to order a stronger force to be sent across country. Having heard of the presence of the reconnaissance force, Rommel brought forward his retirement from Benghazi and was able to brush the armoured cars aside, untroubled by the stronger force which had yet to arrive.^[11]

Prelude

Axis

PzKpfw IIIs on the coast road in Cyrenaica

During the eighteen days between the evacuation of Agedabia on 23 November and the beginning of the Battle of El Agheila on 11 December Rommel described disagreements with his political and military superiors and he engaged in fruitless bitter arguments with Hitler, Hermann Göring, General Albert Kesselring OB Süd (Oberbefehlshaber Süd, Army Command in the South), Ugo Cavallero the Italian chief of staff at Comando Supremo and the governor of Libya, Ettore Bastico.^[12] Rommel wanted to withdraw to Tunis as soon as possible, while the others wanted him to make a stand on the El Agheila–Mersa Brega line.^[13] Mussolini ordered Rommel to stand on the Agheila line to defend Tripolitania and this was supported by Hitler, who ordered that El Agheila should be held "in all circumstances".^[14]

Although the Agheila position was naturally strong, being surrounded by salt marshes, soft sand or broken ground, restricting the ability of vehicles to manoeuvre, Rommel's assessment was that he would be able to hold the position only if he received artillery and tank replacements, if the Luftwaffe was strengthened and his fuel and ammunition supplies were restored.^[15] By this time, all available men and equipment were being diverted to Tunis, following the Allied landings of Operation Torch, to prevent Tunisia falling to an Allied advance from Algeria. By the time of Rommel's visit to Berlin at the beginning of December, Mussolini and Hitler had accepted the reality of the situation and agreed for preparations to be made for a withdrawal to Buerat, some 250 miles (400 km) to the west and by 3 December, the un-mechanised Italian infantry had begun a retirement.^[16]

British

The British had to supply their forces from Egypt to Agedabia. Supplies could be moved 440 mi (710 km) from Alexandria to Tobruk by rail, the 390 mi (630 km) from Tobruk to Agedabia was slightly shorter but supplies had to go by road on the Via Balbia or by sea to Benghazi and then by road to Agedabia. On 26 November, X Corps was taken into reserve and XXX Corps (Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese) took over the Eighth Army front line with the 7th Armoured Division, 51st (Highland) Division and the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Division.^[17] At the end of November, Montgomery planned for the 2nd New Zealand Division (Bernard Freyberg) with the 4th Light Armoured Brigade under command, to commence a wide outflanking movement on 13 December, masked by bombardment and infantry raids on the forward positions of the Panzerarmee, commencing on the night of 11/12 December, to distract attention from the flank. A frontal attack by the 51st (Highland) Division on the coast and 7th Armoured Division inland on their left would begin on the night of 16/17 December, once the New Zealanders were in position to the rear of the Axis position.^[18]

Battle

Rommel's supply position had not improved: Tunisia was still being prioritised for supplies and of the ships which were sent to Tripoli to supply the Panzer Army in November, three quarters had been destroyed. Rommel was short of men and equipment and very short of fuel and ammunition.^[18] His stated intention therefore was to hold out as long as possible but to retire in the face of strong pressure. When the preliminary attacks began on 11 December Rommel took this to be the start of Eighth Army's attack and started to withdraw. By mid morning on 12 December patrols detected that the Axis positions were starting to thin out. In response Montgomery ordered the New Zealand Division to move immediately and brought forward the main assault to the night of 14/15 December.^[19] By the evening of 12 December, the Axis withdrawal was under way, except for some units who were covering the extrication.^[20]

On 13 December, Axis reconnaissance aircraft discovered some 300 vehicles north of Marada oasis 75 mi (121 km) south of El Agheila (the New Zealand column), which meant for the Axis forces the danger of being outflanked. Rommel wished to launch his remaining armour at this outflanking force but was prevented by lack of fuel and ordered the withdrawal to continue.^[21] An attack by the 7th Armoured Division was repulsed in a rearguard action by the Italian Ariete Combat Group. In his diary, Rommel wrote:

Late in the morning, a superior enemy force launched an attack on Combat Group Ariete, which was located south-west of El Agheila, with its right flank resting on the Sebcha Chebira and its left linking up with 90th Light Division. Bitter fighting ensued against 80 British tanks and lasted for nearly ten hours. The Italians put up a magnificent fight, for which they deserved the utmost credit. Finally, in the evening, the British were thrown back by a counter attack of the Centauro's armoured regiment, leaving 22 tanks and 2 armoured cars burnt out or damaged on the battlefield. The British intention of cutting off the 90th Light Division had been foiled.

— Rommel^[22]

The Eighth Army change of plan had come too late and when the New Zealand Division completed their "left hook" on 15 December, they were dispersed after a difficult journey across tough terrain which left them with only 17 serviceable tanks. They found 15th Panzer Division on the escarpment guarding the coast road and the 6th New Zealand Brigade further west, was ordered to form a block on the coast road, while the 5th Brigade protected the divisional supply and transport vehicles.^[23] During the night of 15/16 December, most of the remaining elements of the Panzer Army were able to withdraw towards Nofilia, moving in small fast columns through the gaps in the dispersed New Zealand units, under cover of dark.^[24] On 18 December, short-lived but fierce fighting took place at Nofaliya (100 mi (160 km) west of El Agheila), which brought the battle of El Agheila to an end.^[25]

Aftermath

Analysis

Rommel later commented that experience should have told Montgomery that there was a good chance that

...we should not accept battle. He should not therefore have started bombarding our strong points and attacking our line until his outflanking force had completed its move and was in a position to advance on the coast road in timed co-ordination with the frontal attack.

— Rommel^[26]

Casualties

In 1966, I. S. O. Playfair, the British official historian gave an estimate of 450 Axis prisoners, 25 guns and 18 tanks destroyed from 13–17 December.^[24] In 1962, W. G. Stevens, the New Zealand official historian recorded 2nd Zealand Division casualties of 11 killed, 29 wounded and 8 prisoners.^[27]

Subsequent operations

Rommel planned to defend the Gabes Gap in Tunisia, east of the French pre-war Mareth line, by holding the port of Buerat, while 5th Panzer Army (Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen von Arnim) already in Tunisia confronted the Allied First Army.^[28] The front was 400 mi (640 km) from Tobruk and with such difficulties of supply the Eighth Army was unable to use all its units. Buerat was not strongly defended and despite intelligence of the state of the Axis forces, Montgomery paused until 16 January 1943, when the Eighth Army had a 4:1 superiority in infantry and a 7.5:1 superiority in tanks. Bombing began on 12 January and XXX Corps attacked on 15 January, picking its way along the coast road, through minefields, demolitions and booby-traps. The New Zealand and 7th Armoured divisions swung inland via Tarhuna, supply being provided by the RASC and the New Zealand Army Service Corps and dependent on the quick capture of the port. Rommel withdrew on 15 January and by 19 January, retired from Tripoli after destroying the port and conducted delaying actions into Tunisia. The 7th Armoured Division entered Tripoli on the night of 22/23 January and the Panzerarmee reached the Mareth line, another 320 kilometres (200 mi) west, on 23 January.^[29]

Notes

Footnotes

1. There is a one day difference in the dates between Rommel's memoires and those of his rearguard commander, von der Heydte, and the contributor has tried to reconcile the two sources
2. Rommel saved the Panzerarmee by abandoning Benghazi, and withdrawing to Mersa Brega, when General Friedrich Paulus obeyed Hitler's orders to stand fast during the Soviet Operation Uranus and not withdraw from Stalingrad and the 6th Army and part of the 4th Panzer Army were annihilated.

Citations

1. Rommel 1982, p. 561.
2. Playfair 2004, pp. 81–90.
3. Playfair 2004, p. 83.
4. Playfair 2004.
5. Rommel 1982, p. 602.
6. Stevens 1962.
7. Stevens 1962, p. 14.
8. Rommel 1982, p. 604.
9. Rommel 1982, p. 610.
10. Rommel 1982, p. 611.
11. Hinsley 1981, p. 455.
12. Playfair 2004, p. 93.
13. Rommel 1982, pp. 621, 626.
14. Hinsley 1981, p. 456.
15. Playfair 2004, p. 217.
16. Hinsley 1981, pp. 455–457.
17. Playfair 2004, pp. 200–221.
18. Hinsley 1981, p. 457.
19. Hinsley 1981, p. 458.
20. Rommel 1982, p. 642.
21. Playfair 2004, p. 224.
22. Rommel 1982, p. 373.
23. Playfair 2004, p. 225.
24. Playfair 2004, p. 226.
25. Stevens 1962, pp. 61–67.
26. Hinsley 1981, pp. 458–459.
27. Stevens 1962, p. 57.
28. Neillands 2004, p. 214.
29. Neillands 2004, pp. 218–219.

References

• Hinsley, F. H.; Thomas, E. E.; Ransom, C. F. G.; Knight, R. C. (1981). British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its influence on Strategy and Operations. II. London: HMSO. ISBN 0-11-630934-2.
• Neillands, Robin (2004). Eighth Army: From the Western Desert to the Alps, 1939–1945. London: John Murray. ISBN 0-7195-5647-3.
• Playfair, Major-General I. S. O.; et al. (2004) [1st. pub. HMSO 1966]. Butler, J. R. M., ed. The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series IV (Naval & Military Press ed.). UK: HMSO. ISBN 1-84574-068-8.
• Rommel, Erwin (1982) [1953]. Liddell Hart, B. H., ed. The Rommel Papers. New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-306-80157-0.
• Stevens, W. G. (1962). Bardia to Enfidaville. The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945 (online ed.). Wellington, NZ: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs. OCLC 637332820. Retrieved 28 February 2015.
• Young, Peter, ed. (1983). The History of World War II. 30 volumes. London: Orbis.

External links

• Map, New Zealand Official History