Cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (August 1998)

Operation Infinite Reach

The Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, destroyed during Operation Infinite Reach.
DateAugust 20, 1998
LocationAfghanistan and Sudan
15°38′45″N 32°33′42″E / 15.64583°N 32.56167°E / 15.64583; 32.56167Coordinates: 15°38′45″N 32°33′42″E / 15.64583°N 32.56167°E / 15.64583; 32.56167
Result

Strikes failed[1][2]

  • Al-Qaeda suffers casualties and damage to its installations, but senior al-Qaeda leaders survive[3][4][5]
  • Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant destroyed[6]
  • Al-Qaeda propaganda victory[7][8][9]
Belligerents
 United States al-Qaeda
 Sudan
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
 Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
United States Bill Clinton
United States Anthony Zinni		 Osama bin Laden
Sudan Omar al-Bashir
Fazlur Rehman Khalil
Strength
7 warships, 1 submarine[10] Up to 600 militants at Zhawar Kili Al-Badr[11]
Casualties and losses
None[12] 6–20[13] killed
1 killed, 10 injured[14]
5 ISI officers killed[15]

The August 1998 bombings of Afghanistan and Sudan (codenamed Operation Infinite Reach) were American cruise missile strikes on al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan on August 20, 1998. The attack was in retaliation for al-Qaeda's bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed 224 people (including 12 Americans) and injured 5,000 others.

The U.S. suspected that the Al-Shifa plant was linked to terrorism and was producing chemical weapons for terrorists, based on intelligence reports suggesting the plant's financial ties to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and the presence of chemicals used in weapons manufacturing. On the grounds of this intelligence, the U.S. launched missiles into the plant, destroying much of it and killing or wounding 11 Sudanese. The strikes on Al-Shifa proved controversial; after the attacks, the U.S. rationale was criticized as faulty, and a number of sources agree that the Al-Shifa plant was not involved in chemical weapons production.[14][16][17]

The missile strikes on training camps in Afghanistan succeeded in inflicting an uncertain number of casualties on al-Qaeda, as well as some material damage to the camps themselves, but bin Laden himself was not harmed. Following the attacks, the ruling Taliban reneged on its promise given to Saudi intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal to hand over bin Laden, and the regime instead strengthened its ties with Bin Laden.

Operation Infinite Reach was met with a mixed international response: U.S. allies such as the UK, Germany, Australia, and Israel backed the strikes, but the targeted countries, militant groups, and other nations in the Middle East strongly opposed them. The failure of the attacks to kill bin Laden also enhanced his public image in Muslim nations.

Background

In February 23, 1998, Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and three other leaders of Islamic militant organizations issued a fatwa in the name of the "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," publishing it in Al-Quds Al-Arabi. Deploring the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, the alleged U.S. aim to destroy Iraq, and U.S. support for Israel, they declared that "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilian and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."[18] In spring 1998, the Saudi elites became concerned about the threat posed by al-Qaeda and bin Laden to their country; militants attempted to infiltrate surface-to-air missiles inside the kingdom, an al-Qaeda defector alleged that "prominent Saudis" were bankrolling bin Laden, and bin Laden himself attacked the Saudi royal family harshly.[19] In June 1998, King Fahd ordered Turki to "Finish this," and Turki traveled with to Tarnak Farms to meet with Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, to discuss the question of bin Laden.[20] Turki demanded that the Taliban either expel bin Laden from their country or hand him over to the Saudis, saying that "If [the Taliban] wanted to have good relations with Saudi Arabia, they have to get bin Laden out of Afghanistan." While the Taliban "agreed in principle" with Turki, negotiations stalled by August.[21]

Around the same time, the U.S. was planning its own actions against bin Laden, too. Michael Scheuer, chief of the CIA's bin Laden unit ("Alec Station"), considered using local Afghans to kidnap bin Laden, then exfiltrate him from Afghanistan in a modified Lockheed C-130 Hercules. Documents recovered from Wadih el-Hage's Nairobi computer suggested a link between bin Laden and the deaths of U.S. troops in Somalia, and were used as the foundation for the June 1998 New York indictment of bin Laden, even though the charges were later dropped.[22] However, the planned raid was cancelled in May after internecine disputes between officials at the FBI and the CIA, the National Security Council's hesitance to approve the plan, concerns over the raid's chance of success, and potential for civilian casualties.[23][24]

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, al-Qaeda began reconnoitering Nairobi for potential targets in December 1993, using a team led by Ali Mohamed. In January 1994, bin Laden was personally presented with the team's surveillance reports, and he and his senior advisers began to develop a plan to attack the American embassy in Nairobi. From February to June 1998, al-Qaeda prepared to launch their attacks, renting residences, preparing their bombs, and acquiring trucks. All the while, bin Laden continued his public-relations efforts, giving interviews with ABC News and Pakistani journalists.[25][26] While U.S. authorities had investigated al-Qaeda activities in Nairobi, they had not detected any "credible threats" of imminent attacks.[27]

On August 7, al-Qaeda teams in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, attacked the cities' U.S. embassies simultaneously, using trucks to deliver their bombs. In Nairobi, the explosion collapsed the nearby Ufundi Building and destroyed the embassy, killing 213 people, 12 of them Americans; another 4,000 people were wounded. In Dar es Salaam, the bomber was unable to get close enough to the embassy to demolish it, but the blast killed 11 Africans and wounded 85 people. The assaults were "the most devastating terrorist attack against American targets" since the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings.[28][29][30] To justify the high-casualty attacks, bin Laden claimed that they were in retaliation for the U.S. "invasion" of Somalia, and that the Rwandan Genocide and a supposed U.S. plan to partition Sudan had been devised in the embassies.[31]

Al-Shifa plant bombing and controversy

The missiles were launched from American warships in the Red Sea at about 01:30 EDT (17:30 GMT).[32] At 7:30 PM local time,[10] thirteen missiles hit the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, which the United States claimed was helping Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda's leader and the mastermind behind the embassy attacks, build chemical weapons. The entire factory was destroyed except for the administration, water-cooling, and plant laboratory sections, which were severely damaged. One night watchman was killed and ten other Sudanese were wounded by the strike.[16][33]

Richard Clarke, the United States National Security Council advisor at the time of the strikes, stated that intelligence existed linking bin Laden to Al-Shifa's current and past operators, namely the Iraqi nerve gas experts and the National Islamic Front in Sudan.[34] Since 1995, the CIA had received intelligence suggesting collaboration between Sudan and bin Laden to produce chemical weapons "to use against U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia".[35] According to testimony by U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen, "...the U.S. intelligence community obtained physical evidence from outside the al-Shifa facility in Sudan that supported long-standing concerns regarding its potential role in Sudanese chemical weapon efforts that could be exploited by al Qaeda."[36] Cohen also stated that "multiple, reinforcing elements of information... [including] information from HUMINT and technical sources" backed the intelligence community's view that the al-Shifa plant was linked to terrorism.[37] The CIA had obtained a sample of soil from the facility which showed the presence of EMPTA, "a chemical that was essential in making the extremely potent nerve gas VX."[16] An August 4 CIA intelligence report suggested that bin Laden "had already acquired chemical weapons and might be ready to attack."[38]

Officials later acknowledged, however, that "the evidence that prompted President Clinton to order the missile strike on the Shifa plant was not as solid as first portrayed... there was no proof that the plant had been manufacturing or storing nerve gas, as initially suspected by the Americans, or had been linked to Osama bin Laden, who was a resident of Khartoum in the 1980's."[39][17][40]

The Al-Shifa factory employed 300 Sudanese and provided over half of the country's pharmaceuticals, including "drugs for treating malaria, diabetes, hypertension, ulcers, rheumatism, gonorrhea, and tuberculosis."[16][41] Werner Daum, Germany's ambassador to Sudan from 1996 to 2000, wrote that the attack may have caused "several tens of thousands" of Sudanese civilian deaths due to the resulting shortage of these medicines.[42] The American Bureau of Intelligence and Research wrote a report in 1999 questioning the attack on the factory, suggesting that the connection to bin Laden was not accurate; James Risen reported in The New York Times:

Now, the analysts renewed their doubts and told Assistant Secretary of State Phyllis Oakley that the C.I.A.'s evidence on which the attack was based was inadequate. Ms. Oakley asked them to double-check; perhaps there was some intelligence they had not yet seen. The answer came back quickly: There was no additional evidence. Ms. Oakley called a meeting of key aides and a consensus emerged: Contrary to what the Administration was saying, the case tying Al Shifa to Mr. bin Laden or to chemical weapons was weak.[43]

The Chairman of Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries told reporters that he "had inventories of every chemical and records of every employee's history. There were no such [nerve gas] chemicals being made here."[44] Sudan invited the U.S. to conduct chemical tests at the site for evidence to support its claim that the plant might have been a chemical weapons factory; the U.S. refused the invitation to investigate and did not officially apologize for the attacks.[39] It was later hypothesized that "the chemical [EMPTA] might have been a product of the breakdown of a commercially available pesticide widely used in Africa, which it closely resembles."[16][45]

Attack on camps in Afghanistan

Satellite image showing an al-Qaeda training camp in Zhawar Kili Al-Badr

About 75[46][5] Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired by U.S. Navy ships in the Arabian Sea into the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan at the Zhawar Kili Al-Badr camp complex in the Khost region, a training camp, and a "support complex."[12][11] These included Al Farouq training camp and Jihad Wahl training camp, each of which had about 70 to 120 trainees.[47] Other targets within Zhawar Kili Al-Badr included storage, housing, administration, training, and logistics facilities. Other militant organizations that used these camps included Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, and Pakistani militant groups fighting an insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir.[48][47][49][12][50] The missiles hit at roughly 10:00 PM local time.[5]

The attack was made partly in an attempt to assassinate bin Laden and other leaders.[51] After the attack, the CIA heard that bin Laden had been at Zhawar Kili Al-Badr but had left some hours before the missiles hit.[5]

The earlier arrest of Mohammed Odeh on August 7, while he was traveling to meet with Osama, is said to have alerted bin Laden, who canceled the meeting; this meant that the camps targeted by the cruise missiles were mainly empty the day of the U.S. strike.[52]

Judging that "Collateral damage was just not an issue," the U.S. used cluster munitions in several missiles, seeking to maximize militant casualties.[10] However, various sources differ on the precise number of casualties that the missile strikes against al-Qaeda's Afghan bases caused. According to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, 20 Afghans, seven Pakistanis, three Yemenis, two Egyptians, one Saudi and one Turk were killed.[53] Bin Laden bodyguard Abu Jandal later estimated that only six men had been killed in the strikes: "a Saudi, an Egyptian, an Uzbek, and three Yemenis."[7] Abdul Rahman Khadr, a militant training at the Al Farouq camp, also reported that six men had been killed.[54] The Taliban said that "twenty-two Afghans had also been killed and more than fifty gravely wounded," while Sandy Berger, Clinton's National Security Advisor, stated that "twenty or thirty al-Qaeda operatives were killed."[7] Pakistani and hospital sources gave a death toll of eleven dead and fifty-three wounded.[55] Bin Laden jokingly told militants at the al-Jihad merger that only a few camels and chickens had died.[56] An initial report by the Pakistani government stated that a missile had killed six Pakistanis; the government later retracted the statement and fired its intelligence chief for the incorrect report.[50] ISI director Hamid Gul later stated that "more than half the missiles fell in Pakistani territory, killing two Pakistani citizens,"[7] and Gul reportedly notified the Taliban of the missile strikes in advance.[51] According to reporter Mary Anne Weaver, the attack "hit two ISI training camps in Afghanistan, killing 5 ISI officers and 20 trainees."[15] One 1998 report also suggested that "most of the people killed in Afghanistan were Pakistani recruits training to fight in Kashmir, not bin Laden terrorists."[57]

Following the attack, U.S. surveillance aircraft and reconnaissance satellites photographed the sites for damage assessment. One anonymous official reported that "Some buildings suffered meaningful damage. We missed some others,"[10] but Jandal stated that "Each house was hit by a missile but they did not destroy the camp completely." According to Jandal, bathrooms, the kitchen, and the mosque were hit in the strike.[58] Berger stated that the damage to the camps was "moderate to severe,"[11] while CIA agent Henry Crumpton later wrote that "The enemy suffered a few casualties and some damaged infrastructure, but no more."[4]

Aftermath

“ Interestingly, even if bin Laden had been there, it would have taken a good deal of luck to kill him. The camp facilities at Khowst are fairly extensive and cover a substantial piece of ground. ”
— Michael Scheuer, CIA Station Chief[59]

U.S. President Bill Clinton announced the attacks in a TV address, saying the Khost camp was "one of the most active terrorist bases in the world," adding that "I want the world to understand that our actions today were not aimed against Islam" which he called "a great religion." He emphasized that "Our battle against terrorism... will require strength, courage and endurance. We will not yield to this threat... We must be prepared to do all that we can for as long as we must."[60] U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that "decent people everywhere must send the message to terrorists everywhere that they can hide but they cannot escape the long arm of justice."[32]

Each cruise missile cost about $750,000, and "nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars' worth of armaments" were fired in the strikes overall.[7][5] The failure of the missiles to eliminate their targets would lead to an acceleration in the American program to develop unmanned combat air vehicles.[61] Reportedly, bin Laden sold some of the unexploded missiles "to China for more than $10 million," while Pakistan "may have used some... to design its own version of a cruise missile."[7]

The missiles were launched three days after Clinton testified on the Monica Lewinsky scandal,[62] and some media outlets, Middle Eastern protesters, and Republicans accused Clinton of ordering the attacks as a diversion;[8][63][64] some Arab protesters even made signs reading, "No war for Monica!"[16] The attacks also drew parallels to the then-recently released movie Wag the Dog, which features a fictional president faking a war in Albania to distract attention from a sex scandal.[8][65] Polls taken after the attacks showed that up to "40% of respondents... indicated that they believed distracting the nation was one of the considerations motivating President Clinton."[66] The White House and administration officials denied any connection between the missile strikes and the ongoing scandal.[67][68]

The attacks reportedly strengthened bin Laden's image "as a symbolic figure of resistance."[7] As journalist Steve Coll put it, "Bin Laden's reputation in the Islamic world had been enhanced. He had been shot at by a high-tech superpower and the superpower missed... The missile strikes were his biggest publicity payoff to date."[8] Two hagiographies of bin Laden were soon published in Pakistan, and children in Kenya and Tanzania could even be seen wearing bin Laden T-shirts.[7][8] Maulana Sami ul-Haq, leader of the Pakistani Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) party, concurred that the strikes "turned Osama bin Laden, an ordinary man, into a hero."[69] A 1999 report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories stated that bin Laden "appeared to many as an underdog standing firm in the face of bullying aggression," and added that the missile strikes "provoked a new round of terrorist bombing plots."[70]

On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole, one of the warships that had participated in Operation Infinite Reach, was attacked in Yemen by two al-Qaeda members manning a speedboat loaded with explosives; 17 sailors were killed, 39 were wounded, and the ship was seriously damaged.[71]

International reactions

See also

References

  1. ↑ Wright, p. 285.
  2. ↑ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 118
  3. ↑ Wright 2006, pp. 284–286.
  4. 1 2 Crumpton 2012, p. 111.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 Coll 2005, p. 411.
  6. ↑ Barletta 1998, p. 115.
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Wright 2006, p. 285.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Coll 2005, p. 412.
  9. ↑ Stern 2003, pp. 225, 289.
  10. 1 2 3 4 Newman, Richard; Whitelaw, Kevin; Auster, Bruce; Charski, Mindy; Cook, William (August 31, 1998). "America fights back" (8). U.S. News & World Report.
  11. 1 2 3 4 5 Richter, Paul (August 22, 1998). "U.S. Says Raids a Success, Warns of More Strikes". The Los Angeles Times.
  12. 1 2 3 Cohen, William; Shelton, Henry (August 21, 1998). "'There Can Be No Safe Haven for Terrorists'". The Washington Post.
  13. ↑ Kutsch, Tom (September 5, 2013). "Interactive: US interventions post-Cold War". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 24 October 2015.
  14. 1 2 Barletta 1998, p. 116.
  15. 1 2 Roberts 2008, p. 107.
  16. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wright 2006, p. 282.
  17. 1 2 Reiter, p. 6.
  18. ↑ Wright 2006, pp. 259-260.
  19. ↑ Coll 2005, pp. 397-398.
  20. ↑ Wright 2006, p. 267.
  21. ↑ Coll 2005, pp. 401-402.
  22. ↑ Wright 2006, pp. 265-266.
  23. ↑ Wright 2006, p. 266.
  24. ↑ Coll 2005, p. 395.
  25. ↑ 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 68-70.
  26. ↑ Wright 2006, pp. 262-264.
  27. ↑ Coll 2005, p. 404.
  28. ↑ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 70
  29. ↑ Wright 2006, pp. 270-272.
  30. ↑ Coll 2005, pp. 404-405.
  31. ↑ Wright 2006, p. 272.
  32. 1 2 3 "U.S. missiles pound targets in Afghanistan, Sudan". CNN. August 21, 1998. Retrieved 24 October 2015.
  33. ↑ Barletta 1998, pp. 116-117.
  34. ↑ Loeb, Vernon (23 January 1999). "Embassy Attacks Thwarted, U.S. Says; Official Cites Gains Against Bin Laden; Clinton Seeks $10 Billion to Fight Terrorism". The Washington Post. Retrieved 27 February 2015.
  35. ↑ Stern 2003, p. 256.
  36. ↑ Cohen 2004, p. 9.
  37. ↑ Cohen 2004, p. 14.
  38. ↑ Art & Cronin 2003, p. 323.
  39. 1 2 Lacey, Marc (20 October 2005). "Look at the Place! Sudan Says, 'Say Sorry,' but U.S. Won't". The New York Times. Retrieved 27 February 2015.
  40. ↑ Barletta 1998, p. 130.
  41. ↑ Scharf 1999, p. 494.
  42. ↑ Werner Daum. "Universalism and the West". Harvard International Review. Archived from the original on 14 July 2015.
  43. ↑ Risen, James (October 27, 1999). "To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle". The New York Times. Archived from the original on September 9, 2006. Retrieved 24 October 2015.
  44. ↑ McLaughlin, Abraham (January 26, 2004). "Sudan shifts from pariah to partner". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 24 October 2015.
  45. ↑ Barletta 1998, p. 125.
  46. ↑ Rashid 2002, p. 231.
  47. 1 2 Wright 2006, p. 284.
  48. ↑ Coll 2005, pp. 409–410.
  49. ↑ Myers, Steven Lee (August 21, 1998). "Dozens of Ship-Launched Cruise Missiles Strike at Same Moment, 2,500 Miles Apart". The New York Times.
  50. 1 2 Bearak, Barry (August 23, 1998). "AFTER THE ATTACKS: IN PAKISTAN; Estimates of Toll in Afghan Missile Strike Reach as High as 50". The New York Times. Retrieved 20 November 2015.
  51. 1 2 Coll 2005, p. 410.
  52. ↑ Gertz, Bill (September 18, 2008). "Missing Bin Laden". The Washington Times.
  53. ↑ Rashid 2002, p. 134.
  54. ↑ Wright 2006, pp. 284–285.
  55. ↑ Wright 2006, p. 421.
  56. ↑ Temple-Raston 2007, p. 119.
  57. ↑ Duffy, Brian; Newman, Richard; Kaplan, David; Omestad, Thomas (September 7, 1998). "The price of payback" (9). U.S. News & World Report.
  58. ↑ Wright 2006, pp. 284-285.
  59. ↑ Scheuer 2009, p. 77.
  60. ↑ "Clinton statement in full". BBC News. The BBC.
  61. ↑ Zenko, Micah. "Armed Drones and the Hunt for bin Laden". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 24 October 2015.
  62. ↑ Baum 2004, p. 313.
  63. ↑ Clarke 2004, p. 186.
  64. 1 2 Vick, Karl (August 24, 1998). "U.S., Sudan Trade Claims on Factory". The Washington Post.
  65. ↑ Loeb, Vernon (July 25, 1999). "A Dirty Business". The Washington Post.
  66. ↑ Baum 2004, p. 314.
  67. ↑ Harris, John (August 21, 1998). "In the Midst of Scandal, Clinton Plotted Action". The Washington Post.
  68. ↑ Pine, Art (August 21, 1998). "U.S. Targets Heart of Terror". The Los Angeles Times.
  69. ↑ Stern 2003, p. 225.
  70. ↑ "1998 Missile Strikes on Bin Laden May Have Backfired". The National Security Archive. The George Washington University. Retrieved 24 October 2015.
  71. ↑ Wright 2006, pp. 319-320.
  72. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Muslims, Yeltsin denounce attack, CNN, August 21, 1998
  73. ↑ Chechnya declares war on USA, PTI, Aug 23 1998
  74. 1 2 3 McCoy, Frank; Banerjee, Neela; Fang, Bay; Whitelaw, Kevin (August 31, 1998). "A world of opinions about U.S. strikes" (8). U.S. News and World Report.
  75. 1 2 3 4 Schneider, Howard (August 21, 1998). "Radical States Assail Act; Allies Muted". The Washington Post.
  76. 1 2 Thousands stage anti-U.S. protest in Sudan, CNN, August 22, 1998
  77. ↑ Stern 2003, p. 289.
  78. 1 2 3 Middle East Institute 1999, p. 102.
  79. ↑ Watson, Russell; Barry, John (August 31, 1998). "'Our target was terror'". Newsweek. Retrieved 24 October 2015.
  80. ↑ Stern 2003, p. 273.
  81. ↑ Wright 2006, pp. 285–286.
  82. ↑ "THE OSAMA BIN LADEN FILE: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 343". The National Security Archive. The National Security Archive. Retrieved 23 March 2016.
  83. ↑ Explosion rips through Planet Hollywood in South Africa, CNN, August 25, 1998
  84. ↑ Thomasson, Emma (August 26, 1998). "U.S. Franchise Restaurant Bombed in S. Africa". The Washington Post. Reuters.
  85. ↑ Mifflin, Lawrie (August 21, 1998). "What a Difference the News Makes: Clinton as Commander in Chief". The New York Times.
  86. ↑ Middle East Institute 1999, p. 118.

Bibliography

External links

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