Confrontation analysis

Screenshot illustrating the use of confrontation analysis in a computer-aided role play depicting the Siege of Sarajevo. The software was written by Professor Nigel Howard for General Rupert Smith in 1996.

Confrontation analysis (also known as dilemma analysis) is an operational analysis technique used to structure, understand and think through multi-party interactions such as negotiations. It is the underpinning mathematical basis of drama theory.

It is derived from game theory but considers that instead of resolving the game, the players often redefine the game when interacting. Emotions triggered from the potential interaction play a large part in this redefinition. So whereas game theory looks on an interaction as a single decision matrix and resolves that, confrontation analysis looks on the interaction as a sequence of linked interactions, where the decision matrix changes under the influence of precisely defined emotional dilemmas.^[1]

Derivation and use

Confrontation analysis was devised by Professor Nigel Howard in the early 1990s drawing from his work on game theory and metagame analysis. It has been turned to defence,^[2] political, legal, financial^[3] and commercial ^[4] applications.

Much of the theoretical background to General Rupert Smith's book The Utility of Force drew its inspiration from the theory of confrontation analysis.

I am in debt to Professor Nigel Howard, whose explanation of Confrontation Analysis and Game Theory at a seminar in 1998 excited my interest. Our subsequent discussions helped me to order my thoughts and the lessons I had learned into a coherent structure with the result that, for the first time, I was able to understand my experiences within a theoretical model which allowed me to use them further
— General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (p.xvi)

Confrontation analysis can also be used in a decision workshop as structure to support role-playing^[3] for training, analysis and decision rehearsal.

Method

An interaction as a sequence of confrontations where the card table^[5] changes as the parties struggle to eliminate their dilemmas^[1]

Confrontation analysis looks on an interaction as a sequence of confrontations. During each confrontation the parties communicate until they have made their positions^[6] clear to one another. These positions can be expressed as a card table (also known as an options board^[5]) of yes/no decisions. For each decision each party communicates what they would like to happen (their position^[6]) and what will happen if they cannot agree (the threatened future). These interactions produce dilemmas^[1] and the card table changes as players attempt to eliminate these.

Initial Card Table:^[5] The UN threatens to use air strikes, but is not believed by the Bosnian Serbs: The UN has three dilemmas^[1] The Bosnians have none

Consider the example on the right (Initial Card Table), taken from the 1995 Bosnian Conflict.^[7] This represents an interaction between the Bosnian Serbs and the United Nations forces over the safe areas. The Bosnian Serbs had Bosniak enclaves surrounded and were threatening to attack.

Each side had a position as to what they wanted to happen:

The Bosnian Serbs wanted (see 4th column):

To be able to attack the enclaves
NOT to withdraw their heavy weapons from the enclaves
For the UN NOT to use air strikes

The UN wanted (See 5th column):

The Bosnian Serbs NOT to attack the enclaves
The Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons
The Bosnian Serbs NOT to take hostages.

If no further changes were made then what the sides were saying would happen was (see 1st column):

The Bosnian Serbs said they would attack the enclaves
The Bosnian Serbs said they would NOT withdraw their heavy weapons
The Bosnian Serbs said they would take hostages if the UN uses air strikes
The UN said it would initiate air strikes. However the Bosnian Serbs DID NOT BELIEVE them. (Hence the question mark on the Card Table).

Confrontation analysis then specifies a number of precisely defined dilemmas^[1] that occur to the parties following from the structure of the card tables. It states that motivated by the desire to eliminate these dilemmas, the parties involved will CHANGE THE CARD TABLE, to eliminate their problem.

In the situation at the start the Bosnian Serbs have no dilemmas, but the UN has four. It has three persuasion dilemmas^[8] in that the Bosnian Serbs are not going to do the three things they want them to (not attack the enclaves, withdraw the heavy weapons and not take hostages). It also has a rejection dilemma^[9] in that the Bosnian Serbs do not believe they will actually use the air strikes, as they think the UN will submit to their position, for fear of having hostages taken.

Faced with these dilemmas, the UN modified the card table to eliminate its dilemmas. It took two actions:

Firstly, it withdrew its forces from the positions where they were vulnerable to being taken hostage. This action eliminated the Bosnian Serbs' option (card) of taking hostages.

Second Card Table:^[5] The UN eliminated the Bosnian "hostage" card and brought in an additional, credible "Artillery" card, changing the situation in their favour: The Bosnian Serbs now have two persuasion dilemmas^[8] and two rejection dilemmas^[9]

Secondly, with the addition of the Rapid Reaction Force, and in particular its artillery the UN had an additional capability to engage Bosnian Serb weapons; they added the card "Use artillery against Bosnian Serbs". Because of this, the UN's threat of air strikes became more credible. The situation changed to that of the Second Card Table:

The Bosnian Serbs wanted (see 4th column):

To be able to attack the enclaves
NOT to withdraw heavy weapons from the enclaves
For the UN NOT to use air strikes
For the UN NOT to use artillery

The UN wanted (See 5th column):

The Bosnian Serbs NOT to attack the enclaves
The Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons

If no further changes were made then what the sides were saying would happen was (see 1st column):

The Bosnian Serbs said they would attack the enclaves, but the UN did not believe them.
The Bosnian Serbs said they would NOT withdraw their heavy weapons, but the UN did not believe them.
The UN said it would use artillery. The Bosnian Serbs believed this.
The UN said it would use air strikes. This time, however, the Bosnian Serbs believed them.

Final Card Table:^[5] The final situation. The Bosnian Serbs modified their position to eliminate their dilemmas. This involved accepting their initial goals as unobtainable

Faced with this new situation, the Bosnian Serbs modified their position to accept the UN proposal. The final table was an agreement as shown in the Final Card table (see thumbnail and picture).

Confrontation analysis does not necessarily produce a win-win solution (although end states are more likely to remain stable if they do); however, the word confrontation should not necessarily imply that any negotiations should be carried out in an aggressive way.

The card tables or are isomorphic to game theory models, but are not built with the aim of finding a solution. Instead, the aim is to find the dilemmas facing characters and so help to predict how they will change the table itself. Such prediction requires not only analysis of the model and its dilemmas, but also exploration of the reality outside the model; without this it is impossible to decide which ways of changing the model in order to eliminate dilemmas might be rationalized by the characters.

Sometimes analysis of the ticks and crosses can be supported by values showing the payoff to each of the parties.^[10]

References

1 2 3 4 5 See definition of Dilemma
↑ See The future of Libya
1 2 "role playing... can also be used by investors in the form of "confrontation analysis' such as that organised by former military analyst Mike Young's Decision Workshops" – Greek Dungeons and German Dragons, James Macintosh, Financial Times, 9 November 2011.
↑ See Letting agency case study
1 2 3 4 5 See definition of Options Board/Card table
1 2 See definition of Position
↑ This example developed from that described in Smith R, Tait A, Howard N (1999) Confrontations in War and Peace. Proceedings of the 6th international Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 19–20 June 2001
1 2 See definition of Persuasion Dilemma
1 2 See definition of Rejection Dilemma
↑ See understanding the tables used in confrontation analysis

External links

Dilemmas Galore – A user discussion group. Deals with applications of Confrontation analysis to current politics, military campaigns, business problems, psychology, etc. Also contains a good introduction and glossary of the terms used in Confrontation Analysis.
Dilemma Explorer - A software application to do Confrontation Analysis
Confrontation Manager — A software application using an earlier version of Confrontation Analysis.
Confronteer an iPhone app to do Confrontation Analysis.
N. Howard, 'Confrontation Analysis: How to win operations other than war', CCRP Publications, 1999.
P. Bennett, J. Bryant and N. Howard, 'Drama Theory and Confrontation Analysis' — can be found (along with other recent PSM methods) in: J. V. Rosenhead and J. Mingers (eds) Rational Analysis for a Problematic World Revisited: problem structuring methods for complexity, uncertainty and conflict, Wiley, 2001.
J. Bryant, The Six Dilemmas of Collaboration: inter-organisational relationships as drama, Wiley, 2003.
N. Howard, Paradoxes of Rationality', MIT Press, 1971.
How to structure disputes using Confrontation Analysis contains an illustrated explanation of Confrontation Analysis.
Speed Confrontation Management a brief "How to" manual on doing Confrontation Analysis without using an Options Table.

Topics in game theory

Definitions	Normal-form game Extensive-form game Escalation of commitment Graphical game Cooperative game Succinct game Information set Hierarchy of beliefs Preference

Equilibrium concepts	Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Mertens-stable equilibrium Bayesian-Nash Perfect Bayesian Trembling hand Proper equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Correlated equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Risk dominance Core Shapley value Pareto efficiency Quantal response equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Strong Nash equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium

Strategies	Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Tit for tat Grim trigger Collusion Backward induction Forward induction Markov strategy

Classes of games	Symmetric game Perfect information Simultaneous game Sequential game Repeated game Signaling game Cheap talk Zero-sum game Mechanism design Bargaining problem Stochastic game n-player game Large Poisson game Nontransitive game Global games Strictly determined game

Games	Prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Rock-paper-scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto games War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Cournot game Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Screening game Prisoners and hats puzzle Trust game Princess and monster game Monty Hall problem Rendezvous problem

Theorems	Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Purification theorem Folk theorem Revelation principle Arrow's impossibility theorem

Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Ariel Rubinstein Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Thomas Schelling William Vickrey

See also	All-pay auction Alpha–beta pruning Bertrand paradox Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Topological game Tragedy of the commons Tyranny of small decisions

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