Hash function security summary
This article summarizes publicly known attacks against cryptographic hash functions. Note that not all entries may be up to date. For a summary of other hash function parameters, see comparison of cryptographic hash functions.
Table color key
No known successful attacks — attack only breaks a reduced version of the hash
Theoretical break — attack breaks all rounds and has lower complexity than security claim
Attack demonstrated in practice
Common hash functions
Collision resistance
Main article: Collision attack
Hash function | Security claim | Best attack | Publish date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|---|
MD5 | 264 | 218 time | 2013-03-25 | This attack takes seconds on a regular PC. Two-block collisions in 218, single-block collisions in 241.[1] |
SHA-1 | 280 | 260.3 ... 265.3 | 2012-06-19 | Paper.[2] Attack is feasible with large amounts of computation power.[3] |
SHA256 | 2128 | 31 of 64 rounds (265.5) | 2013-05-28 | Two-block collision.[4] |
SHA512 | 2256 | 24 of 80 rounds (232.5) | 2008-11-25 | Paper.[5] |
Chosen prefix collision attack
Hash function | Security claim | Best attack | Publish date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|---|
MD5 | 264 | 239 | 2009-06-16 | This attack takes hours on a regular PC.[6] |
SHA-1 | 280 | 277.1 | 2012-06-19 | Paper.[2] |
SHA256 | 2128 | |||
SHA512 | 2256 |
Preimage resistance
Main article: Preimage attack
Hash function | Security claim | Best attack | Publish date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|---|
MD5 | 2128 | 2123.4 | 2009-04-27 | Paper.[7] |
SHA-1 | 2160 | 45 of 80 rounds | 2008-08-17 | Paper.[8] |
SHA256 | 2256 | 43 of 64 rounds (2254.9 time, 26 memory) | 2009-12-10 | Paper.[9] |
SHA512 | 2512 | 46 of 80 rounds (2511.5 time, 26 memory) | 2008-11-25 | Paper,[10] updated version.[9] |
Less common hash functions
Collision resistance
Hash function | Security claim | Best attack | Publish date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|---|
GOST | 2128 | 2105 | 2008-08-18 | Paper.[11] |
HAVAL-128 | 264 | 27 | 2004-08-17 | Collisions originally reported in 2004,[12] followed up by cryptanalysis paper in 2005.[13] |
MD2 | 264 | 263.3 time, 252 memory | 2009 | Slightly less computationally expensive than a birthday attack,[14] but for practical purposes, memory requirements make it more expensive. |
MD4 | 264 | 3 operations | 2007-03-22 | Finding collisions almost as fast as verifying them.[15] |
PANAMA | 2128 | 26 | 2007-04-04 | Paper,[16] improvement of an earlier theoretical attack from 2001.[17] |
RIPEMD (original) | 264 | 218 time | 2004-08-17 | Collisions originally reported in 2004,[12] followed up by cryptanalysis paper in 2005.[18] |
RadioGatún | 2608 * | 2704 | 2008-12-04 | For a word size w between 1-64 bits, the hash provides a collision security claim of 28.5w. For any value, the attack can find a collision in 211w time.[19] |
RIPEMD-160 | 280 | 48 of 80 rounds (251 time) | 2006 | Paper.[20] |
SHA-0 | 280 | 233.6 time | 2008-02-11 | Two-block collisions using boomerang attack. Attack takes estimated 1 hour on an average PC.[21] |
Streebog | 2256 | 9.5 rounds of 12 (2176 time, 2128 memory) | 2013-09-10 | Rebound attack.[22] |
Whirlpool | 2256 | 4.5 of 10 rounds (2120 time) | 2009-02-24 | Rebound attack.[23] |
Preimage resistance
Hash function | Security claim | Best attack | Publish date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|---|
GOST | 2256 | 2192 | 2008-08-18 | Paper.[11] |
MD2 | 2128 | 273 time, 273 memory | 2008 | Paper.[24] |
MD4 | 2128 | 2102 time, 233 memory | 2008-02-10 | Paper.[25] |
RIPEMD (original) | 2128 | 35 of 48 rounds | 2011 | Paper.[26] |
RIPEMD-128 | 2128 | 35 of 64 rounds | ||
RIPEMD-160 | 2160 | 31 or 80 rounds | ||
Streebog | 2512 | 2266 time, 2259 data | 2014-08-29 | The paper presents two second-preimage attacks with variable data requirements.[27] |
Tiger | 2192 | 2188.8 time, 28 memory | 2010-12-06 | Paper.[28] |
See also
- Comparison of cryptographic hash functions
- Cryptographic hash function
- Collision attack
- Preimage attack
- Cipher security summary
References
- ↑ Tao Xie, Fanbao Liu, Dengguo Feng (25 March 2013). "Fast Collision Attack on MD5".
- 1 2 Marc Stevens (2012-06-19). "Attacks on Hash Functions and Applications" (PDF). PhD thesis.
- ↑ Bruce Schneier (2012-10-05). "When Will We See Collisions for SHA-1?".
- ↑ Florian Mendel, Tomislav Nad, Martin Schläffer (2013-05-28). Improving Local Collisions: New Attacks on Reduced SHA-256. Eurocrypt 2013.
- ↑ Somitra Kumar Sanadhya, Palash Sarkar (2008-11-25). New Collision Attacks against Up to 24-Step SHA-2. Indocrypt 2008.
- ↑ Marc Stevens, Arjen Lenstra, Benne de Weger (2009-06-16). "Chosen-prefix Collisions for MD5 and Applications" (PDF).
- ↑ Yu Sasaki, Kazumaro Aoki (2009-04-27). Finding Preimages in Full MD5 Faster Than Exhaustive Search. Eurocrypt 2009.
- ↑ Christophe De Cannière, Christian Rechberger (2008-08-17). Preimages for Reduced SHA-0 and SHA-1. Crypto 2008.
- 1 2 Kazumaro Aoki, Jian Guo, Krystian Matusiewicz, Yu Sasaki, Lei Wang (2009-12-10). Preimages for Step-Reduced SHA-2. Asiacrypt 2009.
- ↑ Yu Sasaki, Lei Wang, and Kazumaro Aoki (2008-11-25). "Preimage Attacks on 41-Step SHA-256 and 46-Step SHA-512".
- 1 2 Florian Mendel, Norbert Pramstaller, Christian Rechberger, Marcin Kontak, Janusz Szmidt (2008-08-18). Cryptanalysis of the GOST Hash Function. Crypto 2008.
- 1 2 Xiaoyun Wang, Dengguo Feng, Xuejia Lai, Hongbo Yu (2004-08-17). "Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD".
- ↑ Xiaoyun Wang, Dengguo Feng, Xiuyuan Yu (October 2005). "An attack on hash function HAVAL-128" (PDF). Science in China Series F: Information Sciences 48 (5): 545–556.
- ↑ Lars R. Knudsen, John Erik Mathiassen, Frédéric Muller, Søren S. Thomsen (January 2010). "Cryptanalysis of MD2". Journal of Cryptology 23 (1): 72–90. doi:10.1007/s00145-009-9054-1.
- ↑ Yu Sasaki, Yusuke Naito, Noboru Kunihiro, Kazuo Ohta (2007-03-22). "Improved Collision Attacks on MD4 and MD5". IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences. E90-A (1): 36–47. doi:10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.1.36.
- ↑ Joan Daemen, Gilles Van Assche (2007-04-04). Producing Collisions for Panama, Instantaneously. FSE 2007.
- ↑ Vincent Rijmen, Bart Van Rompay, Bart Preneel, Joos Vandewalle (2001). Producing Collisions for PANAMA. FSE 2001.
- ↑ Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng, Hui Chen, Xiuyuan Yu (2005-05-23). Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD. Eurocrypt 2005.
- ↑ Thomas Fuhr, Thomas Peyrin (2008-12-04). Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun. FSE 2009.
- ↑ Florian Mendel, Norbert Pramstaller, Christian Rechberger, Vincent Rijmen (2006). On the Collision Resistance of RIPEMD-160. ISC 2006.
- ↑ Stéphane Manuel, Thomas Peyrin (2008-02-11). Collisions on SHA-0 in One Hour. FSE 2008.
- ↑ Zongyue Wang, Hongbo Yu, Xiaoyun Wang (2013-09-10). "Cryptanalysis of GOST R hash function". Information Processing Letters 114 (12): 655–662. doi:10.1016/j.ipl.2014.07.007.
- ↑ Florian Mendel, Christian Rechberger, Martin Schläffer, Søren S. Thomsen (2009-02-24). The Rebound Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Whirlpool and Grøstl (PDF). FSE 2009.
- ↑ Søren S. Thomsen (2008). "An improved preimage attack on MD2".
- ↑ Gaëtan Leurent (2008-02-10). MD4 is Not One-Way (PDF). FSE 2008.
- ↑ Chiaki Ohtahara, Yu Sasaki, Takeshi Shimoyama (2011). Preimage Attacks on Step-Reduced RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160. ISC 2011.
- ↑ Jian Guo, Jérémy Jean, Gaëtan Leurent, Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wang (2014-08-29). The Usage of Counter Revisited: Second-Preimage Attack on New Russian Standardized Hash Function. SAC 2014.
- ↑ Jian Guo, San Ling, Christian Rechberger, Huaxiong Wang (2010-12-06). Advanced Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks: First Results on Full Tiger, and Improved Results on MD4 and SHA-2. Asiacrypt 2010. pp. 12–17.
External links
- 2010 summary of attacks against Tiger, MD4 and SHA-2: Jian Guo, San Ling, Christian Rechberger, Huaxiong Wang (2010-12-06). Advanced Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks: First Results on Full Tiger, and Improved Results on MD4 and SHA-2. Asiacrypt 2010. p. 3.
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