Haddock Force
| Haddock Force | |
|---|---|
| Part of the Battle of France | |
 Map showing the location of bases in the Channel Islands and at Salon and the target cities of Turin and Genoa | |
| Type | Bombing campaign |
| Location | Salon, France 43°36′23″N 005°06′33″E / 43.60639°N 5.10917°ECoordinates: 43°36′23″N 005°06′33″E / 43.60639°N 5.10917°E |
| Objective | |
| Date | 11–17 June 1940 |
| Executed by | Royal Air Force Bomber Command |
| Outcome | Allied failure |
| ||||||
Haddock Force was the name given to a Royal Air Force group of bombers dispatched to airfields in southern France, with the mission of bombing northern Italian industrial sites, following the Italian entry into the Second World War. When Italy declared war on 10 June, the plan was put into effect but achieved little.
Background
Wireless decrypts by the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park gave the Anglo-French about a month's notice of an Italian declaration of war.[1] The Battle of France was nearing its final phase when intelligence reports suggested that Italy was on the brink of entering the war on the side of her Axis partner, Germany. There were few resources available to Britain which could be used to support France against the Italians, with the exception of Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command. The Supreme War Council resolved on 31 May that if war was declared, industrial targets and oil plants in the northern Italian cities of Turin and Genoa, were to be attacked as soon as possible. Armstrong Whitworth Whitley bombers could reach their targets from the Channel Islands, while the shorter-ranged Vickers Wellingtons would have to refuel in the south of France and the French Air Command made available the airfield outside Marseilles at Salon-de-Provence and another one nearby.[2] The headquarters of 71 Wing was sent to the Marseilles area on 3 June to prepare reception and refuelling facilities for the British bombers, which were ready on the outbreak of war on 10 June.[3]
Operations
11/12 June
Italy had declared war at midnight on 10 June 1940 and a detachment Wellingtons from 99 Squadron, part of 3 Group, Bomber Command, left England for France and arrived at Salon at 15:30 hours on 11 June. French fighters based near the Italian border had been sent north against the Luftwaffe and despite the agreement to attack Italy, the French authorities decided that provoking retaliation which could only fall on French cities, was to be avoided. While the bombers were refuelling, the force commander, Group Captain R. M. Field, received a telephone call from commander of the local French bomber group, who told him that Italian targets were not to be attacked. Shortly afterwards, Field received orders from the Air Ministry in London that the aircraft should take off as planned. There was a flurry of telephone calls from various French authorities, culminating in a call at 21:45 hours from the Chief of the Air Staff, General Joseph Vuillemin to the British Air Forces in France headquarters.[4]
Field followed the orders from the Air Ministry in Britain but near midnight, as the first Wellington taxied into position for take-off, French troops blocked the runway with a line of lorries and carts; Field had no choice but to abort the mission. Another 36 Whitleys from 10 Squadron, 51 Squadron, 58 Squadron, 77 Squadron and 102 Squadron had refuelled at the advanced bases on Jersey and Guernsey and were on their way to Italy. Severe storms and icing caused the majority of the aircraft to turn back and only 13 reached their targets at Turin and Genoa; two aircraft failed to return.[5]
15/16, 16/17 June
After representations at the highest levels, the French authorities finally consented to the 00 Squadron and 149 Squadron Wellington bombers at Salon attacking Italy. Eight aircraft left on the evening of 15 June heading for Genoa. Thunder storms made navigation difficult and only one aircraft arrived over the target; the rest returned with their bombs. The following night, another attempt was made by nine Wellingtons but only five reached their objective. The French armistice negotiations prevented further operations.[5]
Footnotes
- ↑ Hinsley 1994, p. 59.
- ↑ Ellis 2004, p. 294.
- ↑ Richards 1974, pp. 145–146.
- ↑ Richards 1974, pp. 146–147.
- 1 2 Richards 1974, p. 147.
References
- Richards, Denis (1974) [1953]. Royal Air Force 1939–1945: The Fight At Odds I (pbk. ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-11-771592-1. Retrieved 16 September 2015.
- Ellis, Major L. F. (2004) [1st. pub. HMSO 1953]. Butler, J. R. M., ed. The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. Naval & Military Press. ISBN 978-1-84574-056-6. Retrieved 1 September 2015.
- Hinsley, F. H. (1994) [1993]. British Intelligence in the Second World War. Its influence on Strategy and Operations. History of the Second World War. abridged edition (2nd rev. ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-11-630961-X.
Further reading
- Horne, A. (1982) [1969]. To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Penguin repr. ed.). London: Macmillan. ISBN 0-14-00-5042-6.
- Terraine, J. (1998) [1985]. The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939–1945 (Wordsworth Editions ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton. ISBN 1-85326-683-3.
- Warner, P. (2002) [1990]. The Battle of France, 1940: 10 May – 22 June (Cassell Military Paperbacks repr. ed.). London: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-304-35644-1.