2009 Honduran coup d'état

The 2009 Honduran coup d'état, part of the 2009 Honduran constitutional crisis,^[1][2] occurred when the Honduran Army on orders from the Honduran Supreme Court ousted President Manuel Zelaya and sent him into exile on 28 June 2009.^[3] It was prompted when Zelaya attempted to schedule a non-binding poll on holding a referendum about convening a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution.^[4][5] After Zelaya refused to comply with court orders to cease, the Honduran Supreme Court secretly issued a warrant for his arrest on 26 June.^[6] Two days later, Honduran soldiers stormed the president's house in the middle of the night and detained him,^[7] forestalling the poll.^[8] Instead of bringing him to trial, they put him on a military aeroplane which flew him to Costa Rica. Later that day, after reading a resignation letter of disputed authenticity, the Honduran Congress voted to remove Zelaya from office,^[9] and appointed Speaker of Congress Roberto Micheletti, his constitutional successor, in his place.^[10]

International reaction to the 2009 Honduran coup d'état was marked by widespread condemnation of the events.^[11] The United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS),^[12] and the European Union condemned the removal of Zelaya as a military coup. On 5 July, the OAS, invoking for the first time Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter voted by acclamation of all member states to suspend Honduras from the organisation.^[13]

In July 2011, Honduras's Truth Commission (see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-altschuler/hondurass-truth-commissio_b_550492.html) concluded that Zelaya broke the law when he disregarded the Supreme Court ruling ordering him to cancel the referendum, but that his removal from office was illegal and a coup. The designation by Congress of Roberto Micheletti as interim president was ruled by the Commission as unconstitutional and his administration as a "de facto regime."^[14]

Background

President Zelaya in 2007

President Zelaya was promoting a controversial nonbinding poll on whether to include a fourth ballot box in the November elections on convening a constitutional convention to rewrite the constitution. He had ignored a restraining order in this regard. Opponents said his goal in doing so was to extend his term, although as scheduled the balloting would be simultaneous with the election of his replacement.

Executive decrees and their legal consequences

Just days before the date for the scheduled illegal survey, decree PCM-019-2009, which revokes decree PCM-05-2009 and was issued (but not published) in May, was published in the official paper of record for the government policy, La Gaceta.

Zelaya then issued a new executive decree PCM-020-2009 (La Gaceta article number 31945) which annulled decrees PCM-05-2009 and PCM-019-2009. The new decree called for a "Public Opinion Survey Convening a Constitutional Assembly" and referred to it as "an official activity of the Government of the Republic of Honduras".^[15]

According to a legal analysis by former Supreme Court President Vilma Morales, Zelaya automatically ceased being President of Honduras with the publication of decree PCM-020-2009 and thus no coup d'état existed.^[16] However, PCM-027-2009 was never processed by the Honduran courts. This new decree published in La Gaceta 26 June 2009 explained further the purpose, form and objectives of the opinion poll, to be carried out by the National Institute of Statistics. But the courts had already made up their minds about every attempt that had to do with this issue. Zelaya's lawyers were also denied the possibility to participate in the process. PCM-027-2009 was sheltered in article 5 of the "Law of Citizen Participation" and articles 2 and 5 of the Honduran Constitution. Zelaya defined his actions as a non-binding opinion poll, but his political opponents presented his actions as a binding referendum oriented at reforming articles in the Honduran Constitution concerning forms of government and re-election.

Attorney General's office acts

On 27 May 2009, the Administrative Law Tribunal issued an injunction against holding the referendum at the request of the Honduran Attorney General Luis Alberto Rubi. On 16 June the Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the 27 May injunction. On 18 June, the Administrative Law Tribunal ordered Zelaya to comply with the ruling in writing within five days. The Attorney General's office filed a request for arrest and search warrants.

Supreme Court issues arrest and search warrants

On 26 June, the Honduran Supreme Court unanimously found that the Presidency had not complied with 16 June court order. It also found he was answerable to charges for crimes against the form of government, treason to the motherland, abuse of office and usurpation of functions that damaged the administration. It appointed Supreme Court Justice Tomás Arita Valle to try the case.^[17][18][19]

On 26 June, the Supreme Court issued a sealed (secret) arrest warrant against President Zelaya, signed by Justice Tomás Arita Valle.^[17][20][21] The interim government confirmed that the Supreme Court of Justice unanimously voted to appoint Tomás Arita Valle to hear the process in its preparatory and intermediate phases; and that he lawfully issued an arrest and raid warrant.^[6] The government also states that an investigation was conducted under the auspices of the Honduran Supreme Court that lasted for weeks.^[22]

Some pro-Zelaya supporters have sought to cast doubt on the Supreme Court's documentation.^[23] Jari Dixon Herrera Hernández, a lawyer with the Attorney General's office, said the order to arrest Zelaya came a day after the coup.^[24]

Zelaya's detention and exile

Soldiers stormed the president's residence in Tegucigalpa early in the morning of 28 June, disarming the presidential guard, waking Zelaya and putting him on a plane to Costa Rica. Colonel Bayardo said, "It was a fast operation. It was over in minutes, and there were no injuries, no deaths. We said, 'Sir, we have a judicial order to detain you.' "^[25] In Costa Rica, Zelaya told the pan-Latin American channel TeleSUR that he had been awakened by gunshots. Masked soldiers took his cell phone, shoved him into a van and took him to an air force base, where he was put on a plane. He said he did not know that he was being taken to Costa Rica until he landed at the airport in San José.^[26]

Within several hours of his removal, Zelaya spoke to media in San José, calling the events "a coup" and "a kidnapping." He stated that soldiers pulled him from his bed and assaulted his guards. Zelaya stated that he would not recognise anyone named as his successor, that he would be meeting with diplomats and that he wanted to finish his term in office.^[27]

Tanks patrolled the streets and military planes flew overhead. Soldiers guarded the main government buildings. The government television station and a television station that supports the president were taken off the air. Television and radio stations broadcast no news.^[26] The electrical power, phone lines, and international cable TV were cut or blocked throughout Honduras.^[28] Public transportation was suspended.^[29]

Honduran Military guard buildings

Later that day, the Supreme Court issued a statement that it had ordered the army to remove Zelaya from office.^[30] The Supreme Court stated "The armed forces, in charge of supporting the constitution, acted to defend the state of law and have been forced to apply legal dispositions against those who have expressed themselves publicly and acted against the dispositions of the basic law".^[31] On 30 June, the military's chief lawyer, Colonel Herberth Bayardo Inestroza Membreño, showed a detention order, signed 26 June by a Supreme Court judge, which ordered the armed forces to detain the president, identified by his full name of José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, at his home in the Tres Caminos area of the capital. It cited him for treason and abuse of authority, among other charges.^[25] Colonel Inestroza later stated that deporting Zelaya did not comply with the court order: "In the moment that we took him out of the country, in the way that he was taken out, there is a crime. Because of the circumstances of the moment this crime occurred, there is going to be a justification and cause for acquittal that will protect us."^[32] He said the decision was taken by the military leadership "in order to avoid bloodshed". He said "What was more beneficial, remove this gentleman from Honduras or present him to prosecutors and have a mob assault and burn and destroy and for us to have to shoot?"^[33] Colonel Inestroza also commented that Zelaya's allegiance to Hugo Chávez was hard to stomach and "It would be difficult for us, with our training, to have a relationship with a leftist government. That's impossible. I personally would have retired, because my thinking, my principles, would not have allowed me to participate in that."^[32]

Ramón Custodio, the head of the country's human rights commission, said that Zelaya's exile was a mistake and that the military made an "error" sending deposed President Manuel Zelaya into exile rather than holding him for trial. "I didn't know they would take Zelaya out of the country," Custodio said in an interview in the week of 13 August at his Tegucigalpa office. Honduras's Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case brought by a group of lawyers and judges arguing that the military broke the law taking Zelaya out of the country.^[34] On 17 August 2009, President Micheletti said that a mistake was made when Zelaya was put on a plane to Costa Rica instead of being held for trial: "It wasn’t correct. We have to punish whoever allowed that to happen. The rest was framed within what the constitution requires."^[35]

Congress removes Zelaya from office

De Facto President Roberto Micheletti

The National Congress assembled in the morning. It first voted to accept Zelaya's resignation letter, dated 25 June,^[9] which Zelaya denied signing.^[36] It studied a special report on Zelaya,^[37] and by a show of hands, the National Congress – the majority of whom belonged to Zelaya's own Liberal party^[38] – appointed the President of the National Congress Roberto Micheletti, a member of Zelaya's party, to be president to succeed Zelaya.^[36] Noteworthy that the president changed his political leanings during his administration, from right to left, which earned him the antipathy by his party colleagues.^[39]

The Honduran National Congress unanimously agreed to:^[37]

• Under the Articles 1, 2,3,4, 205, 220, subsections 20, 218, 242, 321, 322, 323 of the Constitution of the Republic,
  • Disapprove Zelaya's repeated violations of the constitution, laws and court orders.
  • Remove Zelaya from office.
• Name the current President of Congress Roberto Micheletti to complete the constitutional period that ends on 27 January 2010.

Legality of ouster

Many governments, media, and human-rights organisations outside Honduras have termed the ouster a coup.

The US government was not unequivocal in its official statements: The White House statement on the day of the coup did not condemn it, the US government never called it a military coup, never called for the "immediate and unconditional" return of President Zelaya and the vast majority of the U.S. aid to Honduras (from the Millennium Challenge Corporation) was never suspended.^[40]

Arguments that Zelaya's removal was illegal have been advanced by several lawyers.^[41][42][43] The Supreme Court never ruled on any of the charges filed by the public prosecutor on 26 June. The arrest warrant was issued for the purposes of taking a deposition from him. According to Edmundo Orellana, the events were constitutionally irregular for several reasons:^[44] because Zelaya was captured by the Armed Forces, not the National Police (Art. 273, 292); and because the Congress, not the courts, judged Zelaya to have broken the law (Arts. 303 and 304). Orellana concluded, "Violations of the Constitution cannot be put right with another violation. The Constitution is defended by subjecting oneself to it. Their violation translates into disregard for the State of Law and infringes on the very essence of the Law. Therefore, a coup d'Etat never has been and should never be the solution to a political conflict." Other civic and business leaders, even those opposed to Zelaya's referendum efforts, agreed that Zelaya was deprived of due process in his ouster.^[45]

Still, many people in Honduras, including most of the country's official institutions, claimed that there was a constitutional succession of power. In a statement to a subcomittee of the US House Committee on International Affairs, former Honduran Supreme Court Justice, Foreign Affairs minister, and law professor Guillermo Perez Cadalso said that all major governmental institutions agreed that Zelaya was violating the law.^[46] Supreme Court Justice Rosalinda Cruz said that, as a sovereign and independent nation, Honduras had the right to freely decide to remove a president who was violating Honduran laws. She added: "Unfortunately, our voice hasn’t been heard."^[47] She compared Zelaya's tactics, including his dismissal of the armed forces chief for obeying a court order to impound ballots to be used in the vote, with those of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez: "Some say it was not Zelaya but Chávez governing."^[6]

There is a small amount of middle ground between those who term the events a coup and those who call them a constitutionally-sound succession of power. On the one hand, several supporters of Zelaya's removal, including Micheletti and the top army lawyer, have admitted that sending Zelaya out of the country was illegal, although they argue it was justified by the need to prevent violence.^[32][48] Acting Honduran President Roberto Micheletti said forcing deposed President Manuel Zelaya to leave the country, instead of arresting him, was a mistake.^[35][48] On the other hand, a fraction of those who oppose the events consider the arrest warrant against Zelaya to be legal, although they say he was denied a fair trial.^[49]

According to an employee of the US Law Library of Congress opinion published September 2009 in Forbes, the military's decision to send Zelaya into exile was illegal,but the judicial and legislative branches applied constitutional and statutory law in accordance with the Honduran legal system.^[50][51] This conclusion was disputed by lawmakers, Honduran constitutional law experts, and government officials, who requested that the LLoC report be retracted.^[52]

in 2010 Wikileaks published a classified cable from 24 July 2009 by the US Ambassador in Tegucigalpa Hugo Llorens finding the removal of President Zalaya was a coup.^[53]

The Embassy perspective is that there is no doubt that the military, Supreme Court and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the Executive Branch, while accepting that there may be a prima facie case that Zelaya may have committed illegalities and may have even violated the constitution. There is equally no doubt from our perspective that Roberto Micheletti's assumption of power was illegitimate. Nevertheless, it is also evident that the constitution itself may be deficient in terms of providing clear procedures for dealing with alleged illegal acts by the President and resolving conflicts between the branches of government.

Independence of judiciary

A lack of an independent, professional judiciary was a factor in the inability of the Honduran government to process Zelaya through a political or criminal trial.^[54] The Honduran judiciary remains deeply politicised with the highest judicial offices still being distributed between the two main parties.^[55] By requiring them to be re-elected it makes them subject to policies of their sponsoring party.^[56] Eight of the judges were selected by the Liberal Party and seven by the National Party. According to a report by Heather Berkman of the University of California the politicisation of the justice system, including the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Public Security and the Public Ministry, inhibits the due process of law.^[56]

José Tomás Arita Valle was vice-minister for foreign affairs in the National Party government of President Ricardo Maduro.^[57] José Antonio Gutiérrez Navas, in 1998, spoke at the UN General Assembly, representing the Liberal Party government of Carlos Roberto Flores, at a session to commemorate fifty years of human rights.^[58] Oscar Fernando Chinchilla Banegas and Gustavo Enrique Bustillo Palma were National Party alternate members of Congress (2002–2006).^[59]

The US State Department noted in 2004 that the judiciary and Attorney Generals's office is subject to corruption and political influence.^[60]

Demonstrations surrounding Zelaya's removal

29 June. Demonstrations were held, expressing opposition to Zelaya and Chávez.

In response to the events, a number of demonstrations were held, some opposing the coup and some supporting it. Some of these are listed below.

On 28 June, hundreds of demonstrators against the coup put up roadblocks in the capital Tegucigalpa.^[61]

On 29 June, about 2,000 of anti-coup demonstrators spent the day in the city's main square.^[62]

On the same day, another demonstration supported Zelaya's removal, in what they described as defence of the constitution, around Tegucigalpa.

On 30 June, demonstrations in favour of the constitution and against Zelaya were held. In an emotional speech, Armeda Lopez said "Chavez ate Venezuela first, then Bolivia, but in Honduras that didn't happen. Here we will not let anyone come to rule us." Signboards included "Enough to illegality", "I love my constitution".^[63]

On 1 July, at around 10 on the morning, white dressed coup supporters emerged in the capital city Tegucigalpa. "Mel out, Mel out!" "Democracy yes, dictatorship no!", "Romeo, friend, the people are with you!" People from the religious sector, women's organisations, politics and government gave speeches in favour of the rule of law. Jorge Yllescas Olive said "Hondurans have saved our country, justice is on our side and we are demonstrating it to the world." Demonstrators also expressed opposition to Hugo Chávez's threats against Honduras.^[64]

On 3 July, around 70,000 people demonstrated in favour of the new government, and against Zelaya.^[65]

On 30 July, some thousands marched in protest against the coup in El Durazno, Tegucigalpa. They were dispersed violently by police, according to Amnesty International.^[66]

On 22 September, some hundreds of anti-coup protesters demonstrating outside the Brazilian embassy, where Zelaya had taken refuge, were dispersed by police.^[67]

Government opponents say that the pro-coup demonstrations were staged and/or paid by the government, giving evidence in some cases. It is claimed that pro-coup demonstrators were bused to the capital Tegucigalpa from all over the country, whereas similar buses with anti-coup demonstrators from the countryside were not allowed to enter the city.^[68]

Human rights abuses of the interim government

A clash between pro-Zelaya protesters and the Honduran military

De facto President Roberto Micheletti ordered a curfew which initially lasted for the 48 hours from Sunday night (28 June) and to Tuesday (30 June) and has continued since then in an arbitrary way.^[69] According to Amnesty International and the International Observation Mission for the Human Rights Situation in Honduras, the curfew law was not published in the official journal La Gaceta and was not approved by Congress.^[69] Originally the curfew ran from 9:00 pm to 6:00 am^[70] That curfew was later revised to be in effect from 10 pm to 5 am, was extended twice, ended on 7 July, and was restarted again on 15 July.^[71] Amnesty International and the International Observation Mission stated that the curfew implementation is arbitrary, with curfew times announced on radio stations, changing randomly each day and between different regions of Honduras.^[69] On 1 July, Congress issued an order (decreto ejecutivo N° 011-2009) at the request of Micheletti suspending four constitutional guarantees during the hours the curfew is in effect.^[72] The "state of exception" declared on 1 July is equivalent to a state of siege, and suspended civil liberties including freedom of transit and due process, as well as permitting search and seizure without a warrant.^[73]

The ambassadors of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua said that on 29 June that they were detained and beaten by Honduran troops before being released.^[28] Venezuela's ambassador to the OAS announced before the OAS that those ambassadors and Patricia Rodas, the Zelaya government's Foreign Minister, had been captured. Minutes after that announcement, Armando Laguna, the Venezuelan ambassador in Tegucigalpa, reported that he and the other ambassadors had been freed. Laguna said that he and the other diplomats were seized when they visited Rodas. He said that Rodas was forced into a van and had been transferred to an air base.^[74] Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez stated that the Venezuelan ambassador was assaulted by Honduran soldiers and left by the side of a road.^[75]

Also, allies of Zelaya, among them several government officials, were taken into custody by the military.^[28] Foreign Minister Patricia Rodas and the mayor of the city San Pedro Sula, Rodolfo Padilla Sunseri, were detained at military bases.^[26] According to a Narconews blog, several congressmen of the Democratic Unification Party (PUD) were arrested and the party's presidential candidate, César Ham, went into hiding.^[76]

According to the Venezuelan government's ABN news service, Tomás Andino Mencías, a member of the party, reported that PUD lawmakers were led away by the military when they tried to enter the parliament building for 28 June vote on Zelaya's deposal.^[77] A dozen former ministers from the Zelaya government went into hiding, some in foreign embassies, fearing arrest.^[78] Local media reported that at least eight ministers besides Rodas had been detained.^[74]

Hugo Chávez and Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez have both separately claimed that Honduran Foreign Minister Patricia Rodas has been detained by the military. Rodríguez said that the Cuban, Venezuelan and Nicaraguan ambassadors to Honduras had tried but were unable to protect Rodas from a group of masked soldiers who forcibly took her from their grasp.^[79] Rodas was sent to Mexico, which offered her asylum and help to resolve the situation.^[80]

Media restrictions

Reuters on 29 June 2009, describing the situation in Honduras as a "media blackout," reported that the military had shut down several TV stations, radio stations, and newspaper's websites. Among the TV stations closed were CNN en Español, TeleSUR, and "a pro-Zelaya channel." Reuters said that "the few television and radio stations still operating on Monday [the 29th] played tropical music or aired soap operas and cooking shows," and "made little reference to the demonstrations or international condemnation of the coup. . . ." A government health worker interviewed by Reuters said that the anti-Zelaya newspapers El Heraldo and La Tribuna, and "some television channels controlled by the opposition" were the only ones still broadcasting on the morning of the 29th.^[81][82] The Miami Herald reported that the "crackdown on the media" began before dawn on the 28th. It said that only pro-Micheletti stations were allowed to broadcast and that they carried only news friendly to the new government.^[83] On 29 June, four Associated Press personnel were detained and removed from their hotel, but then released.^[84]

TeleSUR journalist Adriana Sívori, who was in Tegucigalpa reporting the clashes between the police and protesters, reported that she was arrested by the military under threat, and had her passport seized.^[81] Her detention was confirmed by the Associated Press.^[84] As soon as the international community learned of the detention, and after the quick intervention of the Venezuelan ambassador in Honduras, the journalist and the staff who accompanied her were released. Sívori was reportedly assaulted by the soldiers who detained her. TeleSUR was, until the detention and quick release of journalist Sívori, the only channel that was broadcasting live on all developments in the political crisis.^[85]

According to Diario El Tiempo, there was also some information that the newspaper Diario El Tiempo had been prohibited to broadcast information about the developments. Canal 11, located in Colonia de Miramontes, was also prohibited from broadcasting information about the developments. The Cable Color buildings, which also broadcasts programming of CNN and teleSUR, were surrounded by military forces.^[86] On 29 June, soldiers shut down Channel 8, a government station which was pro-Zelaya.^[84] Channel 36 was raided by soldiers minutes after the coup and remained off the air for a week;^[87] the Miami Herald of 1 July quoted owner Esdras López as saying that the building's occupants were detained during the raid. Channel 66 was raided and was off the air for a short time; according to some journalists, however, a Channel 66 program by Eduardo Maldonado, a popular radio and TV commentator who is pro-Zelaya, remained off the air for days. Maldonado went into hiding.^[87] The Miami Herald noted that Channel 21's signal was briefly interrupted while it was broadcasting a plea against censorship.^[88]

On Monday 29 June, in a replay of the military raids on the Jesuit radio station in El Progreso of the 1960s and 1970s, the Jesuits' progressive radio broadcasts were abruptly pulled off the air at four in the morning. On Sunday evening at 6 pm, just an hour after the coup government's curfew began, a military contingent broke into Radio Progreso's headquarters. With guns pointed, they shouted: "We’ve come to close down this piece of ****!" One broadcaster locked himself in to keep broadcasting throughout the night. Shortly after, another military convoy stopped outside Radio Progreso. A group of soldiers approached the radio station’s guard and asked him if there were any people still working inside. When the guard said no, the soldier in charge told him: "If we find someone inside, you will regret it." And while the coup government, led by Roberto Micheletti, a native of El Progreso, threatened to shut down the station with violence, popular organisations resisting the undemocratic change in their government criticised the station for "watering down" its reporting of the tense and dynamic situation.^[89]

According to a press release published on the website of Radio Globo Honduras, a station which has long sided with Zelaya,^[90] a group of 60 soldiers took the radio off the air and the employees, including Alejandro Villatoro, were allegedly threatened and intimidated. The station was allowed to resume transmission, but staff had to follow some rules which they believed limited freedom of expression.^[91] The website of the radio was down but has been re-established. Alejandro Villatoro said that he was arrested and kidnapped for some hours by the military forces.^[92] On or just before 4 August 2009, the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) terminated Radio Globo's transmission frequency rights.^[93]

"Honduras' two leading radio networks, Radio América and Radio HRN, have urged Hondurans to resume their normal routine and not to protest."^[94] Honduran newspaper La Prensa reported on 30 June that an armed group of Zelaya supporters, attacked its main headquarters by throwing stones and other objects at their windows, until police intervened. According to the paper, it was discovered that the group was led by Venezuelan and Nicaraguan nationalities.^[95]

The Paris-based press freedom group Reporters Without Borders released a statement on 29 June stating that, "The suspension or closure of local and international broadcast media indicates that the coup leaders want to hide what is happening."^[96]

Carlos Lauría of the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists said: "The de facto government clearly used the security forces to restrict the news... Hondurans did not know what was going on. They clearly acted to create an information vacuum to keep people unaware of what was actually happening." However, in an interview published on 9 July 2009 in the Washington Post, Ramón Custodio López, Honduras's human rights ombudsman, said he had received no official complaints from journalists: "This is the first I have heard about an occupation or military raid of a station," he said. "I try to do the best job I can, but there are things that escape my knowledge."^[87]

Aftermath

There were demonstrations supporting and opposing Zelaya's removal from power. The Zelaya administration was investigated and prosecuted in the absence of Zelaya.^[97][98] Some organisations reported human rights violations^{[69][99][100][101][102][103]} and media restrictions.^[104] Zelaya made two open attempts to return to the country, which were rebuffed; he eventually returned clandestinely and sought asylum in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. Negotiations between the coup government and those seeking Zelaya's restitution continued a rocky path; although both sides signed the San José-Tegucigalpa-Guaymuras Accord both had differing interpretations as to the implications for Zelaya's restitution. Some Hondurans hoped to move past the coup through the elections of 29 Novembe 2009.^[105]

On 7 March 2010, Zelaya announced on Venezuelan television that he "plans to write a book describing his ouster."^[106]

In May 2011, after more one and a half years in exile in the Dominican Republic, Zelaya was allowed to return to Honduras, which he did on 28 May. Following that move, the Organization of American States was to vote on readmitting Honduras to its body.^[107][108]

The coup weakened democratic institutions, and along with corruption and police impunity, state security forces engaged in political and social persecution of coup opponents, campesinos, indigenous protesters and others, the crime rate increased massively. This is the context of more than 13,000 Honduran children crossing U.S. borders from October 2013 until May 2014, a 1272% increase compared to 2009.^[109]

WikiLeaks document

On 28 November 2010, the organisation WikiLeaks began releasing 251,287 confidential documents, which detail correspondence between the U.S. State Department and U.S. embassies around the world. Among these is a cable written by U.S. Ambassador Hugo Llorens in late July 2009, which analyzes the legality of the removal of Zelaya under the Honduran constitution. Llorens concluded that although Zelaya might "have committed illegalities and...even violated the constitution", "there is no doubt that the military, Supreme Court and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the Executive Branch".^[110]

Public opinion

Polling organization: Dates of polling: MOE and sample size:	CID-Gallup[111][112] Aug 2008-Jul 2009 +/- 3.3% (>1000 adults)	COIMER & OP[113] 23–29 Aug. +/− 4% (1,470 surveys)	Greenberg Quinlan Rosner[114] 9–13 Oct. 2009 (621 individuals)
Do you favor Zelaya's expatriation?	Yes 41% / No 46% / NR 13%	Yes 17.4% / No 52.7% / NR 29.9%	Yes 38% / No 60% / NR 3%
Did Zelaya's actions justify his removal from office?	Yes 41% / No 28% / NR 31%
Favor constitutional convention to resolve crisis?			Yes 54% / No 43% / NR 11%
Favorable opinion of Manuel Zelaya?	Favorable 46% / Unfavorable 44%	Favorable 44.7% / Unfavorable 25.7% / "Regular" 22.1% / NR 7.5%	Warm 37% / Cool 39% (Personal opinion) Approve 67% / Disapprove 31% (Government actions)
Favorable opinion of Roberto Micheletti?	Favorable 30% / Unfavorable 49%	Favorable 16.2% / Unfavorable 56.5% / "Regular" 17.1% / NR 10.2%	Warm 28% / Cool 57% (personal opinion) Approve 48% / Disapprove 50% (Government actions)
Favorable opinion of Hugo Chávez?			Warm 10% / Cool 83% (personal opinion)
Zelaya should be restored?		Yes 51.6% / No 33% / NR 15.4%	Yes 46% / No 52% / NR 2% (Full powers) Yes 49% / No 50% / NR 1% (Limited powers)
Elections should go forward even if crisis unresolved?		Yes 66.4% / No 23.8% / NR 2.9%	Legitimate 54% / Illegitimate 42% / NR 4%

References

1. Rosenberg, Mica (28 June 2009). "Honduran troops surround presidential palace". Reuters. Retrieved 13 November 2009.
2. Stebbins, Will (8 November 2009). "Winners and losers in Honduras". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 3 December 2009. Retrieved 27 November 2009.
3. Olson, Alexandra (3 December 2009). "Ousted Honduran leader is trapped with few options". Yahoo! News. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 7 December 2009. Retrieved 17 December 2009.
4. "Honduras Quagmire: An Interview with Zelaya". Time Inc. 26 September 2009. Retrieved 15 December 2009.
5. Rosenberg, Mica (28 June 2009). "Army overthrows Honduras president in vote dispute". Reuters. Archived from the original on 29 June 2009. Retrieved 6 July 2009.
6. "Honduras Supreme Court Judge Defends President Ouster (Update1)". Bloomberg. 1 July 2009. Retrieved 15 December 2009.
7. "Honduran leader forced into exile", BBC, 28 June 2009;
   One hundred soldiers: "Honduran Leader's Populism is what Provoked Military Violence", Benjamin Dangl, Alternet, 1 July 2009.
   Ten guards: "Honduras supreme court 'ordered arm coup'" Telegraph, 28 June 2009.
8. "Q&A: Crisis in Honduras". BBC News. Archived from the original on 6 July 2009. Retrieved 6 July 2009.
9. "Esta es la supuesta renuncia de Zelaya". 28 June 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2009.
10. Longman, Jeré. "Roberto Micheletti". The New York Times. Retrieved 15 December 2009.
11. Romero, Simon (28 June 2009). "Rare Hemisphere Unity in Assailing Honduran Coup". The New York Times. Retrieved 29 June 2009.
12. Reuters (29 June 2009). "OAS condemns Honduras coup, demands return of Zelaya". World Bulletin. Archived from the original on 2 July 2009. Retrieved 29 June 2009.
13. "July 5, 2009 press release posted on oas.org: "The Special General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) decided today to suspend immediately the right to participate in the institution of Honduras following the coup d’Etat that expelled President José Manuel Zelaya from power."". OAS. Retrieved 19 October 2010.
14. "Honduras Truth Commission rules Zelaya removal was coup". BBC. 7 July 2011. Archived from the original on 8 July 2011. Retrieved 7 July 2011.
15. "Cambio de reglas a última hora". La Tribuna. 28 June 2009. Archived from the original on 11 December 2009.
16. "Ya no era presidente cuando fue detenido". La Prensa. Archived from the original on 12 December 2009.
17. Lacey, Marc (2 July 2009). "Leader's Ouster Not a Coup, Says the Honduran Military". The New York Times. Retrieved 2 July 2009.
18. "(Detention order for Zelaya) Attorney General, Honduras". 25 June 2009. Archived from the original on 13 December 2009. Retrieved 15 December 2009.
19. "Se presenta requermiento fiscal. Que se libre orden de captura.- ..." (PDF-1.3). Libertad Digital. 2 July 2009. Archived from the original on 23 August 2009. Retrieved 23 August 2009.; creation/modification timestamp contained in PDF-1.3 file is "20090702113502-05'00'"; date in displayed version of the file: 25 June 2009
20. "Orden de captura contra Zelaya". Corte Suprema de Justica, Honduras. 26 June 2009. Archived from the original on 11 December 2009. Retrieved 15 December 2009.
21. "letter to: Senor jefe del estado mayor conjunto de las fuerzas armadas..." (PDF-1.4). Libertad Digital. 2 July 2009. Archived from the original on 23 August 2009. Retrieved 23 August 2009.; creation timestamp contained in PDF-1.4 file is "20090207105728+02'00'" and is listed here bibliographically as 2009-07-02, since an ISO 8601 date in displayed version of the file: 26 June 2009
22. Goodman, Joshua (1 July 2009). "Honduras Supreme Court Judge Defends President Ouster (Update1)". Bloomberg. Retrieved 19 October 2010.
23. "Jari Dixon Member of Lawyers Front Against the Coup". Embassy of Honduras, Washington D.C. 21 August 2009. Archived from the original on 8 February 2010. Retrieved 15 December 2009.
24. Hodge, James; Linda Cooper (14 July 2009). "U.S. continues to train Honduran soldiers". National Catholic Reporter. Archived from the original on 23 August 2009. Retrieved 5 August 2009.
25. Lacy, Marc (1 July 2009). "Leader's Ouster Not a Coup, Says the Honduran Military". The New York Times. Retrieved 3 July 2009.
26. Malkin, Elisabeth (28 June 2009). "Honduran President is Ousted in Coup". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 29 June 2009. Retrieved 29 June 2009.
27. "Honduran president calls arrest a 'kidnapping'". ABC News. Associated Press. 28 June 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2009.
28. "Leftist leaders hold emergency meeting over Honduras coup". The Christian Science Monitor. 29 June 2009. Retrieved 29 June 2009.
29. "El nuevo Goierno de Honduras decreta el toque de queda", El País (Spain), 29 June 2009. Retrieved July 2009. Archived 26 July 2009.
30. "Honduran leader forced into exile". BBC News. 28 June 2009. Archived from the original on 29 June 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2009.
31. McDermott, Jeremy (28 June 2009). "Honduras supreme court 'ordered army coup'". The Daily Telegraph (London). Archived from the original on 8 September 2009. Retrieved 28 July 2009.
32. English summary of interview with the legal counsel of the Honduras armed forces, Colonel Herberth Bayardo Inestroza, Robles, Frances (3 July 2009). "Top Honduran military lawyer: We broke the law". The Miami Herald. Archived from the original on 6 September 2009. Retrieved 6 September 2009.; original Dada, Carlos; José Luis Sanz (2 July 2009). "Cometimos un delito al sacar a Zelaya, pero había que hacerlo" (in Spanish). El Faro.net, El Salvador. Archived from the original on 6 September 2009. Retrieved 6 September 2009.
33. "Ejército de Honduras reconoció que cometió un delito al sacar a Zelaya" (in Spanish). cooperativa.cl. Retrieved 5 July 2009.
34. Schmidt, Blake; Eric Sabo (13 August 2009). "Zelaya's Exile an 'Error', Honduras Human Rights Chief Says". Bloomberg L.P. Retrieved 13 August 2009.
35. Martinez, Andres; Blake Schmidt (17 August 2009). "Honduras's Micheletti Says Zelaya Exile Was 'Error' (Update1)". Bloomberg L.P. Retrieved 17 August 2009.
36. Weissert, Will; Cuevas, Freddy (28 June 2009). "Honduran military ousts president ahead of vote". The Star (Toronto). Associated Press. Retrieved 28 June 2009.
37. "Congreso destituye a Manuel Zelaya". La Tribuna. 29 June 2009. Archived from the original on 12 December 2009. Retrieved 15 December 2009.
38. "listadodiputados". Archived from the original on 26 July 2009. Retrieved 23 July 2009.
39. Cunha Filho, Clayton M. "Un giro de derecha a izquierda? Un análisis del caso hondureño" (in Spanish). Retrieved 23 December 2012.
40. Mark Weisbrot Top Ten Ways You Can Tell Which Side the United States Government Is on With Regard to the Military Coup in Honduras December 16, 2009, CommonDreams.org
41. Moncada Silva, Efrain (25 September 2009). "Inconstitucionalidad de la llamada "sucesión constitucional"". La Tribuna (Honduras). Archived from the original on 30 September 2009. Retrieved 25 September 2009.
42. Orellana, Edmundo (21 September 2009). "¿Sucesión presidencial?". La Tribuna (Honduras). Archived from the original on 15 November 2010. Retrieved 21 September 2009.
43. Cassel, Doug (29 July 2009). "Honduras: Coup d’Etat in Constitutional Clothing?". American Society of International Law. Archived from the original on 2 September 2009. Retrieved 9 October 2009.
44. Orellana, Edmundo (1 August 2009). "El 28 de junio y la Constitución por Edmundo Orellana". La Tribuna (Honduras). Archived from the original on 25 October 2010. Retrieved 8 November 2009.
45. "Hondurans against Zelaya, but for the rule of law". The Christian Science Monitor. 7 July 2009. Retrieved 15 December 2009.
46. "Prepared Statement of the Hon. Guillermo Perez Cadalso Before the U.S. House Committee on International Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere". U.S. House Committee on International Affairs. 10 July 2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 December 2009.
47. "Honduras Supreme Court Judge Defends President Ouster (Update1)". Bloomberg. 1 July 2009. Retrieved 20 December 2009.
48. Restivo, Néstor (30 September 2009). "Sacamos a Zelaya porque se fue a la izquierda, puso a comunistas". El Clarin (Argentina). Retrieved 30 September 2009.. Archived 4 October 2009.
49. Miller Llana, Sarah (19 July 2009). "Briefing: Was Zelaya's ouster a coup?". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 7 November 2009.
50. Ratliff, William (28 September 2009). "Understanding The Mess in Honduras". Forbes. Archived from the original on 30 December 2009. Retrieved 19 December 2009.
51. Norma C. Gutiérrez (August 2009). "Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues" (PDF). Directorate of Legal Research for Foreign, Comparative, and International Law. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 December 2009. Retrieved 19 December 2009.
52. "Lawmakers ask Library of Congress to retract Honduras report". McClatchy Newspapers. 28 October 2009. Archived from the original on 1 November 2009. Retrieved 4 November 2009.
53. "Cable 09TEGUCIGALPA645, TFHO1: OPEN AND SHUT: THE CASE OF THE HONDURAN COUP". July 2009. Archived from the original on 29 November 2010. Retrieved 29 November 2010.
54. "Q+A: The dispute that led to a coup in Honduras". Reuters. 9 July 2009. Retrieved 21 December 2009.
55. "Page inexistantes". ICJ. Archived from the original on 25 December 2009. Retrieved 19 October 2010.
56. Heather Berkman (n.d.). "The Politicization of the Judicial System of Honduras and the Proliferation of Las Maras" (PDF). School of International Relations, University of California, San Diego. Archived (PDF) from the original on 8 June 2011. Retrieved 27 April 2011.
57. http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press2002/sp/Año99/.../0316011.htm
58. United Nations, 11 December 1998, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OPENS SECOND DAY OF MEETINGS TO COMMEMORATE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
59. "Republica De Honduras". Angelfire.com. Retrieved 19 October 2010.
60. "Honduras". State.gov. 25 February 2004. Archived from the original on 5 November 2010. Retrieved 19 October 2010.
61. The Guardian: Protesters demand return of ousted Honduran president Manuel Zelaya
62. "BBC: New Honduran leader sets curfew". BBC. 29 June 2009.
63. "Plantón por la paz y democracia". La Tribuna. 30 June 2009. Archived from the original on 20 December 2009.
64. "Multitudinario apoyo al nuevo gobierno". El Heraldo. Archived from the original on 18 December 2009.
65. "El pueblo vuelve a rechazar a Zelaya". La Prensa. 3 July 2009. Archived from the original on 19 December 2009.
66. Amnesty International. Honduras: human rights crisis threatens as repression increases. 2009. p.7
67. Reuters: Honduras police disband pro-Zelaya demonstration
68. Al Jazeera: Honduras rejects Zelaya restoration
69. "Honduras: human rights crisis threatens as repression increases" (PDF). Amnesty International. 19 August 2009. Retrieved 19 August 2009.
70. "New Honduras leader orders 48-hour curfew". Inquirer. 29 June 2009. Retrieved 29 June 2009.
71. "Toque de queda hasta el martes". 3 July 2009. Retrieved 4 July 2009.
72. "Congresso restringe cuatro guarantías constitucionales". 2 July 2009. Archived from the original on 4 July 2009. Retrieved 2 July 2009.
73. , Comision Internacional de Derechos Humanos "Honduras: Golpe de Estado y Derechos Humanos".
74. Ordaz, Pablo (28 June 2009). "El Ejército expulsa al presidente hondureño, Manuel Zelaya". El País (in Spanish). Retrieved 28 June 2009.
75. "Honduras' Congress Names Acting President". SKY News. 28 June 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2009.
76. "Correction: Honduran Presidential Candidate Is Still Alive". Narco News. Notimex. 28 June 2009. Retrieved 29 June 2009.
77. "Hondureños de 37 ciudades se movilizarán para restituir a Zelaya en la presidencia". Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias. Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias. 28 June 2009. Retrieved 29 June 2009.
78. Booth, William (1 July 2009). "Honduras Targets Protesters With Emergency Decree: Media in Country Also Feel Pressure". The Washington Post. Retrieved 4 July 2009.
79. "Honduran Congress names provisional president". CNN. 29 June 2009. Archived from the original on 29 June 2009. Retrieved 29 June 2009.
80. "Manuel Zelaya, Roberto Micheletti Duel For Honduras". Huffington Post. 29 June 2009. Retrieved 29 June 2009.
81. "Police clash with demonstrators in Honduran capital". CNN. 29 June 2009. Retrieved 1 July 2009.
82. Mohammed, Arshad; Alexander, David (29 June 2009). "Obama says coup in Honduras is illegal". Reuters. Retrieved 30 June 2009.
83. Miami Herald, 1 July 2009, Honduras new government is censoring journalists. Retrieved 23 July 2009. Archived 26 July 2009.
84. https://web.archive.org/20090704041145/http://news.yahoo.com:80/s/ap/20090630/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/lt_honduras_journalists. Archived from the original on 4 July 2009. Retrieved 7 November 2009. Missing or empty |title= (help)
85. "Liberan a equipo periodístico de teleSUR detenido por la fuerza en Honduras", teleSURtv.net, 29 June 2009 (Spanish). Retrieved 29 June 2009. Archived 2 July 2009 at the Wayback Machine.
86. "Militares rondaron Canal 11, Cable Color y Diario Tiempo" (in Spanish). Diario El Tiempo. Archived from the original on 2 July 2009. Retrieved 1 July 2009.
87. Forero, Juan (9 July 2009). "In Honduras, One-Sided News of Crisis". The Washington Post. Retrieved 10 July 2009.
88. "Honduras new government is censoring journalists", Miami Herald, 1 July 2009. Retrieved July 2009. Archived 26 July 2009.
89. Coleman, Kevin (7 July 2009). "A Coup is Not a Coup. A Not-Coup is a Coup". The History News Network. Retrieved 20 September 2010.
90. Casey, Nicholas (3 July 2009). "Honduras Takes Control of Some Media". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 5 July 2009.
91. Villatoro, Alejandro (29 June 2009). "Contra la libertad de expresion Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras de toman instalaciones de Radio Globo" (in Spanish). Radio Globo. Archived from the original on 15 July 2011. Retrieved 1 July 2009.
92. Villatoro, Alejandro (30 June 2009). "Contra la libertad de expresion Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras de toman instalaciones de Radio Globo" (in Spanish). Radio Globo. Retrieved 1 July 2009.
93. "Gobierno de facto anuncia el cierre de Radio Globo" (in Spanish). COFADEH. 5 August 2009. Archived from the original on 4 August 2009. Retrieved 5 August 2009.
94. Nicholas Kozloff, CounterPunch, 2 July 2009, Spinning the Honduran Coup: Latin America Media Battle Continues. Retrieved 23 July 2009. Archived 26 July 2009.
95. "UViolencia contra LA PRENSA". La Prensa. 30 June 2009. Retrieved 30 June 2009.
96. Rosenberg, Mica (29 June 2009). "Honduran army smothers media after coup". Reuters. Retrieved 1 July 2009.
97. "CSJ: Zelaya debe someterse a justicia". La Prensa. 27 November 2009. Retrieved 19 December 2009.
98. "CSJ: Zelaya debe enfrentar procesos penales". La Prensa. 23 August 2009. Retrieved 19 December 2009.
99. Pérez, Luis Guillermo; (many) (6 August 2009). "Gobierno de facto viola derechos humanos" (in Spanish). Agencia Latinoamerica de Información. Archived from the original on 25 August 2009. Retrieved 26 August 2009.
100. "International Mission denounces the brutal repression of pacific demonstrations". Agencia Latinoamerica de Información. 30 July 2009. Archived from the original on 2 August 2009. Retrieved 2 August 2009.
101. Quixote Center Emergency Delegation of Solidarity, Accompaniment and Witness (7 August 2009). "Letter to Honduran Attorney General Rubi". Quixote Center. Archived from the original on 8 August 2009. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
102. "Police brutality rampant in Honduras, amnesty report says". CNN. 19 August 2009. Retrieved 19 August 2009.
103. "Preliminary Observations on the IACHR Visit to Honduras". Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 21 August 2009. Retrieved 28 August 2009.
104. "New media measures take effect in Honduras". Associated Press. 10 October 2009. Retrieved 11 October 2009.
105. "Honduras hopes to move past coup with election (Version 1)". AP via Yahoo News. 29 November 2009. Archived from the original on 3 December 2009. Retrieved 30 November 2009.
107. Zelaya Returns to Honduras Almost 2 Years After Ouster Latin America Herald Tribune, 28 May 2011.
108. "OAS to Vote on Readmission of Honduras". Voice of America. 25 May 2011. Archived from the original on 2 June 2011. Retrieved 7 July 2011.
109. Dan Beeton The legacy children of the Honduran coup.Many of the youths crossing the US border are fleeing a country torn apart by coup supported by US government Al Jazeera, June 28, 2014
110. Llorens, Hugo. "TFHO1: OPEN AND SHUT: THE CASE OF THE HONDURAN COUP". Public Library of US Diplomacy. WikiLeaks. Retrieved 17 July 2014.
111. Brown, Ian T.; Rios, Jesus (30 October 2009). "In Honduras, Instability, Fear of Civil War Preceded Deal". United States: Gallup. Results are based on face-to-face interviews with at least 1,000 adults, aged 15 and older, conducted in Aug. 24-Sept. 2008, and July 11-25, 2009, in Honduras. ...maximum margin of sampling error is ±3.3 percentage points....
112. Boz (10 July 2009). "Poll Numbers!!! Divided in Honduras". Bloggings by Boz. Retrieved 13 July 2009. ...these numbers come from interviews done from 30 June-4 July....
113. COIMER & OP (Consultores en Investigación de Mercados y Opinión Pública) (2009). "Estudio de Opinión Pública – Nivel Nacional" [Public opinion survey - National Level] (PDF) (in Spanish). United States: Narco News. Retrieved 7 October 2009. Para la realización del estudio se levantaron 1470 encuestas en 16 de los 18 departamentos del pais.... La encuesta se comenzó a levantar el 23 de agosto y finalizó el jueves 29 de agosto. El margen de error se estima en 4.0%.
114. "Honduras Frequency Questionnaire, October 9–13, 2009" (PDF). United States: Greenberg Quinlar Rosler Research. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 November 2009. October 9-13, 2009; 621 Respondents