Information Operations (United States)

Information Operations is a category of direct and indirect support operations for the United States Military. By definition in Joint Publication 3-13, "IO are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own."[1] Information Operations (IO) are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. or rumors deliberately spread widely to influence opinions.[1]

Information Operations (IO)

Comes from JP 3-13 (Joint Publication) and pertains to Information Operations (IO) in the United States.

Electronic Warfare (EW)

Main article: Electronic Warfare
U.S. Military personnel assigned to the 4th Psychological Operations Group, 193rd Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air Nation Guard (ANG) broadcast television and radio programming
EC-130J Commando Solo

Computer Network Operations (CNO

computer network exploitation. Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. Also called CNE.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

Soldiers from the U.S. Army's 350th Tactical Psychological Operations, 10th Mountain Division, drop leaflets over a village near Hawijah in Kirkuk province, Iraq, on March 6, 2008.
U.S. Army PSYOP Force structure
NATO leaflet in Libya

Military Deception (MILDEC)

Main article: Military_deception
Simulated OH-58C Kiowa helicopter and simulated fuel blivets during a deception operation on 10 November 1990 carried out by the XVIII Airborne Corps Deception Cell. This simulated forward arming and refueling point (FARP) at TL 139512 in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia was approximately 45 kilometers northwest of An Nuariya.

Operations Security (OPSEC)

Someone Talked

Equipment Methods and Tactics

EC-130

Main article: Lockheed_EC-130

The EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) was based on a basic C-130E platform and provided tactical airborne command post capabilities to air commanders and ground commanders in low air threat environments. This EC-130E ABCCC has since been retired.

The EC-130E Commando Solo was an earlier version of a U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard psychological operations (PSYOPS) aircraft. This aircraft also employed a C-130E airframe, but was modified by using the mission electronic equipment from the retired EC-121S Coronet Solo aircraft. This airframe served during the first Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), the second Gulf War (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and in Operation Enduring Freedom. The EC-130E was eventually replaced by the EC-130J Commando Solo and was retired in 2006.

The EC-130J Commando Solo is a modified C-130J Hercules used to conduct psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs broadcast missions in the standard AM, FM, HF, TV, and military communications bands. Missions are flown at the maximum altitudes possible to ensure optimum propagation patterns. The EC-130J flies during either day or night scenarios with equal success, and is air-refuelable. A typical mission consists of a single-ship orbit which is offset from the desired target audience. The targets may be either military or civilian personnel. The Commando Solo is operated exclusively by the Air National Guard, specifically the 193d Special Operations Wing (193 SOW), a unit of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard operationally gained by the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The 193 AOW is based at the Harrisburg Air National Guard Base (former Olmstead AFB) at Harrisburg International Airport in Middletown, Pennsylvania.

The U.S. Navy's EC-130Q Hercules TACAMO ("Take Charge and Move Out") aircraft was a land-based naval aviation platform that served as a SIOP strategic communications link aircraft for the U.S. Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarine force and as a backup communications link for the USAF manned strategic bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile forces. To ensure survivability, TACAMO operated as a solo platform, well away from and not interacting with other major naval forces such as sea-based aircraft carrier strike groups and their carrier air wings or land-based maritime patrol aircraft Operated by Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron THREE (VQ-3) and Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron FOUR (VQ-4), the EC-130Q was eventually replaced by the U.S. Navy's current TACAMO platform, the Boeing 707-based E-6 Mercury.

Computer Network Operations

Stuxnet

Main article: Stuxnet

Stuxnet is a computer worm discovered in June 2010. It initially spreads via Microsoft Windows, and targets Siemens industrial software and equipment. While it is not the first time that hackers have targeted industrial systems,[10] it is the first discovered malware that spies on and subverts industrial systems,[11] and the first to include a programmable logic controller (PLC) rootkit.[12][13]

In May 2011, the PBS program Need To Know cited a statement by Gary Samore, White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in which he said, "we're glad they [the Iranians] are having trouble with their centrifuge machine and that we – the US and its allies – are doing everything we can to make sure that we complicate matters for them", offering "winking acknowledgement" of US involvement in Stuxnet.[14] According to the British Daily Telegraph, a showreel that was played at a retirement party for the head of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Gabi Ashkenazi, included references to Stuxnet as one of his operational successes as the IDF chief of staff.[15]

Suter

Suter is a military computer program developed by BAE Systems that attacks computer networks and communications systems belonging to an enemy. Development of the program has been managed by Big Safari, a secret unit of the United States Air Force. It is specialised to interfere with the computers of integrated air defence systems.[16] Suter was integrated into US unmanned aircraft by L-3 Communications.[17]

Three generations of Suter have been developed. Suter 1 allows its operators to monitor what enemy radar operators can see. Suter 2 lets them take control of the enemy's networks and direct their sensors. Suter 3, tested in Summer 2006, enables the invasion of links to time-critical targets such as battlefield ballistic missile launchers or mobile surface-to-air missile launchers.

The program has been tested with aircraft such as the EC-130, RC-135, and F-16CJ.[16] It has been used in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2006.[18][19]

U.S. Air Force officials have speculated that a technology similar to Suter was used by the Israeli Air Force to thwart Syrian radars and sneak into their airspace undetected in Operation Orchard on 6 September 2007. The evasion of air defence radar was otherwise unlikely because the F-15s and F-16s used by the IAF were not equipped with stealth technology.[17][18]

PSYOP

B (SOMS-B)

--The SOMS-B is a ground-based HMMWV mounted radio and television broadcast system. Like the EC-130C/J it can broadcast on AM, FM, SW and VHF television frequencies. The SOMS-B also has the capability to produce programming or radio and television broadcasts[20][21]

Other/Integrated

Radio

Radio Free Afghanistan

Radio Free Afghanistan (RFA) is the Afghan branch of Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) broadcast services. It broadcasts 12 hours daily as part of a 24-hour stream of programming in conjunction with Voice of America (VOA). RFA first aired in Afghanistan from 1985 to 1993 and was re-launched in January 2002. RFA produces a variety of cultural, political, and informational programs that are transmitted to listeners via shortwave, satellite and AM and FM signals provided by the International Broadcasting Bureau. RFA’s mission is "to promote and sustain democratic values and institutions in Afghanistan by disseminating news, factual information and ideas".[22]

Radio in a Box

Main article: Radio in a box
United States Psychological Operations

Radio is the dominant information tool to reach wide audiences in isolated, mountainous regions. The US military has deployed RIABs throughout Afghanistan in order to communicate with the residents. Due to a 70 percent illiteracy rate and lack of education in Afghanistan, radio is a vital communications tool used to broadcast information where radio ownership exceeds 80 percent.[23][24] The United States military operates approximately 100 RIABs and hire local Afghan DJs in Afghanistan to broadcast information and host call-in shows.[25] The United States Army employed RIAB systems to broadcast anti-Taliban and anti-Al Qaeda messages and countered Taliban propaganda by pushing onto Taliban frequencies in Paktia Province.[26][27] One advantage of employing RIAB systems is the ability to broadcast vital information immediately to a large audience in the event of a crisis.[25] One Afghan DJ has 50,000 listeners.[28] Nawa District Governor Abdul Manaf uses the local RIAB station to conduct weekly call-in shows and believes the RIAB system is one of his best communication tools to inform a large audience.[29] In Afghanistan's Paktika province, which has a literacy rate of two percent, an estimated 92 percent of the residents listen to the radio every day.[27][28] Radio programs transmitted using RIAB systems provide beneficial information to Afghan farmers in remote areas.[23] In the isolated, mountainous Wazi Kwah district of Paktika Province, a RIAB system supplies the only source of outside news.[30] Afghan National Army commanders use the RIAB to communicate to villagers and elders and provide thoughts to the community.[31] Afghans can use information distributed by the United States military such as how to react to an approaching military convoy or purpose or use of U.S.-sponsored agriculture programs. For general news, Afghans can also use other information outlets such as the BBC or VOA because RIAB systems are controlled by the US military.[32] Special Operations first employed RIAB systems in Afghanistan in 2005 which improved their ability to supply information to and communicate with the local population in their areas of operation.[33]

Terrorists (IO from US Perspective)

"Terrorists are adept at integrating their physical acts of violence with IO. They make audio and video recordings of the incidents for distribution over the internet and on television. Their violence becomes theater, staged for its psychological impact, and replayed over and over again in the media as IO."[34]

Computer Network Operations

There are many examples of CNA and are generally done in support of other operations. Terrorists have integrated cyber attacks into their thinking, strategies, and operations as an extremely cost-effective way to harm the US and other adversaries.[36]

The same can be said for CNE, which is about penetrating computer networks before actually attacking them. Gaining access to specific networks is seen to be as part of the CNA process for terrorists (they do not distinguish between the two).[36]

As for CND, terrorists are aware of keeping data secure and websites running because they use the internet. Hamas and Hizballaha have had to defend their websites from Israeli hackers who in the past have defaced them. The methods they use include access controls, encryption, authentication, firewalls, intrusion detection, anti-viral tools, audits, security management, and security awareness and training.[36]

Steganography

Main article: Steganography

When one considers that messages could be encrypted steganographically in e-mail messages, particularly e-mail spam, the notion of junk e-mail takes on a whole new light. Coupled with the "chaffing and winnowing" technique, a sender could get messages out and cover their tracks all at once.

An example showing how terrorists may use forum avatars to send hidden messages. This avatar contains the message "Boss said that we should blow up the bridge at midnight." encrypted with mozaiq using "växjö" as password.

Rumors about terrorists using steganography started first in the daily newspaper USA Today on 5 February 2001 in two articles titled "Terrorist instructions hidden online" and "Terror groups hide behind Web encryption". In July the same year, an article was titled even more precisely: "Militants wire Web with links to jihad". A citation from the article: "Lately, al-Qaeda operatives have been sending hundreds of encrypted messages that have been hidden in files on digital photographs on the auction site eBay.com". Other media worldwide cited these rumors many times, especially after the terrorist attack of 9/11, without ever showing proof. The Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera reported that an Al Qaeda cell which had been captured at the Via Quaranta mosque in Milan had pornographic images on their computers, and that these images had been used to hide secret messages (although no other Italian paper ever covered the story). The USA Today articles were written by veteran foreign correspondent Jack Kelley, who in 2004 was fired after allegations emerged that he had fabricated stories and sources.

In October 2001, the New York Times published an article claiming that al-Qaeda had used steganography to encode messages into images, and then transported these via e-mail and possibly via USENET to prepare and execute the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack. The Federal Plan for Cyber Security and Information Assurance Research and Development,[38] published in April 2006 makes the following statements:

Moreover, an online "terrorist training manual", the "Technical Mujahid, a Training Manual for Jihadis" contained a section entitled "Covert Communications and Hiding Secrets Inside Images."[39]

By early 2002, a Cranfield University MSc thesis developed the first practical implementation of an online real-time Counter Terrorist Steganography Search Engine. This was designed to detect the most likely image steganography in transit and thereby provide UK Ministry of Defence Intelligence Staff a realistic approach to "narrowing the field", suggesting that interception capacity was never the difficulty but rather prioritising the target media.

Al-Qaeda has used steganography in such "plain sight" mediums such as internet pornography to communicate information about their attacks to be carried out on civilian populations.[40]

Military Deception

A police search of a U.K. al-Qaeda member's home uncovered what is now called "The al-Qaeda Training Manual", a techniques instruction book on deception, forgery, "blending in", hiding places, and the use of covers to blend into the terrorist area of operation (usually cities with large civilian populations).[41] The philosophy the MILDEC is for the concealment of activities rather than misleading adversaries.[42]

PSYOP

See also: Martyrdom video

Terrorist PSYOP differs from American PSYOP in one two major areas. First, US PSYOP targets foreign adversaries and information is coordinated with many other agencies and screened before it is published. Second, while PSYOP by US and coalition forces is "designed to bring an end to violence and save lives, terrorist PSYOP is frequently directed toward promoting violence and threatening civilian populations with death and destruction. Suicide bombers are portrayed as martyrs rather than killers of innocent people."[43]

The Internet is the main resource to spread propaganda with al-Aqaeda and other terrorist groups. "According to Bruce Hoffman, before it was taken down, al-Qaeda's website Alneda.com emphasized three themes: 1)the West is implacably hostile to Islam, 2) the only way to address this threat and the only language the West understands is the logic of violence, and 3) jihad is the only option"[43][44]

Terrorists also like to use the internet to recruit and persuade children to their cause. As Dorothy Denning has found, "Children are being taught to hate Jews and Westerners, and to take up arms against them [through cartoons and comic-book style web pages, bedtime stories, and computer games]".[45]

OPSEC

All terrorists practice a high level of OPSEC since their need to be secret is how they can be successful. Whether it is the al-Qaeda training manual, online magazines targeted for the world, or the training of youth in Jihad camps, OPSEC is one of the first priorities for terrorists.[46]

Secure communications are big as well. The 11 September hijackers, for example, accessed anonymous Hotmail and Yahoo! accounts from computers at Kinko's and at a public library.[47] Messages are also coded. Three weeks before the attacks, Mohamed Atta reportedly received a coded email message that read: "The semester begins in three more weeks. We've obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering."[48] The faculties referred to the four targets (twin towers, Pentagon, and Capitol).[49]

The list of methods goes on and on and is very similar to the methods used in organized crime around the world.

Criticism

See also

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_13.pdf
  2. DOD Information Operations Roadmap, 30 October 2003, p.61
  3. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/02_psyop-jp-3-53.pdf
  4. 1 2 JCS, JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception (Washington, DC: GPO, 31 May 1996), v-vi.
  5. http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art014.pdf , p. 98
  6. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_13_3.pdf
  7. "Military Personnel Warned Against Geotagging Photos". RedOrbit Staff & Wire Reports. Retrieved 2012-04-18.
  8. Post, Global. "Army: Facebook geotagging dangerous for soldiers". Tucson Sentinel. Retrieved 2012-04-18.
  9. "OPSEC". Army Spouses Online Facebook. Retrieved 2012-04-18.
  10. "Building a Cyber Secure Plant". Siemens. 30 September 2010. Retrieved 5 December 2010.
  11. Robert McMillan (16 September 2010). "Siemens: Stuxnet worm hit industrial systems". Computerworld. Retrieved 16 September 2010.
  12. "Last-minute paper: An indepth look into Stuxnet". Virus Bulletin.
  13. "Stuxnet worm hits Iran nuclear plant staff computers". BBC News. 26 September 2010.
  14. Gary Samore speaking at the 10 December 2010 Washington Forum of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington DC, reported by C-Span and contained in the PBS program Need to Know ("Cracking the code: Defending against the superweapons of the 21st century cyberwar", 4 minutes into piece)
  15. Williams, Christopher (2011-02-15). "Israel video shows Stuxnet as one of its successes". London: Telegraph.co.uk. Retrieved 2012-02-14.
  16. 1 2 David A. Fulghum, Michael A. Dornheim, and William B. Scott. "Black Surprises". Aviation Week and Space Technology. Retrieved 2007-10-05.
  17. 1 2 John Leyden (4 October 2007). "Israel suspected of 'hacking' Syrian air defences". The Register. Retrieved 2007-10-05.
  18. 1 2 David A. Fulghum (3 October 2007). "Why Syria's Air Defenses Failed to Detect Israelis". Aviation Week and Space Technology. Retrieved 2007-10-05.
  19. David A. Fulghum (14 January 2007). "Technology Will Be Key to Iraq Buildup". Aviation Week and Space Technology.
  20. DOCUMENT CALLED IO IN OEF AND IF -saved in your folder
  21. "SOMS-B 2 MRBS Antenna System". Federal Business Opportunities. Retrieved 2012-04-18.
  22. http://www.rferl.org/section/Afghanistan/149.html/
  23. 1 2 http://www.theworld.org/2010/02/afghanistans-radio-war/
  24. Radio in a Box (2011). Radio in a Box "Retrieved 2011-14-10"
  25. 1 2 Radio in a Box - Giving Afghanistans Their Own Voice! (2010). Radio in a Box - Giving Afghanistans Their Own Voice! "Retrieved 2011-14-10"
  26. Army radio connects with Afghans (2009). Army radio connects with Afghans "Retrieved 2011-10-30"
  27. 1 2 Military Embraces Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (2008). Radio in a Box - Military Embraces Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan "Retrieved 2011-11-11"
  28. 1 2 In Afghan Fight, U.S. Takes to the Airwaves (2010). In Afghan Fight, U.S. Takes to the Airwaves "Retrieved 2011-14-10"
  29. /The Busiest Man in Nawa (2011). The Busiest Man in Nawa "U.S. Marine Corps Releases", "Retrieved 2011-11-10"
  30. Local DJ celebrity to his Afghan listeners (2010). Local DJ celebrity to his Afghan listeners "Retrieved 2011-10-14"
  31. Radio-in-a-Box: Afghanistan's New Warrior-DJs (2011). Radio-in-a-Box: Afghanistan's New Warrior-DJs "Retrieved 2011-10-14"
  32. The Pentagon, Information Operations, and International Media Development (2010). The Pentagon, Information Operations, and International Media Development "A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance", :e27 "Retrieved 2011-10-14"
  33. Breaking the Afghan Insurgency (2007). Breaking the Afghan Insurgency "Special Warfare" 20 (5):e26 "Retrieved 2011-11-10"
  34. Denning (2005), p. 6
  35. Denning (2005), p. 20
  36. 1 2 3 Denning (2005), p. 11
  37. Taylor, Rob (27 April 2012). "Taliban website hacked as Afghan cyber war heats up". Reuters US. Retrieved 2012-04-27.
  38. Federal Plan for Cyber Security and Information Assurance Research and Development National Science and Technology Council, April 2006
  39. The Jamestown Foundation
  40. "Al Qaeda planned to hijack cruise ships and execute passengers, reveals 'treasure trove of intelligence' embedded in PORN video". London: Daily Mail Online. Retrieved 1 May 2012.
  41. http://www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf
  42. Denning (2005), p. 7
  43. 1 2 Denning (2005)
  44. Bruce Hoffman, "Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26:429-442, 2003.
  45. Denning (2005), p. 5
  46. Denning (2005), p. 12
  47. Brian Ross, "A Secret Language," ABCNEWS.com, 4 October 2001.
  48. 58 "Virtual Soldiers in a Holy War," Ha’aretz Daily, 16 September 2002.
  49. Denning (2005), p. 13
  50. Baker, Ralph (2006). The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations. Military Review. pp. 34–35.
  51. McChrystal, Gen. Stanley A. (21 September 2009). "COMISAF Initial Assessment". US Department of Defense. Retrieved 2012-04-17.

Bibliography

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