McConnell v. FEC

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

Argued September 8, 2003
Decided December 10, 2003
Full case name Addison Mitchell McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
Citations

540 U.S. 93 (more)

124 S. Ct. 619; 157 L. Ed. 2d 491; 2003 U.S. LEXIS 9195; 72 U.S.L.W. 4015; 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 13
Prior history Mixed ruling by the District Court for the District of Columbia
Holding
Not all political speech is protected by the First Amendment from government infringement.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Stevens, O'Connor, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
Majority Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter
Majority Breyer, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor
Concurrence Scalia
Concurrence Thomas
Concurrence Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia
Dissent Rehnquist, joined by Scalia, Kennedy
Dissent Stevens, joined by Breyer, Ginsburg
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I; 116 Stat. 81
Overruled by
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) (in part)

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),[1] is a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), often referred to as the McCainFeingold Act.

The case takes its name from Senator Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky, and the Federal Election Commission, the federal agency that oversees U.S. campaign finance laws.

It was partially overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).[2]

History

The case was brought by groups such as the California Democratic Party and the National Rifle Association,[3] and individuals including U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, then the Senate Majority Whip, who argued that the legislation was an unconstitutional infringement on their First Amendment rights.[4] Senator McConnell had been a longtime opponent of BCRA in the Senate, and had led several Senate filibusters to block its passage.[5][6]

In early 2002, a multi-year effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way money is raised and spent on political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill).[6] Its key provisions were 1) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; 2) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and 3) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures").[7]

In May 2003, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a ruling on the constitutionality of the law, but the ruling never took effect because the case was immediately appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Oral arguments

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a special session on September 8, 2003. On Wednesday, December 10, 2003, it issued a complicated decision totaling 272 pages in length, that, with a 5-4 majority, upheld the key provisions of McCain-Feingold including (1) the "electioneering communication" provisions (which required disclosure of and prohibited the use of corporate and union treasury funds to pay for or broadcast cable and satellite ads clearly identifying a federal candidate targeted to the candidate's electorate within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election); and (2) the "soft money" ban (which prohibited federal parties, candidates, and officeholders from raising or spending funds not in compliance with contribution restrictions, and prohibited state parties from using such "soft money" in connection with federal elections).

Opinions

Justices Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg established the majority for two parts of the Court's opinion:

Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions.

In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits.

The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.

Two dissenting opinions were included in the decision:

Three other justices wrote separate opinions on the decision:

See also

References

Further reading

External links

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