United States v. Wurzbach
| United States v. Wurzbach | |||||||
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| Argued January 20, 1930 Decided February 24, 1930 | |||||||
| Full case name | United States v. Wurzbach | ||||||
| Citations |
50 S.Ct. 167; 74 L.Ed. 508 | ||||||
| Prior history | Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas | ||||||
| Holding | |||||||
| The sixth section of the act of August 15, 1876, is not unconstitutional | |||||||
| Court membership | |||||||
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| Case opinions | |||||||
| Majority | Holmes, joined by Taft, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Sanford, Stone | ||||||
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930), is a unanimous ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that the term "political purpose," as used in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, was not impermissibly vague. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, which had quashed an indictment under the Act.
Harry M. Wurzbach, a member of the United States House of Representatives from Texas, was indicted under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that he had received money from employees of the United States government. The District Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas had thrown out the indictment on two grounds: 1) That the term "political purpose" did not include the behavior in question; and 2) If the term did include the behavior, then the Act was unconstitutional.
Majority opinion
Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which contains just 752 words.
Holmes dismissed almost out of hand the district court's lengthy discussion of the terms and structure of the Act. "This language is perfectly intelligible and clearly embraces the acts charged," he wrote.[1] The district court had concluded that Article One, Section 4 of the Constitution only permitted Congress to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections, and that primary elections did not fall under federal control (as per Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).[1] Holmes, however, argued that the ability to restrict receipt of funds was not contingent upon when or where these funds were received (e.g., primary or general election).[2] For argument in this regard, Holmes cited Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371.[3]
The district court was reversed, and the case remanded.