Propaganda in the People's Republic of China

Propaganda in the People's Republic of China

Large sign featuring a propaganda slogan in 1972: "Long Live the Great, Glorious, and Correct Communist Party!"
Simplified Chinese 中华人民共和国宣传活动
Traditional Chinese 中華人民共和國宣傳活動

Propaganda in the People's Republic of China refers to the use of propaganda by the Communist Party of China to sway public and international opinion in favor of its policies.[1][2] Domestically, this includes censorship of proscribed views and an active cultivation of views that favor the government. Propaganda is considered central to the operation of the CPC government.[3] The common Chinese term xuānchuán (宣传) can mean "dissemination", "propaganda", or "publicity".

Aspects of propaganda can be traced back to the earliest periods of Chinese history, but propaganda has been most effective in the twentieth century owing to mass media and an authoritarian government.[3] China in the era of Mao Zedong is known for its constant use of mass campaigns to legitimize the state and the policies of leaders. It was the first CPC to successfully make use of modern mass propaganda techniques, adapting them to the needs of a country which had a largely rural and illiterate population.[3]

Today, propaganda in China is usually depicted through cultivation of the economy and Chinese nationalism.[4]

History

Mao era

The origins of the CCP propaganda system can be traced to Yan'an Rectification Movement and the rectification movements carried out there.[5] following which it became a key mechanism in the Party's campaigns.[2][6] Mao explicitly laid out the political role of culture in his 1942 "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature". The propaganda system, considered a central part of CCP's "control system",[2][7] drew much from Soviet, Nazi and other totalitarian states' propaganda methods.[2] It represented a quintessential Leninist "transmission belt" for indoctrination and mass mobilization.[2] David Shambaugh observes that propaganda and indoctrination are considered to have been a hallmark of the Maoist China;[2][5][7] the CCP employed a variety of "thought control" techniques, including incarceration for "thought reform," construction of role models to be emulated, mass mobilization campaigns, the creation of ideological monitors and propaganda teams for indoctrination purposes, enactment of articles to be memorized, control of the educational system and media, a nationwide system of loudspeakers, among other methods.[2] While ostensibly aspiring to a "Communist utopia," often had a negative focus on constantly searching for enemies among the people. The means of persuasion was often extremely violent, "a literal acting out of class struggle."[8]

According to Anne-Marie Brady, an Associate Professor at the University of Canterbury's School of Political Science and Communication, CCP propaganda and thought work (sīxiǎng gōngzuò 思想工作) traditionally had a much broader notion of the public sphere than is usually defined by media specialists.[8] Chinese propagandists used every possible means of communication available in China after 1949, including electronic media such as film and television, educational curriculum and research, print media such as newspapers and posters, cultural arts such as plays and music, oral media such as memorizing Mao quotes, as well as thought reform and political study classes.[8]

China Central Television has traditionally served as a major national conduit for televised propaganda, while the People's Daily newspaper has served as a medium for print propaganda. During the Mao years, a distinctive feature of propaganda and thought work was "rule by editorial," according to Brady. Political campaigns would be launched through editorials and leading articles in People's Daily, which would be followed by other papers.[8] Work units and other organizational political study groups utilized these articles as a source for political study, and reading newspapers in China was "a political obligation". Mao used Lenin's model for the media, which had it function as a tool of mass propaganda, agitation, and organization.[8]

During the Cultural Revolution, PRC propaganda was crucial to the formation and promotion of the cult of personality centered around Chairman Mao Zedong, as well as mobilizing popular participation in national campaigns.[9] Past propaganda also encouraged the Chinese people to emulate government approved model workers and soldiers, such as Lei Feng, Chinese Civil War hero Dong Cunrui, Korean War hero Yang Gensi, and Dr. Norman Bethune, a Canadian doctor who assisted the Communist Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. It also praised Third World revolutionaries and close foreign allies such as Albania and North Korea while vilifying both the American "imperialists" and the Soviet "revisionists" (the latter of whom was seen as having betrayed Marxism–Leninism following the Sino-Soviet split).

According to Barbara Mittler, Maoist era propaganda left memories of violence and slander upon many Chinese, and their psychological strains drove many to madness and death.[10] Today, Maoist era propaganda are no longer used by the CCP, and are largely commercialized for the purposes of nostalgia.[11]

Modern era

Following the death of Mao in 1976, propaganda was used to blacken the character of the Gang of Four, which was blamed for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. During the era of economic reform and modernization that was initiated by Deng Xiaoping, propaganda promoting "socialism with Chinese characteristics" was distributed. The first post-Mao campaign was in 1983 which saw the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign.

The events of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 were an indication to many elders in the CCP that liberalization in the propaganda sector had gone too far, and that the Party must re-establish its control over ideology and the propaganda system.[8]

Brady writes that propaganda and thought work have become the "life blood" of the Party-State since the post-1989 period, and one of the key means for guaranteeing the CCP's continued legitimacy and hold on power.[8]

Propaganda sign in Xiamen, China facing Kinmen, Republic of China. Sign says "Peaceful Unification. One country two systems"

In the 1990s, propaganda theorists described the challenges to China's propaganda and thought work as "blind spots"; mass communication was advocated as the antidote. From the early 1990s, selective concepts from mass communications theory, public relations, advertising, social psychology, and other areas of modern mass persuasion were introduced into China's propaganda system for the purpose of creating a modern propaganda model.[8]

Kurlantzick and Link noted that through cultivating economic growth and Chinese nationalism, the CCP has modernized authoritarianism to maintain their political control.[4] They asserted that elite business leaders, who have benefited from China's economic growth, have accepted the CCP's authoritarian control as a result, largely preventing the new rich and emerging middle class from challenging their rule. Fenby argues that the latter, rather than accepting the system per se, have learnt to use it to their advantage. Kurlantzick and Link also noted that dissent still largely exists in the Chinese populace in regards to government policies on the economy, environment and society, particularly in rural areas, as they are becoming more aware of their constitutional rights. A recent poll in 2007 showed that 70% of Chinese consider the new rich to be corrupt and unworthy of respect.[12]

Recent developments

In early 2009 the Communist Party embarked on a multibillion-dollar global media expansion, including a 24-hour English-language news channel in the style of Western news agencies. According to Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, it was part of Hu Jintao's plan to "go global" and make "the voice of China better heard in international affairs", by strengthening their foreign-language services, and being less political in their broadcasting. Bequelin notes that their function is to channel a specific view of China to an international audience, and their fundamental premise remains the same; that all information broadcast must reflect the government's views. The Chinese government encouraged the adaption of Western style media marketing in their news agencies due to internal competition with national commercial media.[13]

The 2008 Summer Olympics were portrayed by the Chinese government as a symbol of China's pride and place in the world,[14] and seem to have bolstered some domestic support for the Chinese government, and support for the policies of the Communist Party of China, giving rise to concerns that the state will possibly have more leverage to disperse dissent.[15]

In the lead-up to the Olympics, the government allegedly issued guidelines to the local media for their reporting during the Games: most political issues not directly related to the games were to be downplayed; topics such as pro-Tibetan independence and East Turkestan movements were not to be reported on, as were food safety issues such as "cancer-causing mineral water."[16] As the 2008 Chinese milk scandal broke in September 2008, there was widespread speculation that China's desire for a perfect Games may have been a factor contributing towards the delayed recall of contaminated infant formula.[17][18]

In 2011, Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai and the city's Propaganda Department initiated a 'Red Songs campaign' that demanded every district, government departments and commercial corporations, universities and schools, state radio and TV stations to begin singing "red songs", praising the achievements of the Communist Party of China and PRC. Bo said the aim was "to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals of his father's comrade-in-arms Mao Zedong"; although academic Ding Xueliang of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology suspected the campaign's aim was to further his political standing within the country's leadership.[19][20][21] [22] During Bo Xilai's career in Chongqing, he also sent out mass text messages mostly of his favorite quotations from chairman Mao.

Terminology

See also: Xuanchuan

According to the SOED, English propaganda originally meant "a committee of cardinals responsible for foreign missions" (from Latin Congregatio de Propaganda Fide "Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith") in the 18th century, but in the 20th century, the meaning negatively changed to "the systematic dissemination of doctrine, rumour, or selected information to propagate or promote a particular doctrine, view, practice, etc.; ideas, information, etc. disseminated thus (frequently derogatory)".[23] While the English word usually has a pejorative connotation, the Chinese word xuānchuán (宣传 "propaganda; publicity") can have either a neutral connotation in official PRC contexts or a pejorative one in informal contexts.[24]

Xuānchuán first appeared in the 3rd-century historical text Records of the Three Kingdoms meaning "to announce or convey information", and was chosen to translate the Marxist-Leninist concept of Russian propagánda пропаганда in the early 20th-century People's Republic of China. Some xuanchuan collocations usually refer to "propaganda" (e.g., xuānchuánzhàn 宣传战 "propaganda war"), others to "publicity" (xuānchuán méijiè 宣传媒介 "mass media; means of publicity"), and still others are ambiguous (xuānchuányuán 宣传员 "propagandist; publicist").[25]

Mechanics

Control of media

Media operations and content are tightly controlled,[26][27] and the Party largely determines what appears in news reports. Controlling media content allows the Communist Party to disseminate propaganda supportive of government policies, censor controversial news stories, and have reports published criticizing political adversaries, including advocates of religious freedom and democracy, supporters of Taiwanese and Tibetan independence, and representatives of the United States government.[26] In 2005, Reporters Without Borders published a report about the state-run news agency Xinhua, calling it "the world's biggest propaganda agency".[28]

While in the past the CCP's Central Propaganda Department and its local branches sent faxes to all media throughout the country with instructions indicating subjects that the media should stress or avoid entirely, directives are now imparted to ranking media managers or editors during phone conversations—a move designed to reduce the paper trail.[26] Media in China faces few restrictions on content that is not deemed to be politically damaging.[26]

Wu Xuecan, a former editor of the People's Daily overseas edition,[29] reports that through control of the "ideological domain, material means and living necessities," editors and reporters are conditioned to keep news and reports aligned with the interests of the Chinese Communist Party.[29] Wu further reports that, political study sessions ensures that editors first practice self-censorship.[29] He Qinglian writes that long years of media control have bred in Chinese journalists a habit of "self-discipline," and that most Chinese journalists resign themselves to playing the role of "Party mouthpieces."[27] Control is also directed at sources of information, as ordinary people are restricted from providing news to Chinese media, and more so to foreign media.[27]

Thought reform

Propaganda and thought work in the Maoist era had a number of distinctive features, according to Brady, such as "ideological remolding" or "thought reform" (思想改造), ideological purges, ritual humiliation of ideological opponents, an emphasis on political study to raise levels of awareness of the current line, and targeting high-profile individuals as symbols of negative tendencies which must be eradicated.[8]

The experiences of propaganda and thought work in the Cultural Revolution provided the CCP with a "profound lesson," according to Brady. Virtually all post-Mao era Party leaders had been under attack during that time, and drew two seemingly contradictory lessons: the rejection of mass movements and thought reform as means of transforming China, and the recognition of the "vital role of propaganda and thought work in China's political control." The administration of propaganda and thought work was plagued by these issues through the 1980s, and up to the events of 4 June 1989.[8]

Biderman and Meyers wrote in 1968 that while some kind of thought reform is characteristic of all totalitarian regimes, the CCP "set about it more purposefully, more massively, and more intensively than have other ruling groups," including through employing known techniques in new ways. They note the presence of such techniques in Maoist political campaigns, such as daily meetings for criticism and self-criticism; surveillance and sanctions were connected with education to find and correct deficiencies in personal conducts. In the military, political leaders attacked all personal connections between soldiers that were not based on political conviction, thus exploiting social pressures and personal anxieties to build a sense of conformity.[30]

In terms of intensity and scope, spiritual control has been reinforced under the CCP's rule, and has become a basic feature of citizens' daily life, according to Victor Shaw.[31] To an extent, the "freedom of silence" cherished by some older Chinese scholars was not even possible for an illiterate peasant in a remote area under the CCP mass propaganda.[31]

According to Shaw, the CCP utilizes propaganda to spread its policies, build social consensus, and mobilize the population for social programs. Ideological tensions result in mass movements, and the resulting spiritual control legitimizes the political establishment.[31] "Political studies, legal education, heroic models, and thought reform provide the CCP with effective weapons to propagandize rules and legal codes, normalize individual behaviour, and rehabilitate deviants in labor camps."[31]

Kurlantzick and Link stated that the CCP uses the technique of "thoughtwork" (sixiang gongzuo) to maintain popular obedience, dating back to the Mao Zedong era.[4] They noted that while Mao-era campaigns are aimed at transforming the Chinese society and people's natures, the modern approach to thoughtwork are more subtle and only focuses on issues important to the CCP's rule. According to Kurlantzick and Link, it consists largely of cultivating pro-government views in the media and other influential people in Chinese society, and as such complaints against the government becomes distracted with pro-government propaganda. The government also attempts to distance itself from local issues by blaming them on corrupt local officials, says Kurlantzick and Link.

Spin doctors

According to Anne-Marie Brady, the Foreign Ministry first set up a system of designated officials to give information in times of crisis in 1983, and greatly expanded the system to lower levels in the mid-1990s. China's spin had been directed only at foreigners, but in the 1990s leaders realised that managing public crises was useful for domestic politics; this included setting up provincial level "News Coordinator Groups," and inviting foreign PR firms to give seminars.[8]

Brady writes that Chinese foreign propaganda officials took cues from the Blair government's spin doctoring during the mad cow disease crisis of 2000–2001, and the Bush government's use of the U.S. media after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. According to her, the Blair model allows for a certain amount of negative coverage to be shown during a crisis, which is believed to help release some of the "social tension" surrounding it. She believes information managers in China used this approach during coal mining disasters of 2005.[8]

According to Brady, trained official spokespeople are now available on call in every central government ministry, as well as in local governments, to deal with emerging crises; these spin doctors are coordinated and trained by the Office of Foreign Propaganda/State Council Information Office.[8]

During the July 2009 Ürümqi riots, Communist Party officials moved swiftly in a public relations campaign. According to Newsweek, Party officials felt that the recent riots risked tarnishing China's global image, and underwent a public relations program involving quickly getting out the government's official version of the events, as well as transporting foreign journalists to riot affected areas. The growth in new technologies, such as email and SMS, forced the CCP's hand into taking up spin.

Instead of attempting a media blackout as with the 2008 Tibetan unrest, the Party has adopted a series of more advanced techniques to influence the information leaving China. The day after violence in Ürümqi, the State Council Information Office set up a Xinjiang Information Office in Ürümqi to assist foreign reporters. It invited foreign media to Xinjiang to tour the riot zones, visit hospitals, and look at the aftermath themselves. Journalists were also given CDs with photos and TV clips. "They try to control the foreign journalists as much as possible by using this more sophisticated PR work rather than ban[ning] them," according to Professor Xiao Qiang, quoted by Newsweek.[32]

Structure and mechanics

According to David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs[33] and a fellow of the Brookings Institution,[34] the CCP's propaganda system extends itself as a sprawling bureaucratic establishment, into virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information.[2] Shambaugh notes that according to the CCP publication Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian.[2][35] numerous public places, such as media and news organizations, educational institutions, literature and art centers, and cultural exhibitions come under CCP's propaganda oversight. Shambaugh believes that this expansive definition implies that every conceivable medium which transmits and conveys information to the people of China falls under bureaucratic purview of the CCP Propaganda Department (CCPPD).[2] Shambaugh states that the writ of the CCPPD has remained unchanged since the Maoist era, although the mechanics of oversight and active censorship have undergone considerable evolution.[2]

According to official government reports in 2003, channels of propaganda dissemination of the CCPPD included 2,262 television stations (of which 2,248 were "local"), 2,119 newspapers, 9,074 periodicals and 1,123 publishing houses,[2][36] in addition to internal circulation papers and local gazetteers, approximately 68 million internet accounts with more than 100 million users, and more than 300 million mobile phone users who fall under the system's purview.[37]

According to Brady, propaganda work by the CCP has been historically divided into two categories: directed towards Chinese people (internal or duinei) and directed towards foreigners and the outside world (external or duiwai) as well as four types: political, economic, cultural and social.[1] The Central Propaganda Department oversees internal propaganda, and, the closely linked bureaucracy, The Office of Foreign Propaganda matters relating to external propaganda.[1]

Shambaugh states that the propaganda system, including the Central Propaganda Department, are highly secret and does not appear in officially published diagrams of the Chinese Bureaucratic System, whether in Chinese or in other languages.[1][2] The Office of Foreign Propaganda itself is more commonly known as 'Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China', under the dual nameplate system, according to Brady.[1] The chief of Chinese propaganda, Li Changchun, was named as nineteenth most powerful person in the world by Forbes magazine in 2009.

Propaganda on the Internet

Traditionally, the CCP propaganda apparatus had been based around suppressing news and information, but this often meant the Party found itself in a reactive posture, according to Chinese media expert David Bandurski.[38] In later years the Internet played a key role in the spread of propaganda to Chinese diaspora. PRC-based Internet sites remain a leading source of Chinese-language and China-related news for overseas Chinese. The Internet is an extremely effective tool for guiding and organizing overseas Chinese public opinion, according to Anne-Marie Brady.[39]

Brady cites an example of the role of the Internet in organizing popular protests by overseas Chinese, its usage by the state against a perceived bias of the Western media in its coverage of unrest in Tibetan areas in March 2008 and, a month later, in organizing a series of worldwide demonstrations in support of China during the Olympic torch relay.[39]

Brady noted that these protests were genuine and popular, demonstrating the effectiveness of China's efforts to rebuild positive public opinion within the Chinese overseas diaspora, but the demonstrations nevertheless received official support both symbolically and in practice[39] While there was no compulsion for overseas Chinese to attend the rallies, those who did were given free T-shirts, souvenirs, transport, and accommodation, donated by local embassy officials and China-based donors.[39]

Online spin doctors

Main article: 50 Cent Party

China is known for using internet "spin doctors", specially trained internet users who comment on blogs, public forums or wikis, to shift the debate in favor of the Communist Party and influence public opinion.[38] They are sometime called the "50-cent party" – named so because they are allegedly paid 50 Chinese cents for each comment supporting the CCP they make.[40]

An internal government document released by the BBC outlines the requirements for those employed as spin-doctors, which include having "relatively good political and professional qualities, and have a pioneering and enterprising spirit", being able to react quickly, etc.[40]

It is believed that such government-sponsored Internet commentators have now become widespread and their numbers could be in the tens of thousands;[40] Bandurski suggests the number may be up to 280,000[38] while The Guardian puts the estimate as 300,000.[41] According to The Guardian, the growth in popularity of such astroturfing owes to the ease with which web 2.0 technologies such as Twitter, Wikipedia and YouTube can be employed to sway public opinion. The BBC reports that special centres have been set up to train China's 'army of internet spin doctors'.[40]

Domestic propaganda

Within the doctrine of China's peaceful rise resorting to Peace Journalism has been analyzed as a growing trend in China's strategy for domestic propaganda, in particular in covering news from Xinjiang.[42] After Zbigniew Brzezinski's having termed Central Asia the "Global Balkans"[43] Idriss Aberkane has argued the resorting to unilateral, state-endorsed Peace Journalism could be a way for China to "de-balkanize" Xinjiang. This he has called "coercive Peace Journalism".

Peace journalism does not sell well because it typically proscribes the coverage of a conflict by news eliciting strong emotional reactions. Man becomes easily addicted to strong emotions and this has played a central role in peace journalism's failure at being adopted by mainstream media. On the other hand, mainstream media badly need (and compete with each other) to provide the strongest emotional value to their audience and this has become a vital part of their business model.

Yet in the People's Republic the media industry is not driven by returns on financial investments but by returns on political interests. Thus paradoxically promoting Peace Journalism is much easier for the PRC than say for countries of the European Union as in promoting a political agenda the former can afford to broadcast news with low emotional weight, especially in a non competitive environment for its media industry[42] Aberkane 2011

The Chinese government has used its public evaluations of historical, public figures as a means of communicating to the Chinese public the traits and political goals that it considers desirable and undesirable. The Chinese government has historically tended towards evaluating public figures either as villains or heroes, leaving little room for interpretation and making it clear whether the traits and goals of individual figures should be emulated or despised. The public image of some figures, including Peng Dehuai, have undergone radical reverses throughout the history of the PRC, as required by Party propagandists: Peng was portrayed as a subhuman villain during the Cultural Revolution; but, since 1978, has been evaluated as a nearly perfect Marxist, general, and public official.[44]

By examining the qualities associated with public figures whose images have been manipulated to make those figures either exaggeratedly positive or exaggeratedly negative symbols, scholars have developed a number of assumptions about the traits and political goals generally desired by various PRC governments. Figures whose images have been manipulated to make them positive symbols will be portrayed as: coming from proletarian or semi-proletarian backgrounds; being courageous, fair, straightforward, and honest in their treatment of subordinates and superiors; leading a simple and frugal life; demonstrating great concern for the "masses"; achieving outstanding professional success; and, being impeccably loyal to the Party and to the communist cause. Figures whose images have been manipulated to make them negative symbols will be portrayed as: coming from backgrounds which have exposed them to "bourgeoise" thoughts and attitudes; adhering to all or most historical attempts to oppose political figures in the PRC who later became powerful, which are also vilified; being professionally inept, only succeeding temporarily or appearing to succeed through trickery or deception; participating in "conspiracies" against the correct leadership of the Party; cooperating with "foreign countries" (historically either the Soviet Union or the United States, depending on which is more threatening at the time); and, having numerous negative traits, such as opportunism or corruption. Usually, public figures will provide considerable examples of either positive or negative qualities, but will be made to fit either a positive or negative stereotype through exaggerating qualities which support the interpretation desired by the Party, and by omitting from the historical narrative qualities which contradict the Party's intended interpretation.[44]

External propaganda

The Chinese state refers to all media work abroad as wai xuan, or "external propaganda."[13] In a 2008 report, the U.S. State Department's International Security Advisory Board declared that China was in the midst of a "comprehensive strategic deception campaign," which was said to include "Psychological Warfare (propaganda, deception, and coercion), Media Warfare (manipulation of public opinion domestically and internationally), and Legal Warfare (use of ‘legal regimes' to handicap the opponent in fields favorable to him)."[45]

On its official Chinese Web site, CCTV describes itself as "the mouthpiece of the Party and the government," and lists its main operations under the heading "propaganda situation," referring to new foreign-language channels as "reaching a new stage in external propaganda."[13]

In 2013, a film was released accusing the United States of trying to overthrow the ruling government of China.[46]

Goals of China's foreign propaganda

Through its external propaganda operations, China seeks to shape international perception of the Chinese government and its policies. The CCP's main goals are:

  1. Reduce fears that China is a threat to neighboring countries. China seeks to change its image within the region from that of a growing threat and aggressor to that of a benefactor and potential partner.[47]:5 Beijing is working to "diminish fears of China's future military power, or concerns that China's massive economic growth would divert trade and foreign investment from other nations."[47]:40
  2. Secure access to resources and energy. As China's economy continues to grow at a rapid pace, the need for resources and energy has become more pressing. To protect its access to these resources, China is working to gain the trust of foreign states that possess oil, gas, and other materials.[47]:41
  3. Build alliances and weaken Taiwan's relationship with the international community. In 1994, China announced that it would "use all economic and diplomatic resources to reward countries that are willing to isolate Taiwan."[48] Through propaganda as well as economic incentives, China seeks to convince any nation that still recognizes Taiwan to switch their loyalty to Beijing and formally declare that Taiwan is part of China.[49]
  4. Promote a multipolar world and constrain U.S. global power.[50] China seeks to slowly diminish the United State's influence in Asia, and create its own sphere of influence in Southeast Asia.[51]

Overall, China seeks to "allay concerns about China's economic rise, military build-up and increasing political and diplomatic influence."[52]

Common CCP propaganda themes

Former CCP leader Deng Xiaoping advised Chinese leadership to "hide your capabilities, and bide your time."[53] Most modern Chinese foreign propaganda seeks to pursue China's strategic goals while adhering to this advice. The following are common themes found in China's foreign propaganda:

Instruments

The PRC uses many tactics and techniques to disseminate its propaganda themes abroad. China uses its news and media outlets, which are directly influenced by various state organizations (and ultimately the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP),[55] to relay news stories consistent with these themes to foreign audiences. In 2009, reports emerged that China intends to invest US$6.6 billion to expand its foreign language news service. This includes plans for a 24-hour English-language news network to discuss world affairs from Beijing's point of view.[56]

Several Chinese news/propaganda outlets include:

Soft power initiative

Since 2005, Chinese Premier Hu Jintao has promoted a "soft power initiative"[57] aimed at increasing China's influence overseas through cultural and language programs. These trends have been identified by the American Council of Foreign Relations, which describes that "Beijing is trying to convince the world of its peaceful intentions, secure the resources it needs to continue its soaring economic growth, and isolate Taiwan."[57] The article points out that adverse effects of soft power, that "China has the potential to become the 600-pound gorilla in the room," and that "Chinese influence may begin to breed resentment."[57]

The politburo members Li Changchun and Liu Yunshan have repeatedly stressed that Chinese propaganda should be equally spread both domestically and internationally, and Li Changchun stated that the Confucius Institutes are "an important channel to glorify Chinese culture, to help Chinese culture spread to the world", which is "part of China's foreign propaganda strategy".[58]

The Economist noted that Confucius Institutes are used to project China's soft power and win the support of an external audience, and Confucius was specifically chosen to cast an image of peace and harmony. Such centers are partially sponsored by the Chinese government, with a hands-off approach to management, its directors being directly appointed by their attached universities.[59]

In 2009, Chinese state media launched the English-language version of the Global Times, a nationally distributed news publications. It was described as a part of a larger push by the Chinese government to have a greater say in international media, as well as supplanting what it considers to be biased Western media sources.[60]

In 2009, Chinese Premier Hu Jintao initiated the "Grand External Propaganda Strategy", (Chinese: 宏大的對外宣傳格局, short: 大外宣 Dà Wàixuān), a government propaganda project budgeted at RMB 45 billion Yuan. The aim of the project is to "Seize the initiative, gain the right to speak, maintain an active role, and grasp the power to raise the appeal of our positions in public opinion and in international broadcasting."[61]

In early 2011, the Chinese government launched a million dollar advertising campaign, which was aimed to improve the "incomplete understandings" the American public has about China. A 60-second ad was shown at New York's Times Square, which featured Chinese personalities such as scientist Sun Jiadong, singer Liu Huan and news anchor Jing Yidan, ending with the message of "Chinese Friendship". Newsweek noted that the ad's great production values, but criticized it as confusing and explaining little about the featured Chinese identities.[62]

Propaganda in the arts

As in the Soviet Union, the CCP under Mao Zedong took socialist realism as its basis for art, making clear its goal was the 'education' of the people in communist ideology. This included, as during the Cultural Revolution, transforming literature and art to serve these ends. Pre-revolutionary songs[63] and operas[64] were banned as a poisonous legacy of the past. Middle and high schools were targeted by one campaign because the students circulated romance and love stories among themselves.[65]

Maoist propaganda art has been remade and modernized for almost two decades, and old Cultural Revolution era propaganda productions have appeared in new formats such as DVDs and karaoke versions. They appear in rock and pop versions of revolutionary songs in praise of Mao, as well as T-shirts, watches, porcelain, and other memorabilia.[10] The works of propaganda from the Cultural Revolution have been selling extremely well in recent years,[10] largely for nostalgia, social, patriotic or entertainment purposes[11]

Propaganda songs and music, such as guoyue and revolutionary opera, have a long and storied history in the PRC, featuring prominently in the popular culture of the 1950s to the 1970s. Many of these songs were collected and performed as modern rock adaptations for several albums that were released during the 1990s, including "Red Rock" and "Red Sun: Mao Zedong Praise Songs New Revolutionary Medley". The latter sold 6–10 million copies in China.[66] Most of the older songs praise Mao, the CCP, the 1949 revolution, the Chinese Red Army and the People's Liberation Army, the unity of the ethnic groups of China, and the various ethnic groups' devotion to Mao and the CCP.

Famous propaganda works

Novel

"Red Crag" (红岩), a famous 1961 Chinese novel featuring underground communist agents fighting an espionage battle against the Kuomintang.

Sculpture

Rent Collection Courtyard (收租院), a 1965 sculpture depicting former landlord Liu Wencai as an evil landlord collecting rent from poor, although this depiction has been disputed by modern accounts.

Films and plays

The Red Detachment of Women

Songs

The titles of some of the more well-known propaganda songs are as follows:

Most of the songs listed above are no longer used as propaganda by the CCP, but are exhibited in mainland China as a means of reviving popular nostalgia for the "old times".

Influence operations in the United States

Through a combination of overt and covert activities, China has sought to gain strategic political influence within the American government in order to affect policies and the political process. In the U.S., China employs efforts to "influence U.S. academics, journalists, think tank personnel and other shapers of public opinion…"[67] China also aims to influence businessmen and politicians.

Agents of influence

Using a variety of methods, the PRC has recruited American agents of influence to advocate for Chinese interests in the United States. While many of these agents of influence serve China unwittingly, they can be very effective. A 1999 Congressional report found that "the Chinese Government continues to seek influence in Congress through various means, including inviting Congressional members to visit the PRC, lobbying ethnic Chinese voters and prominent U.S. citizens, and engaging U.S. business interests to weigh in on issues of mutual concern."[68] Junkets were also effectively used by the Soviet Union as part of active measures to co-opt Western politicians, journalists, and academics.

China also uses its vast market as leverage in order to persuade American companies to lobby for Chinese interests. This is especially true of companies that deal in high technology or dual-use technology, as there are significant export controls placed on such technology. According to the 1999 Cox Report, "Executives wishing to do business in the PRC share a mutual commercial interest with the PRC in minimizing export controls on dual-use and military-related technologies. The PRC has displayed a willingness to exploit this mutuality of interest in several notoriously public cases by inducing VIPs from large U.S. companies to lobby on behalf of initiatives, such as export liberalization, on which they are aligned with the PRC."[69]

U.S. elections

Through its agents in America, the PRC has financed a number of political candidates. Katrina Leung, a Chinese spy, contributed $10,000 to the campaign of Richard Riordan, the former mayor of Los Angeles. When he lost his primary to Bill Simon Jr., Leung contributed $4,200 to Simon's campaign. At the direction of her Chinese handlers, Leung also contributed to the 1992 campaign of George H. W. Bush It is estimated that Leung donated around $27,000 to politicians in the 1990s on behalf of the PRC.[70]

A 2012 report by the Government Accountability Institute[71] cites other examples: It was discovered that officers from the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. "sought to direct contributions from foreign sources to the Democratic National Committee before the 1996 presidential campaign."[72] While these allegations have been denied by the PRC, "Secret communications between Beijing and the Chinese Embassy in Washington establish that the influence-buying plan was ‘government sanctioned…'"[73]

In 1996, People's Liberation Army intelligence officer Gen. Ji Shengde provided Johnny Chung, a fundraiser for the Democratic National Committee, with $300,000 to donate towards President Bill Clinton's reelection. Chung visited the White House over fifty times during the 1996 presidential campaign, and was responsible for over $400,000 of contributions to the DNC.[74] This money was returned after the election.

See also

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Chinese Propaganda posters.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 Brady, Anne-Marie (2006). "Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era". Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 1 (3): 58–77.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Shambaugh, David (Jan 2007). "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy". China Journal (57): 25–58.
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  9. ↑ Landsberger, Stefan R. (2010), Models and Martyrs Stefan Landsberger's Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages. Check |url= value (help)
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  61. ↑ Chinese: "抢占先机，赢得话语权，掌握主动权，抓住提高舆论引导能力和国际传播能力"
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  66. ↑ Rethinking Cultural Revolution Culture, Audio-Visual Accompaniment to the Exhibit: "Picturing Power: Art and Propaganda in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) A Multi-Media Exhibition Held at Universitätsmuseum Heidelberg, 31.1.-28.2.2001
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  69. ↑ Cox, Christopher (1999). "U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China". Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, 105th Cong., 2nd sess.: 49.
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  71. ↑ "America the Vulnerable: Are Foreign and Fraudulent Online Campaign Contributions Influencing U.S. Elections?" (PDF). Government Accountability Institute. 26 September 2012.
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  73. ↑ Woodward, Bob (25 April 1997). "FBI Links Top China Officials, U.S. Donations". The Washington Post.
  74. ↑ Johnston, David (12 May 1999). "Committee Told Of Beijing Cash For Democrats". The New York Times.

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