Rojava

Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava
اتحاد شمال سوريا و روج آفا
Federasyona Bakurê Sûriyê – Rojava
Flag
Status De facto autonomous federation of Syria
CapitalQamişlo (Qamishli)[1][2]
37°03′N 41°13′E / 37.050°N 41.217°E / 37.050; 41.217
Official languages Kurdish
Arabic[3]
Syriac-Aramaic
Government Democratic confederalist[4][5][6][7][8]
 •  Co-President Hediya Yousef[9]
 •  Co-President Mansur Selum[9]
Autonomous region
 •  Autonomy proposed July 2013 
 •  Autonomy declared November 2013 
 •  Regional government established November 2013 
 •  Interim constitution adopted January 2014 
 •  Federation Declared 17 March 2016 
Population
 •  2014 estimate 4.6 million[10][11][12]
Currency Syrian pound (SYP)
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Rojava (IPA: [roʒɑːˈvɑ], "the West"), also known as Syrian Kurdistan, Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: ڕۆژاڤای کوردستان‎, Rojavayê Kurdistanê), is a de facto autonomous region made up of three self-governing cantons in northern Syria. Rojava is formed of large parts of Al Hasakah and Aleppo governate.

The region gained its autonomy in November 2013, as part of the ongoing Rojava conflict, establishing a society based on principles of direct democracy, gender equality, and sustainability.[13] Rojava consists of the three cantons of (from east to west) Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin.[14] Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava is unrecognized as autonomous by the government of Syria[15] and is a participant in the Syrian Civil War.[16] On 16 March 2016, the de facto administration of Rojava declared the establishment of a federal system of government as the Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava (Kurdish: Federasyona Bakurê Sûriyê – Rojava‎).[17][18][19]

Nationalist Kurds generally consider Rojava to be one of the four parts of a greater Kurdistan, which also includes parts of eastern and southeastern Turkey (Northern Kurdistan), northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan), and northwestern Iran (Eastern Kurdistan).[20] However, Rojavan government and society is polyethnic.[21]

Name

Rojava (rojava, "west"), is the short name of the Kurdish name West Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojavayê Kurdistanê‎)[22][23] It is also known as Syrian Kurdistan and Kurdistan under the line/border (Kurdistana Binxetê; simply Binxet (IPA: [bɪnxɛt]), "Underline"; bin "under" + xet "line").[24]

Geography

Areas under control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (yellow)

Rojava lies to the west of the River Tigris along the Turkish border. There are three cantons: Jazira Canton, Kobani Canton and separately Afrin Canton. Jazira Canton also borders Iraqi Kurdistan to the southeast. Other borders are disputed in the Syrian Civil War. All cantons are at latitude approximately 36 and a half degrees north. They are relatively flat except for the Kurd Mountains in Afrin Canton.

History

One of the oldest historic sites in thie area is Tell Halaf. It is an archaeological site in the Al Hasakah governorate of northeastern Syria, near the Turkish border, just opposite Ceylanpınar. It was the first find of a Neolithic culture, subsequently dubbed the Halaf culture, characterized by glazed pottery painted with geometric and animal designs. The site dates to the 6th millennium BCE and it is the location of the Aramean city-state of Guzana or Gozan in the 10th century BCE.

The Kurd Mountains were already Kurdish-inhabited when the Crusades broke out at the end of the 11th century.[25] According to René Dussaud, the region of Kurd-Dagh and the plain near Antioch were settled by Kurds since antiquity.[26][27]

Ottoman Empire

See also: Ottoman Syria
Kurdish-inhabited areas in 1992 according to the CIA

During the Ottoman period (1299–1922), large Kurmanji-speaking Kurdish tribal groups both settled in and were deported to areas of northern Syria from Anatolia. The largest of these tribal groups was the Reshwan confederation, which was initially based in the Adiyaman region but eventually also settled throughout Anatolia. The Milli confederation, which was documented in Ottoman sources from the year 1518 onward, was the most powerful tribal group and dominated the entire northern Syrian steppe in the second half of the 18th century. Their influence continued to rise and eventually their leader Timur was appointed Ottoman governor of Raqqa (1800-1803).[28][29] The Kurdish dynasty of Janbulads ruled the region of Aleppo as governors for the Ottomans from 1591 to 1607 and were allied with the Medici of Tuscany.[30] At the beginning of the 17th century, districts of Jarabulus and Seruj on the left bank of the Euphrates had been settled by Kurds.[31]

The Danish writer Carsten Niebuhr who traveled to Jazira in 1764 recorded five nomadic Kurdish tribes (Dukurie, Kikie, Schechchanie, Mullie and Aschetie) and one Arab tribe. According to Niebuhr, those tribes were settled near Mardin in Turkey, and paid the governor of that city for the right of grazing their herds in the Syrian Jazira.[25][32] These Kurdish tribes gradually settled in villages and cities and are still present in Jazira (modern Syria's Hasakah Governorate).[33]

The Ottoman province of Diyarbekir, which included parts of modern-day northern Syria, was called Eyalet-i Kurdistan during the Tanzimat reforms period (1839-1867).[34] Until the 19th century, Kurdistan did not include the lands of Syrian Jazira in some books.[note 1][35] The Treaty of Sèvres' putative Kurdistan did not include any part of today's Syria.[36]

According to McDowall, Kurds slightly outnumbered Arabs in Jazira in 1918.[37] The demographics of Northern Syria saw a huge shift in the early part of the 20th century when the Ottoman Empire (Turks) conducted ethnic cleansing of its Christian populations and some Kurdish tribes joined in the atrocities committed against the Arameans.[38][39][40] Many Assyrians fled to Syria during the genocide and settled mainly in the Jazira area.[41][41][42][43]

The Arameans of Nusaybin crossed the border into Syria and settled in Qamishli, which was separated by the railway (new border) from Turkey. Nusaybin became Kurdish and Qamishli became an Aramaic city.[44]

French Mandate

Things soon changed, however, with the immigration of Kurds beginning in 1926 following the failure of the Sheikh Said rebellion against the Turkish authorities.[45] While many of the Kurds in Syria have been there for centuries, waves of Kurds fled their homes in Turkey and settled in Syria, where they were granted citizenship by the French mandate authorities.[46] This large influx of Kurds moved to Syria’s Jazira province. It is estimated that 25,000 Kurds fled at this time to Syria.[47]

In the late 1930s a small but vigorous separatist movement emerged in Qamishli. With some support from French Mandate officials, the movement actively lobbied for autonomy direct under French rule and separation from Syria on the ground that majority of the inhabitants were not Arabs. Syrian nationalists saw the movement as a profound threat to their eventual rule. The Syrian nationalists allied with local Arab Shammal tribal leader and Kurdish tribes. They together attacked the Christian movement in many towns and villages. Local Kurdish tribes who were allies of Shammal tribal sacked and burned Assyrian town of Amuda.[48][49][50] In 1941, the Aramaic community of al-Malikiyah was subjected to a vicious assault. Even though the assault failed, Arameans felt threatened and left in large numbers, and the immigration of Kurds from Turkey to the area converted al-Malikiya, al-Darbasiyah and Amuda to Kurdish-majority cities.

According to the French report to the League of Nations in 1937, the population of Jazira consisted of 82,000 Kurdish villagers, 42,000 Muslim Arab pastoralists, and 32,000 Christian town dwellers.[51]

Autonomy movement of 1930s

Between 1932 and 1939, a Kurdish-Christian autonomy movement emerged in Jazira. The demands of the movement were autonomous status similar to the Sanjak of Alexandretta, the protection of French troops, promotion of Kurdish language in schools and hiring of Kurdish officials. The movement was led by Michel Dome, mayor of Qamishli, Hanna Hebe, general vicar for the Syriac-Catholic Patriarch of Jazira, and the Kurdish notable Hajo Agha. Some Arab tribes supported the autonomists while others sided with the central government. In the legislative elections of 1936, autonomist candidates won all the parliamentary seats in Jazira and Jarablus, while the nationalist Arab movement known as the National Bloc won the elections in the rest of Syria. After victory, the National Bloc pursued an aggressive policy toward the autonomists. The Jazira governor appointed by Damascus intended to disarm the population and encourage the settlement of Arab farmers from Aleppo, Homs and Hama in Jazira.[52] In July 1937, armed conflict broke out between the Syrian police and the supporters of the movement. As a result, the governor and a significant portion of the police force fled the region and the rebels established local autonomous administration in Jazira. [53] In August 1937 a number of Christians in Amuda were killed by a pro-Damascus Kurdish chief.[54] In September 1938, Hajo Agha chaired a general conference in Jazira and appealed to France for self-government.[55] The new French High Commissioner, Gabriel Puaux, dissolved parliament and created autonomous administrations for Jabal Druze, Latakia and Jazira in 1939 which lasted until 1943.[56]

Pre-autonomy government from Damascus

Rojava under Syrian rule had little investment or development from the central government. Laws discriminated against Kurds from owning property, and many were without citizenship. Property was routinely confiscated by government loansharks. There were no high schools, and Kurdish language education in middle schools was forbidden, compromising Kurdish students' education. Hospitals lacked equipment for advanced treatment and instead patients had to be transferred outside Rojava.[57]

Arabization policy of Syrian governments

According to Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, successive Syrian governments continued to adopt a policy of ethnic discrimination and national persecution against Kurds, completely depriving them of their national, democratic and human rights. Syrian governments imposed ethnically-based programs, regulations and exclusionary measures on various aspects of Kurds’ lives – political, economic, social and cultural – among which are the following:[58][59]

Federal Rojava (2016-Present)

On 10 February, Rojava's first representation office outside of Kurdistan (and second in total) opened in Moscow, in order to develop a "comprehensive partnership with Moscow".[63] This will grow support for autonomy, Kurdish-International diplomatic relations and possibly independence in the near future.[64]

On 17 March 2016, at a conference in Rmeilan, Syrian Turkmen, Arab, Christian and Kurdish officials declared the establishment the Federation of Northern Syria in the areas they controlled in Northern Syria which would encompass ethnic minority groups. The conference was led in large part by the Kurdish PYD Party.[65] Though officials reaffirmed they would not support dividing Syria, the declaration was quickly renounced by both the Syrian Government and oppositional Syrian National Coalition.[18]

Rojava conflict

Military situation in the Syrian Civil War as of May 1, 2016.
  Controlled by Syrian Government forces
  Controlled by Kurdish forces (Rojava)
  Controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
  Controlled by al-Nusra Front
  Controlled by Syrian opposition forces

(For a more detailed map, see Cities and towns during the Syrian Civil War)

During the Syrian Civil War, Syrian government forces withdrew from three Kurdish enclaves, leaving control to local militias in 2012. Because of the war, People's Protection Units (YPG) were created by the Kurdish Supreme Committee to defend the Kurdish-inhabited areas in Syria. In July 2012 the YPG established control in the towns of Kobanî, Amuda and Afrin.[66] The two main Kurdish groups, the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), afterwards formed a joint leadership council to administer the towns.[66] Later that month the cities of Al-Malikiyah (Dêrika Hemko), Ra's al-'Ayn (Serê Kaniyê), Al-Darbasiyah (Dirbêsî), and Al-Maabadah (Girkê Legê) also came under the control of the People's Protection Units.

The only major Kurdish-majority cities that remained under government control were Al-Hasaka and Qamishli,[67][68] although parts of both soon also came under the control of the YPG.

In July 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) began to forcibly displace Kurdish civilians from towns in Ar-Raqqah governorate. After demanding that all Kurds leave Tell Abyad or else be killed, thousands of civilians, including Turkmen and Arab families, fled on 21 July. Its fighters looted and destroyed the property of Kurds, and in some cases, resettled displaced Arab Sunni families from the Qalamoun area (Rif Damascus), Dayr Az-Zawr and Ar-Raqqah, in abandoned Kurdish homes. A similar pattern was documented in Tel Arab and Tal Hassel in July 2013. As ISIL consolidated its authority in Ar-Raqqah, Kurdish civilians were forcibly displaced from Tel Akhader, and Kobanî in March and September 2014, respectively.[69]

Map of the territory changes during the YPG-led Northern Syria offensive (2015)

In 2014, Kobanî was besieged by ISIL and later liberated by YPG forces and the Free Syrian Army cooperating as Euphrates Volcano, with air support from United States-led airstrikes.

In January 2015, the YPG fought against Syrian regime forces in Hassakeh,[70] and clashed with those stationed in Qamishli in June 2015.[71] After the latter clashes, Nasir Haj Mansour, a Kurdish official in the northeast stated "The regime will with time get weaker ... I do not imagine the regime will be able to strengthen its position".[72]

On 13 October 2015, Amnesty International accused YPG of demolishing homes of village residents and forcing them out of areas under Kurdish control.[73] According to Amnesty International, some displaced people said that the YPG has targeted their villages on the pretext of supporting ISIL; some villagers revealed the existence of a small minority that might have sympathized with the group.[73][74] The YPG also threatened the villagers with US coalition airstrikes if they failed to leave. The village of Husseiniya was completely razed to the ground leaving 14 out of 225 houses standing.[73]

Democratic confederalism

The Kurdish Supreme Committee (Desteya Bilind a Kurd, DBK) was established by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) as the governing body of Rojava in July 2012.[75] The member board consists of an equal number of PYD and KNC members.[76] In November 2013, the PYD announced an interim government divided into three non-contiguous autonomous areas or cantons, Afrin, Jazira and Kobani.[77]

The political system of Rojava is inspired by democratic confederalism and communalism. It is influenced by anarchist and libertarian principles, and is considered by many a type of libertarian socialism.[78] The basic unit at the local level is the community which pools resources for education, protection and governance. At a national level communities are unrestricted in deciding their own economic decisions on who they wish to sell to and how resources are allocated. There is a broad push for social reform, gender equality and ecological stabilization in the region.[79]

Political writer David Romano describes it as pursuing "a bottom-up, Athenian-style direct form of democratic governance". He contrasts the local communities taking on responsibility vs the strong central governments favoured by many states. In this model, states become less relevant and people govern through councils.[80] Rojava divides itself into regional administrations called cantons named after the Swiss cantons.[81]

Neighborhood assembly system

The governance model of Rojava has an emphasis on local management, with regions divided into cantons with democratically elected committees to make decisions. The Movement for a Democratic Society (also known as TEV-DEM) is the political coalition governing Rojava.

Its programme immediately aimed to be "very inclusive" and people from a range of different backgrounds became involved, including Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, and Turkmen & Yazidis (from Muslim, Christian, and Yazidi religious groups). It sought to "establish a variety of groups, committees and communes on the streets in neighborhoods, villages, counties and small and big towns everywhere". The purpose of these groups was to meet "every week to talk about the problems people face where they live". The representatives of the different community groups meet 'in the main group in the villages or towns called the "House of the People"'.

According to Zaher Baher of the Haringey Solidarity Group, the TEV-DEM has been "the most successful organ" in Rojava because it has the "determination and power" to change things, it includes many people who "believe in working voluntarily at all levels of service to make the event/experiment successful", and it has "set up an army of defence consisting of three different parts" - the YPG (a "mixed force of men and women that exists in the towns and all the checkpoints outside the towns to protect civilians from any external threat"), the YPJ ("a special unit for women only, to deal with issues of rape and domestic violence"[82] along with national defense), and the Asayish which is a democratically elected police force.

Centralised political representation

Alongside TEV-DEM there is the Kurdish Supreme Committee, the interim governing body of Rojava which consists of an equal number of Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish National Council (KNC) members, and a smaller number of Syriac Union Party (Syria) members.[76] This council is mainly concerned with external affairs.

There are no plans for independence from Syria, but for self-administration and control of local resources.[83]

Elections for a new government were planned to be held before the end of 2014,[84] but this was postponed due to fighting. Local elections were eventually held in March 2015.

There are 20 ministries dealing with the economy, agriculture, natural resources, and foreign affairs.[84] Among other stipulations outlined is a quota of 40% for women’s participation in government, as well as another quota for youth. In connection with a decision to introduce affirmative action for ethnic minorities, all governmental organizations and offices are based on a co-presidential system.[85]

Economy

The autonomous administration is supporting efforts for workers to form cooperatives, such as this sewing cooperative in Derik.

In 2012, the PYD launched what it originally called the Social Economy Plan, later renamed the People’s Economy Plan (PEP). The PEP's policies are based primarily on the work of Abdullah Öcalan and ultimately seek to move beyond capitalism in favor of democratic confederalism.[86]

Private property and entrepreneurship are protected under the principle of "ownership by use", although accountable to the democratic will of locally organized councils. Dr Dara Kurdaxi, a Rojavan economist, has said that: "The method in Rojava is not so much against private property, but rather has the goal of putting private property in the service of all the peoples who live in Rojava."[87] [note 2]

The private sector is comparatively small, with the focus being on expanding social ownership of production and management of resources through communes and collectives. Several hundred instances of collectivization have occurred across towns and villages in all three cantons, with each commune consisting of approximately 20-35 people.[88] According to the Ministry of Economics, approximately three quarters of all property has been placed under community ownership and a third of production has been transferred to direct management by workers councils.[89]

There are also no taxes on the people or businesses in Rojava. Instead money is raised through border crossings, and selling oil or other natural resources.[90][91] Trade as well as access to both humanitarian and military aid is difficult as Rojava remains under a strict embargo enforced by Turkey.[92]

Price controls are managed by democratic committees per canton, which can set the price of basic goods such as for food and medical goods. This mechanism can also be used for managing public production to, for instance, produce more wheat to keep prices low for important goods.[91]

The government is seeking outside investment to build a power plant and a fertilizer factory.[93]

Resources

Oil and food production exceeds demand[84] so exports include oil and agricultural products such as sheep, grain and cotton. Imports include consumer goods and auto parts.[94] The border crossing of Yaroubiyah is intermittently closed by the Kurdistan Regional Government side. Turkey does not allow Syrian Kurd businesspeople or their goods to cross its border [95] although Rojava would like the border to be opened.[96]

Before the war, Al-Hasakah governorate was producing about 40,000 barrels of crude oil a day. However, during the war the oil refinery has been only working at 5% capacity due to lack of refining chemicals. Some people work at primitive oil refining, which causes more pollution.[97]

In 2014, the Syrian government was still paying some state employees,[98] but fewer than before.[99] The Rojavan government says that "none of our projects are financed by the regime".[96]

Military and police

Female fighters of the YPJ play a significant combat role in Rojava.

The DBK's armed wing is the People's Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG). Military service was declared compulsory in July 2014 [100] due to the ongoing war against Daesh.

The People's Protection Units was founded by the PYD party after the 2004 Qamishli clashes, but it was not active until the Syrian Civil War.[101] As of the signing of the Arbil Agreement by the PYD and Kurdish National Council (KNC), the YPG came under the nominal command of the Kurdish Supreme Committee, although in reality it is almost exclusively still the armed wing of the PYD.[102] The Sootoro is a Christian militia defending Aramaic areas. Another Aramaic militia is the Sutoro, the armed wing of Syriac Union Party. The police function in Rojava-controlled areas is performed by the Asayish armed formation.

The YPG is a trained force utilizing snipers and mobile weaponry to launch hit-and-run attacks and maneuver quickly.

Relying on speed, stealth, and surprise, it is the archetypal guerrilla army, able to deploy quickly to front lines and concentrate its forces before quickly redirecting the axis of its attack to outflank and ambush its enemy. The key to its success is autonomy. Although operating under an overarching tactical rubric, YPG brigades are inculcated with a high degree of freedom and can adapt to the changing battlefield.[103]

The existing police force is trained in non-violent conflict resolution as well as feminist theory before being allowed access to a weapon. Directors of the Asayiş police academy have said that the long-term goal is to give all citizens six weeks of police training before ultimately eliminating the police.[104]

Criminal justice

A new criminal justice system has been implemented that emphasizes restoration over retribution. Prisons are operated by TEV-DEM, housing mostly those charged with terrorist activity related to ISIL and other extremist groups.

Demographics

Further information: Kurds in Syria and Demographics of Syria

The demographics of this area saw a huge shift in the early part of the 20th century due to the Assyrian and Armenian Genocides. Tens of thousands of Assyrians and Armenians fled to Syria from Turkey.

Rojava’s population has nearly doubled to about 4.6 million. The newcomers are Sunni and Shia Syrian Arabs who have fled from violence taking place in southern parts of Syria. There are also Syrian Christians members of the Assyrian Church of the East, Chaldean Catholic Church, Syriac Catholic Church, Syriac Orthodox Church, and others, driven out by Islamist forces.[11]

Ethnicity

Religion

Most people in Rojava are Muslim but some are Christian. There are also other minorities, such as Zoroastrians and Yazidism, and many Kurdish people in Rojava support laicism.[107]

Languages spoken

Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac-Aramaic and Turkish (Syrian Turkmen dialect) are spoken.

Population centres

This list includes all cities, towns and villages controlled by Rojava with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The population figures are given according to the 2004 Syrian census.[108] Cities in gray are only partially under the control of Rojava, and partially under the control of the Syrian government. Cities in boldface are the capital of their respective cantons.

English Name Kurdish Name Arabic Name Syriac Name Population Canton
Al-Hasakah Hesîçe الحسكة ܚܣܟܗ 188,160 Jazira Canton
Al-Qamishli Qamişlo القامشلي ܩܡܫܠܐ 184,231 Jazira Canton
Kobanî Kobanî عين العرب 44,821 Kobanî Canton
Afrin Efrîn عفرين 36,562 Afrin Canton
Ras al-Ayn Serêkaniyê رأس العين ܪܝܫ ܥܝܢܐ 29,347 Jazira Canton
Amuda Amûdê عامودا 26,821 Jazira Canton
Al-Malikiyah Dêrika Hemko المالكية ܕܪܝܟ 26,311 Jazira Canton
Tell Rifaat Arpêt تل رفعت 20,514 Afrin Canton
Al-Qahtaniyah Tirbespî القحطانية ܩܒܪ̈ܐ ܚܘܪ̈ܐ 16,946 Jazira Canton
Al-Shaddadah Şeddadê الشدادي 15,806 Jazira Canton
Al-Muabbada Girkê Legê المعبدة 15,759 Jazira Canton
Tell Abyad Girê Spî تل أبيض 14,825 Kobanî Canton
Al-Sabaa wa Arbain السبعة وأربعين 14,177 Jazira Canton
Jandairis Cindarêsê جنديرس 13,661 Afrin Canton
Al-Manajir Menacîr المناجير 12,156 Jazira Canton

Foreign relations

Turkey has been strictly against Rojava and claims the YPG is the same as the PKK, which is considered a terrorist organisation by the EU, NATO, US, Canada, Australia and Turkey but not by the United Nations, Russia, China and Switzerland. The European Union, US and NATO doesn't consider the YPG as a terrorist organization and they work closely together to fight against ISIL.[109] Also, Rojava and YPG leaders insist that the PKK is a separate organization.[110] In 2014 Turkey was accused of supporting ISIL attacks on the YPG, allowing them to conduct attacks from the Turkish border and providing logistical support.[111]

There is military cooperation with Iraqi Kurdistan and the USA.[112]

In January 2015, a UK parliament committee asked the government to explain and justify its policy of not working with the Rojava military to combat ISIL.[113] France is also supportive of Rojava.[114]

In February 2016 the Rojava administration opened their first foreign consulate in Moscow, Russia. Amid growing alliances between the Kurds and Russia.[115] In April 2016, a consulate in Stockholm, Sweden, was next.[116] Further consulates in London, Berlin, Washington, Paris as well as in several Arab countries, are planned.[116][117][118] Rojava's YPG self-defence militia since April 2016 has an official representation in Prague, Czech Republic.[119]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Modern Curdistan is of much greater extent than the ancient Assyria, and is composed of two parts, the Upper and Lower. In the former is the province of Ardelaw, the ancient Arropachatis, now nominally a part of Irak Ajami, and belonging to the north-west division called Al Jobal. It contains five others, namely, Betlis, the ancient Carduchia, lying to the south and south-west of the lake Van. East and south-east of Betlis is the principality of Julamerick—south-west of it, is the principality of Amadia—the fourth is Jeezera ul Omar, a city on an island in the Tigris, and corresponding to the ancient city of Bezabde—the fifth and largest is Kara Djiolan, with a capital of the same name. The pashalics of Kirkook and Solimania also comprise part of Upper Curdistan. Lower Curdistan comprises all the level tract to the east of the Tigris, and the minor ranges immediately bounding the plains, and reaching thence to the foot of the great range, which may justly be denominated the Alps of western Asia.
    A Dictionary of Scripture Geography (1846), John Miles.[35]
  2. ↑ This and other aspects of the Rojava revolution have led some anti-capitalists to criticise the revolution for not going far enough e.g. 'Anarchist Federation statement on the Rojava revolution'; Gilles Dauve, 'Rojava: reality and rhetoric'; Alex de Jong, 'Stalinist caterpillar into libertarian butterfly? - the evolving ideology of the PKK'; Anti War, '‘I have seen the future and it works.’ – Critical questions for supporters of the Rojava revolution', 'The grim reality of the Rojava Revolution - from an anarchist eyewitness' and Devrim Valerian, 'The bloodbath in Syria: class war or ethnic war?'. Other anti-capitalists have been significantly less critical e.g. David Graeber, 'No. This is a Genuine Revolution'; Janet Biehl, 'Poor in means but rich in spirit', 'From Germany to Bakur' and the Kurdistan Anarchist Forum

References

  1. ↑ http://basnews.com/en/News/Details/Syrian-Defense-Minister-in-Qamishli--We-won-t-let-anyone-take-Hasakah/21882
  2. ↑ "ISIS suicide attacks target Syrian Kurdish capital - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East". Al-Monitor. Retrieved 18 February 2015.
  3. ↑ "West Kurdistan divided into three cantons". ANF. 6 January 2014. Retrieved 6 January 2014.
  4. ↑ Jongerden, Joost. "Rethinking Politics and Democracy in the Middle East" (PDF). Retrieved 8 September 2013.
  5. ↑ Ocalan, Abdullah (2011). Democratic Confederalism (PDF). ISBN 978-0-9567514-2-3. Retrieved 8 September 2013.
  6. ↑ Ocalan, Abdullah (2 April 2005). "The declaration of Democratic Confederalism". KurdishMedia.com. Retrieved 8 September 2013.
  7. ↑ "Bookchin devrimci mücadelemizde yaşayacaktır". Savaş Karşıtları (in Turkish). 26 August 2006. Retrieved 8 September 2013.
  8. ↑ Wood, Graeme (26 October 2007). "Among the Kurds". The Atlantic. Retrieved 8 September 2013.
  9. 1 2 "Syrian Kurds declare new federation in bid for recognition". Middle East Eye. 17 March 2016.
  10. ↑ In der Maur, Renée; Staal, Jonas (2015). "Introduction". Stateless Democracy (PDF). Utrecht: BAK. p. 19. ISBN 978-90-77288-22-1.
  11. 1 2 Estimate as of mid November 2014, including numerous refugees. "Rojava’s population has nearly doubled to about 4.6 million. The newcomers are Sunni and Shia Syrian Arabs who have fled from violence taking place in southern parts of Syria. There are also Syrian Christians members of the Assyrian Church of the East, Chaldean Catholic Church, Syriac Catholic Church, Syriac Orthodox Church, and others, driven out by Islamist forces. "In Iraq and Syria, it's too little, too late". Ottawa Citizen. 14 November 2014.
  12. ↑ "A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard". New York Times. 24 November 2015.
  13. ↑ "The Constitution of the Rojava Cantons". Retrieved 14 May 2015.
  14. ↑ Syria: Kurds announce creation of new Tal Abyad 'canton'
  15. ↑ "Fight For Kobane May Have Created A New Alliance In Syria: Kurds And The Assad Regime". International Business Times. 8 October 2014. Retrieved 18 February 2015.
  16. ↑ "Kurds regain 15km of Kobane countryside, killing dozens of IS militants". Retrieved 7 August 2015.
  17. ↑ "Federation of Northern Syria and Rojava". Yeniozgurpolitika (in Kurdish). 14 March 2016.
  18. 1 2 "Syria civil war: Kurds declare federal region in north". Aljazeera. 17 March 2016.
  19. ↑ Bradley, Matt; Albayrak, Ayla; Ballout, Dana. "Kurds Declare ‘Federal Region’ in Syria, Says Official". Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660. Retrieved 2016-03-18.
  20. ↑ Kurdish Awakening: Nation Building in a Fragmented Homeland, (2014), by Ofra Bengio, University of Texas Press
  21. ↑ "A Small Key Can Open A Large Door". Combustion Books. Retrieved 23 May 2015.
  22. ↑ "Barzanî xêra rojavayê Kurdistanê dixwaze". Avesta Kurd (in Kurdish). 15 July 2012. Retrieved 13 May 2015.
  23. ↑ "Yekîneya Antî Teror a Rojavayê Kurdistanê hate avakirin". Ajansa Nûçeyan a Hawar (in Kurdish). 7 April 2015. Retrieved 13 May 2015.
  24. ↑ "Binxet". Kurdica (in German). 1 December 2008. Retrieved 28 February 2016.
  25. 1 2 Kreyenbroek, P.G.; Sperl, S. (1992). The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview. Routledge. p. 114. ISBN 0415072654.
  26. ↑ Dussaud, René (1927). Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et médiévale. Geuthner. p. 425.
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