Territorial disputes in the South China Sea
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve both island and maritime claims among several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
There are disputes concerning both the Spratly and the Paracel islands, as well as maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin and elsewhere. There is a further dispute in the waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands.[1] The interests of different nations include acquiring fishing areas around the two archipelagos; the potential exploitation of suspected crude oil and natural gas under the waters of various parts of the South China Sea; and the strategic control of important shipping lanes.
The Shangri-La Dialogue serves as the "Track One" exchange forum on security issues surrounding the Asia-Pacific region, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea.[2] The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific is the "Track Two" forum for dialogue on security issues.[3][4]
In February 2016, President Obama initiated the U.S.-ASEAN Summit at Sunnylands for closer engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea were a major topic, but its joint statement, the "Sunnylands Declaration", did not name the South China Sea, instead calling for "respect of each nation's sovereignty and for international law". Analysts believe it indicates divisions within the group on how to respond to China's maritime strategy.[5][6]
On March 17, 2016, in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 94 s. 2016, President Aquino created the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea, to secure the State's sovereignty and national territory and preserve marine wealth in its waters and exclusive economic zone, reserving use and enjoyment of the West Philippine Sea exclusively for Filipino citizens.[7]
Specific disputes
Area of dispute | Brunei |
Cambodia |
China |
Indonesia |
Malaysia |
Philippines |
Singapore |
Taiwan |
Vietnam |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The nine-dash line area | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ||
Vietnamese coast | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ||
Sea area north of Borneo | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | |||
South China Sea islands | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | |||
Sea area north of the Natuna Islands | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | |||
Sea area west of Palawan and Luzon | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | |||
Sabah area | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ||||||
Luzon Strait | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ||||||
Pedra Branca area | ✔ | ✔ |
The disputes involve both maritime boundaries and islands.[8] There are several disputes, each of which involved a different collection of countries:
- The nine-dash line area claimed by the Republic of China, later People's Republic of China which covers most of the South China sea and overlaps Exclusive Economic Zone claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Singapore has reiterated that it is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute and therefore allows Singapore to play a neutral role in being a constructive conduit for dialogue among the claimant states.[9]
- Maritime boundary along the Vietnamese coast between Brunei, Cambodia, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
- Maritime boundary north of Borneo between Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
- Islands in the South China Sea, including the Paracels Islands, the Pratas Islands, Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands between Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
- Maritime boundary in the waters north of the Natuna Islands between Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam.[10]
- Maritime boundary off the coast of Palawan and Luzon between Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
- Maritime boundary, land territory, and the islands of Sabah, including Ambalat, between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
- Maritime boundary and islands in the Luzon Strait between the China, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
- Maritime boundary and islands in the Pedra Branca (and Middle Rocks) between Singapore and Malaysia.
Background
The area may be rich in oil and natural gas deposits; however, the estimates are highly varied. The Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining of the People's Republic of China estimate that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion tons of crude oil (compared to Kuwait with 13 billion tons). In the years following the announcement by the ministry, the claims regarding the South China Sea islands intensified.[11] However, other sources claim that the proven reserve of oil in the South China Sea may only be 7.5 billion barrels, or about 1.1 billion tons.[12] According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s profile of the South China Sea region, a US Geological Survey estimate puts the region's discovered and undiscovered oil reserves at 11 billion barrels, as opposed to a Chinese figure of 125 billion barrels.[13] The same EIA report also points to the wide variety of natural gas resource estimations, ranging from 190 trillion cubic feet to 500 trillion cubic feet, likely located in the contested Reed Bank".[13]
The South China Sea is dubbed by China as the "second Persian Sea."[14] The state-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to spend 200 billion RMB (US$30 billion) in the next 20 years to exploit oil in the region, with the estimated production of 25 million metric tons of crude oil and natural gas per annum, at a depth of 2000 meters within the next five years.[15]
The Philippines began exploring the areas west of Palawan for oil in 1970. Exploration in the area began in Reed Bank/Tablemount.[16] in 1976, gas was discovered following the drilling of a well.[17] However, China's complaints halted the exploration.
On 27 March 1984, the first Philippine oil company discovered an oil field off Palawan, which is an island province bordering the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea.[18] These oil fields supply 15% of annual oil consumption in the Philippines.
The nine-dotted line was originally an "eleven-dotted-line," first indicated by the then Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947, for its claims to the South China Sea. After, the Communist Party of China took over mainland China and formed the People's Republic of China in 1949. The line was adopted and revised to nine as endorsed by Zhou Enlai.[19]
The legacy of the nine-dotted line is viewed by some Chinese government officials, and by the Chinese military, as providing historical support for their claims to the South China Sea.[20]
In the 1970s, however, the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries began referring to the Spratly Islands as included in their own territory. On 11 June 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines issued Presidential decree No. 1596, declaring the Spratly Islands (referred to therein as the Kalayaan Island Group) as Philippine territory.[21]
The abundant fishing opportunities within the region are another motivation for the claim. In 1988, the South China Sea is believed to have accounted for 8% of world fishing catches, a figure that has grown since then. There have been many clashes in the Philippines with foreign fishing vessels (including China) in disputed areas. China believes that the value in fishing and oil from the sea has risen to a trillion dollars.
The area is also one of the busiest shipping routes in the world. In the 1980s, at least 270 merchant ships used the route each day. Currently, more than half the tonnage of oil transported by sea passes through it, a figure rising steadily with the growth of Chinese consumption of oil. This traffic is three times greater than that passing through the Suez Canal and five times more than the Panama Canal.
As of 1996, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and other countries asserted claims within the Chinese nine-dotted line[22] The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into effect on 16 November 1994, resulted in more intense territorial disputes between the parties.
As of 2012, all of the Paracel Islands are under Chinese control.
Eight of the Spratly Islands are under Chinese control; Vietnamese troops control the greatest number of Spratly islands, 29. Eight islands are controlled by the Philippines, five by Malaysia, two by Brunei and one by Taiwan. In 2012 the Indian Ambassador to Vietnam, while expressing concern over rising tension in the area, said that 50 per cent of its trade passes through the area and called for peaceful resolution of the disputes in accordance with international law.[23]
Incidents
Foreign ships which illegally fished in Indonesian waters were destroyed by the Indonesian government.[24][25][26][27] The Vietnamese government objected to the destruction of its own ships.[28]
Indonesian waters were also violated by Filipino fishermen.[29]
On 19 March 2016, China coast guards prevented Indonesian authorities from detaining a Chinese fishing boat near the Natunas, although China accepts that the Natuna islands and seas around them belong to Indonesia. The crew were detained by Indonesia earlier, but their fishing boat was rammed free by a Chinese guards vessel while been towed. Indonesia summoned the Chinese ambassador in protest and China in turn demanded the release of the crew as they were in "traditional Chinese fishing grounds".[30][31] However, Indonesia refused to release the crew and accused China of sharply raising tensions in the region.[32]
2011 agreement
On 20 July 2011, the PRC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed to a set of preliminary guidelines which would help resolve the dispute.[33] The agreement was described by the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Zhenmin, as "an important milestone document for cooperation among China and ASEAN countries".[33] Some of the early drafts acknowledged aspects such as "marine environmental protection, scientific research, safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue and combating transnational crime," although the issue of oil and natural gas drilling remains unresolved.
Chinese objection to Indian naval presence and oil exploration
On 22 July 2011, the INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault vessel on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China Sea by a party identifying itself as the Chinese Navy and stating that the ship was entering Chinese waters.[34][35] A spokesperson for the Indian Navy explained that as no ship or aircraft was visible, the INS Airavat proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all."[34]
In September 2011, shortly after China and Vietnam signed an agreement seeking to contain a dispute over the South China Sea, India's state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) said that its overseas investment arm, ONGC Videsh Limited, had signed a three-year agreement with PetroVietnam for developing long-term co-operation in the oil sector, and that it had accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea[36] In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, without referring to India by name, stated as follows:
"China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the island. China's stand is based on historical facts and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed in the course of history and this position has been held by Chinese Government for long. On the basis of this China is ready to engage in peaceful negotiations and friendly consultations to peacefully solve the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights so as to positively contribute to peace and tranquillity in the South China Sea area. We hope that the relevant countries respect China's position and refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue. We hope they will respect and support countries in the region to solve the bilateral disputes through bilateral channels. As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute."[37][38]
An Indian foreign ministry spokesman responded, "The Chinese had concerns, but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and [we] have conveyed this to the Chinese."[37] The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times.[36][38]
Retrenchment
In Spring 2010, Chinese officials reportedly communicated to US officials that the South China Sea is "an area of 'core interest' that is as non-negotiable" and on par with Taiwan and Tibet on the national agenda.[39] but may have backed away from that assertion in 2011.[40][41][42]
In October 2011, China's Global Times newspaper, published by the Communist Party, People's Daily, editorialised on South China Sea territorial disputes under the banner "Don't take peaceful approach for granted". The article referenced recent incidents involving Philippines and South Korea detaining Chinese fishing boats in the region:[43]
- "If these countries don't want to change their ways with China, they will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved." Global Times (China), 25 October 2011 Responding to questions about whether this reflected official policy, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated the country's commitment "to resolving the maritime dispute through peaceful means."[44]
Alan Dupont of the University of New South Wales has said that the Chinese government appears to be directing its fishing fleet into disputed waters as a matter of policy.[45]
Oil development
Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement early in 1978 on the development of oil in the South China Sea. As of 2012, Vietnam had concluded some 60 oil and gas exploration and production contracts with various foreign companies.[46] In 1986, the "White Tiger" oil field in the South China Sea came into operation, producing over 2,000 tons of crude oil per year, followed by the "The Bear" and "Dragon" oil fields.[47] As of 2011, Vietnam was the sixth-largest oil producer in the Asia-Pacific region although the country is now a net oil importer; in 2009 while petroleum accounted for 14 percent of government income, this was down from 24 percent in 2004.[48]
China's first independently designed and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China Sea is the Ocean Oil 981 (海洋石油981). The major shareholders are J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (19%), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (14%), T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and affiliates (6%), and BlackRock, Inc. (5%).[49] It began operation on 9 May 2012 in the South China Sea, 320 kilometres (200 mi) southeast of Hong Kong, at a depth of 1,500 m and employing 160 people.[50] On 2 May 2014, the platform was moved near to the Paracel islands,[51] a move Vietnam stated violated their territorial claims[52] while Chinese officials said was legal[53] as it falls within surrounding waters of the Paracel Islands which China militarily controls.
Non-claimant views
United States
The United States and China are currently in disagreement over the South China Sea.[54] This disagreement is exacerbated by the fact that the US is not a member of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Nevertheless, the US has stood by its manoeuvres, claiming that "peaceful surveillance activities and other military activities without permission in a country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),"[55] is allowed under the convention. Additionally, a South China Sea free to access is in the US's economic and geopolitical interests.[56] In relation to the dispute, Secretary Clinton voiced her support for fair access by reiterating that freedom of navigation and respect of international law is a matter of national interest to the United States.[57] Her comments were countered by China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as "in effect an attack on China," who warned the United States against making the South China Sea an international issue or multilateral issue.[58]
Clinton testified in support of congressional approval of the Law of the Sea Convention, which would strengthen US ability to support countries that oppose Chinese claims to certain islands in the area.[59] On 29 May 2012, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed concern over this development, stating that "non-claimant Association of South East Asian Nations countries and countries outside the region have adopted a position of not getting involved into territorial disputes."[60] In July 2012, the United States Senate passed resolution 524, initially sponsored by Senator John Kerry, stating (among other things) the United States' strong support for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, reaffirms the United States' commitment to assist the nations of Southeast Asia to remain strong and independent, and supports enhanced operations by the United States armed forces in the Western Pacific.[61]
In 2014, the United States responded to China's claims over the fishing grounds of other nations by saying that "China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law for these extensive maritime claims."[62] USN CNO Jonathan Greenert then pledged American support to the Philippines in its territorial conflicts with the PRC.[63] The Chinese Foreign Ministry asked the United States to maintain a neutral position on the issue.[64] In 2014 and 2015, the United States continued freedom of navigation operations, including in the South China Sea.[65] Sources closer to Pentagon have also said that the US administration is planning to deploy some naval assets within the 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands. In response to this announcement, Beijing issued a strict warning and said that she would not allow any country to violate China's territorial waters in the name of "Freedom of Navigation".[66] On 27 October 2015, a US destroyer USS Lassen navigated within 12 nautical miles reclaimed land in the Subi Reef as the first in a series of "Freedom of Navigation Operation".[67] This is the first time since 2012 that the US has directly challenged China's claims of the island's territorial limit.[68] On 8–9 November 2015, two US B-52 strategic bombers flew near artificial Chinese-built islands in the area of the Spratly Islands and were contacted by Chinese ground controllers but continued their mission undeterred.[69]
The United States itself has not signed UNCLOS, but has accepted all but Part XI as customary international law.[70]
Ethnic minorities
Cham people issue
Former Cham states were originated in South China Sea and were annexed by Vietnam in 1832;[71] The Vietnamese government fears that using the evidence of Champa's historical connection to the disputed islands in South China Sea would expose the human rights violations and killings of ethnic minorities in Vietnam such as in the 2001 and 2004 uprisings, and lead to the issue of Cham autonomy being brought to attention.[72]
Moro Conflict
The Moro Conflict[73] is an ongoing insurgency in Mindanao. In 1969, political tensions and open hostilities developed between the Government of the Philippines and Moro Muslim rebel groups.[74] Nur Misuari, a political science lecturer, established the Moro National Liberation Front in 1972,[75][76][77] which fought against the Philippines government in a conflict that lasted over four decades.[78] The Peace process with the Bangsamoro in the Philippines lead to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, a peace deal that was signed with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a splinter group from the MNLF.[78][79] The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has declared its support for China against the Philippines government in the South China Sea dispute.[80]
Independent analysis
The position of China on its maritime claims based on UNCLOS and history has been ambiguous, particularly with the nine dash line map.[81][82] For example, in its notes verbales in 2011, the first phrase stated that China has undisputed sovereignty over the islands and the adjacent waters, suggesting China is claiming sovereignty over its territorial waters, a position consistent with UNCLOS.[81] However, the second phrase in its notes verbales stated that China enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters along with the seabed and subsoil contained in this region, suggesting that China is claiming sovereignty over all of the maritime space (includes all the geographic features and the waters within the nine dash line).[81] The third phrase indicates support for basing their claims on historical basis as well.[81] Recently in its notes verbales in 2011, China has explicitly stated that it claims the territorial waters and all of the islands in which each island has its own exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.[82] A major problem with this claim is that it fails to distinguish between geographic features considered as "islands" or "rocks" under UNCLOS.[82] The vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China's claims based on historical claims is invalid.[83] Many ambiguities arise from the notion of historical claims as a basis for claiming sovereignty and is inherently ambiguous.[82][83][84]
Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji criticized Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for trying to falsely portray China as a threat to Japan and that it was invading its neighbors like the Philippines. He pointed out that the Spratly islands were not part of the Philippines when the US acquired the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris in 1898, and the Japanese-ruled Taiwan itself had annexed the Spratly islands in 1938, a move that was never challenged by the US-ruled Philippines, which never asserted that it was their territory. He also pointed out that other countries did not need to do full land reclamation since they already controlled islands and that the reason China engaged in extensive land reclamation is because they needed it to build airfields since China only has control over reefs.[85]
See also
- East China Sea EEZ disputes
- First island chain
- Great wall of sand
- Scarborough Shoal standoff
- Spratly Islands dispute
References
Footnotes
- ↑ Keck, Zachary (20 March 2014). "China’s Newest Maritime Dispute". The Diplomat. Retrieved 12 February 2015.
Vaswani, Karishma (19 October 2014). "The sleepy island Indonesia is guarding from China". Retrieved 19 October 2014.
R.C. Marshall, Andrew (25 August 2014). "Remote, gas-rich islands on Indonesia's South China Sea frontline". Reuters. Retrieved 12 February 2015. - ↑ "Keynote Address: Lee Hsien Loong". Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- ↑ "Regional Security Outlook 2014" (PDF). CSCAP. Retrieved 26 November 2015.
- ↑ "Regional Security Outlook" (PDF). CSCAP. Retrieved 26 November 2015.
- ↑ Obama Unveils New ASEAN Economic Initiative at Sunnylands Summit | The Diplomat, February 18, 2016
- ↑ US seeking stronger trade ties with Asean | Inquirer Global Nation, February 17th, 2016
- ↑
- ↑ "An interactive look at claims on the South China Sea". The Straits Times. Retrieved 2016-02-29.
- ↑ "Singapore suggests interim solution to South China Sea dispute". Channel News Asia. Retrieved 2016-03-01.
- ↑ John Pike. "Natuna Islands". Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- ↑ "CHINA’S MULTILATERALISM AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: QUEST FOR HEGEMONIC STABILITY?" (PDF). Retrieved 4 October 2014.
- ↑ John Pike. "South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas". Retrieved 4 October 2014.
- 1 2 "South China Sea – International – Analysis – U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)".
- ↑ "南海经济国防意义皆重要 誉称"第二个波斯湾"". Tencent News. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- ↑ Oil bonanza in South China Sea
- ↑ C. Michael Hogan (2011) South China Sea Topic ed. P. Saundry. Ed.-in-chief C.J.Cleveland. Encyclopedia of Earth. National Council for Science and the Environment. Washington DC
- ↑ "CMOL – Camago-Malampaya Oil Leg Project". Archived from the original on 19 March 2008. Retrieved 15 March 2008.
- ↑ Map of the Philippines showing the location of Palawan
- ↑ "Uncertainty And Insecurity Generated By Claimants In South China Sea – OpEd". Eurasia Review. 22 August 2012.
- ↑ Hille, Kathrin, "Chinese boats fish in dangerous waters", Financial Times, 24 April 2012.
- ↑ "Presidential Decree no. 1596 – Declaring Certain Area Part of the Philippine Territory and Providing for their Government and Administration". Chan Robles Law Library. 11 June 1978. Retrieved 5 February 2014.
- ↑ Daniel J. Dzurek (1996). The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who's on First?. IBRU. pp. 44–47. ISBN 978-1-897643-23-5.
- ↑ "India for peaceful resolution of South China sea dispute". The Hindu (Chennai, India). 6 July 2012.
- ↑ http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/30/indonesia-sinks-106-foreign-boats.html
- ↑ http://www.thestar.com.my/news/regional/2016/02/22/indonesia-sinks-27-foreign-boats-to-stop-illegal-fishing/
- ↑ http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1103/c98649-8970791.html
- ↑ http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/indonesia-could-sink-57-more-vessels-in-war-on-illegal-fishing/
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- ↑ http://dzrhnews.com/dfa-confirms-arrest-200-filipino-fishermen/
- ↑ China’s Coast Guard Rams Fishing Boat to Free It From Indonesian Authorities - The New York Times
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- 1 2 Martina, Michael (20 July 2011). "RPT-China, ASEAN set 'guidelines' on sea row, but no deal expected". Reuters, 20 July 2011. Retrieved 20 July 2011.
- 1 2 "China face-off in South China Sea" DNA India report
- ↑ South Asia Analysis Group whitepaper, 2 September 2011
- 1 2 "China paper warns India off Vietnam oil deal" Reuters article, 16 October 2011
- 1 2 South Asia Analysis Group whitepaper, 17 September 2011
- 1 2 "China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects" in The Hindu, 15 September 2011
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- ↑ Edward Wong (30 March 2011). "China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea Is a ‘Core Interest’ Worth War". New York Times. Retrieved 1 September 2012.
- ↑ Bonnie S. Glaser (April 2012). "Armed Clash in the South China Sea". East Asia. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 1 September 2012.
For example, China may explicitly refer to the South China Sea as a core interest; in 2010 Beijing hinted this was the case but subsequently backed away from the assertion.
- ↑ Phil Stewart; John Ruwitch (12 October 2010). "U.S. sees crisis fears easing over South China Sea". Reuters (Hanoi). Retrieved 1 September 2012.
- ↑ "Don't take peaceful approach for granted". Global Times (China). 25 October 2011. Retrieved 25 October 2011.
- ↑ Wadhams, Nicholas (25 October 2011). "China May Resort to Force in Sea Disputes, Global Times Says". Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved 25 October 2011.
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu told reporters today in Beijing that China "adheres to the strategy of peaceful development. … Sowing discord and hostility will only complicate" the issue, Jiang said.
- ↑ Pasick, Adam (29 July 2014). "How China’s Enormous Fishing Fleet Is Being Used As a Surrogate Navy". www.defenseone.com (Quartz). Retrieved 29 July 2014.
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- ↑ 11 May 2012, 南海钻井平台上工人直升机上下班, NetEase News (Chinese)
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- ↑ Zhu, Ningzhu (7 May 2014). "China urges against Vietnamese interference in territorial water exploration". Xinhuanet. Retrieved 16 May 2014.
- ↑ Jing Huang; Andrew Billo (10 December 2014). Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Navigating Rough Waters. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 192–196. ISBN 978-1-137-46368-5.
Robert G. Sutter (8 August 2013). U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 170–172. ISBN 978-1-4422-1807-9.
McDevitt, Michael (25 November 2014). "The South China Sea: Navigating the Most Dangerous Place in the World". War on the Rocks. Retrieved 14 March 2015.
Diola, Camille (5 November 2014). "US won't 'agree to disagree' with China on sea row". Philippine Star. Retrieved 14 March 2015. - ↑ Lawrence, Susan V.; Thomas Lum (11 March 2011). U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues. CRS Report for Congress R41108. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. p. 26. Retrieved 25 October 2013.
- ↑ Bouchat, Clarence J. (June 2014). "The Parcel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. United States Army. Retrieved 13 March 2015.
Yujuico, Emmanuel. "The real story behind the South China Sea dispute" (PDF). London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved 13 March 2015. - ↑ Landler, Mark (23 July 2010). "Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands". New York Times. Retrieved 15 March 2015.
- ↑ David Martin Jones; Michael Lawrence Rowan Smith; Nicholas Khoo (1 January 2013). Asian Security and the Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility. Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 57. ISBN 978-1-78100-462-3.
Denny Roy (20 August 2013). Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security. Columbia University Press. p. 219. ISBN 978-0-231-52815-3. - ↑ Hachigian, Nina (12 June 2012). "China's Rise Is A Big Reason to Ratify the Law of the Sea Convention". Issues. Center for American Progress. Retrieved 13 March 2015.
"Written Testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary U.S. Department of State" (PDF). Center for Oceans Law and Policy. University of Virginia. 23 May 2012. Retrieved 13 March 2015. - ↑ "China, U.S. square off on South China Sea". UPI. 29 May 2012. Retrieved 30 May 2012.
- ↑ John Kerry (23 July 2012). "S.Res. 524: A resolution reaffirming the strong support of the United States for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties ...". govtrack.us. Civic Impulse, LLC. Retrieved 3 September 2012.
- ↑ Williams, Carol J. (10 January 2014). "China asserts control over vast sea area, angering neighbors, U.S.". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 12 January 2014.
- ↑ Mogato, Manuel (13 February 2014). "U.S. admiral assures Philippines of help in disputed sea". Reuters. Retrieved 13 February 2014.
- ↑ "Beijing slams US Navy official for 'aiding Philippines' remarks". Want China Times. 16 February 2014. Retrieved 15 February 2014.
- ↑ "Dragon Breathes Fire Over S. China Sea, Worries US". Free Press Journal (Mumbai, India). 28 February 2015. Retrieved 27 March 2015.
"US freedom of navigation operations challenge China's maritime security". Want China Times (Taiwan). 28 March 2015. Retrieved 27 March 2015.
Alexander, David (25 March 2015). "U.S. military challenged maritime claims of 19 countries in 2014". United States: Reuters. Retrieved 27 March 2015. - ↑ "Beijing Slams Washington's Plans for 'Incursion' Into South China Sea". sputniknews.com. Retrieved 2015-10-10.
- ↑ "After Months of Waiting, US Finally Begins Freedom of Navigation Patrols Near China's Man-Made Islands". The Diplomat. October 27, 2015.
- ↑ Blanchard, Ben; Shalal, Andrea (28 October 2015). "Angry China shadows U.S. warship near man-made islands". Reuters. Retrieved 26 November 2015.
- ↑ "US B-52 bombers flew near disputed islands in South China Sea, says Pentagon". The Gurdian. November 12, 2015.
- ↑ See United States and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea#History
- ↑ Ian Glover (2004). Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History. Psychology Press. p. 209. ISBN 978-0-415-29777-6.
Bill Hayton (11 September 2014). The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia. Yale University Press. pp. 14–16. ISBN 978-0-300-18954-4.
Robert D. Kaplan (25 March 2014). Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. Random House Publishing Group. pp. 12–16. ISBN 978-0-8129-9433-9.
Anthony Reid (1 August 2000). Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia. Silkworm Books. pp. 34–38. ISBN 978-1-63041-481-8. - ↑ Bray, Adam (16 June 2014). "The Cham: Descendants of Ancient Rulers of South China Sea Watch Maritime Dispute From Sidelines". National Geographic News (National Geographic). Archived from the original on 2014. Retrieved 3 September 2014.
- ↑ "Amazon.com: Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies (Policy Studies) (9781932728149): Eric Gutierrez, Saturnino Jr. Borras: Books".
- ↑ "The CenSEI Report (Vol. 2, No. 13, April 2-8, 2012)". Retrieved 26 January 2015.
- ↑ Daniel Cassman (August 14, 2015). "Moro National Liberation Front". Mapping Militant Organizations - Stanford university.
- ↑ "The Moro National Liberation Front". Religious Literacy Project. Harvard Divinity School.
- ↑ "Moro National Liberation Front". Resources on Faith, Ethics & Public Life. Georgetown University Berkley Center.
- 1 2 "Philippines, Muslim rebels sign final peace deal to end conflict". tribunedigital-chicagotribune.
- ↑ "Philippine peace breakthrough". Bangkok Post. 25 January 2014.
- ↑ "The Long Struggle for Moro Autonomy in the Philippines". Foreign Policy In Focus.
- 1 2 3 4 Beckman, Robert (2013). "The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea". The American Journal of International Law (American Society of International Law) 107 (1): 142–163. Retrieved 24 February 2016.
- 1 2 3 4 Dupuy, Florian; Dupuy, Pierre-Marie (2013). "A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea". The American Journal of International Law (American Society of International Law) 107 (1): 124–141. Retrieved 24 February 2016.
- 1 2 Malik, Mohan. "Historical Fiction: China's South China Sea Claims". World Affairs. Retrieved 24 February 2016.
- ↑ Feith, David. "What Lies in the South China Sea". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 24 February 2016.
- ↑ Taoka, Shunji (September 21, 2015). Translated by Rumi Sakamoto. "‘China Threat Theory’ Drives Japanese War Legislation". The Asia-Pacific Journal (Japan Focus) 13 (38-5). Retrieved 26 September 2015.
Bibliography
- Bateman, Sam; Emmers, Ralf, eds. (2008). Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a co-operative management regime (illustrated ed.). Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0-203-88524-4. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
- Kivimäki, Timo, ed. (2002). War Or Peace in the South China Sea?. Contributor Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (illustrated ed.). NIAS Press. ISBN 8791114012. ISSN 0904-597X. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
- Morley, James W.; Nishihara, Masashi, eds. (1997). Vietnam Joins the World. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-3306-X. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
- Nordquist, Myron H.; Moore, John Norton (1998). Security Flashpoints: Oil, Islands, Sea Access and Military Confrontation ; [twenty-first Annual Seminar Held at the UN Plaza Hotel in New York City from February 7 – 8, 1997]. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 90-411-1056-9.
- Pak, Hŭi-gwŏn (2000). The Law of the Sea and Northeast Asia: A Challenge for Cooperation. Publications on Ocean Development 35. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 9041114076. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
- Severino, Rodolfo (2011). Where in the World is the Philippines?: Debating Its National Territory (illustrated ed.). Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. ISBN 9814311715. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
- Wortzel, Larry M.; Higham, Robin D. S. (1999). Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military History (illustrated ed.). ABC-CLIO. ISBN 0-313-29337-6. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
Further reading
- Bautista, Lowell B. (December 2011). "PHILIPPINE TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES: INTERNAL TENSIONS, COLONIAL BAGGAGE, AMBIVALENT CONFORMITY" (PDF). JATI – Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 16: 35–53.
- Bonnet, Francois-Xavier, "Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal", Irasec's Discussion Paper, No 14, November 2012,www.irasec.com,Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal
- Raine, Sarah; Le Miere, Christian (2013). Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes. Routledge for IISS.
- Rowan, Joshua P. (2005). "The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute" (PDF). Asian Survey 45 (3): 414–436. doi:10.1525/as.2005.45.3.414.
- Clive Schofield et al., From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia (July 2011)
- Rising Tensions in the South China Sea, June 2011 Q&A with Ian J. Storey
- Tupaz, Edsel (27 April 2012). "Sidebar Brief: The Law of the Seas and the Scarborough Shoal Dispute". JURIST.
- Weissmann, Mikael (2010). "The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A study in conflict prevention and peace building" (PDF). Asian Perspectives 34 (3): 35–69.
External links
- Website of the Chinese National Institute for South China Sea Studies
- Website of the Vietnamese Program for South China Sea Studies Chương trình nghiên cứu Biển Đông (Vietnamese)
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